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INTRODUCTION
To many academic observers of the American corporation,
the frequent accounts of staggering corporate debt loads or
mass layoffs and plant closings are positive signs that augur
optimal minimization of the agency costs of capital. These
agency costs (the principal's costs of monitoring and attempt-
ing to control the agents)' have preoccupied the literature ever
1. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J.
FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
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since the publication of Berle and Means' classic, The Modern
Corporation and Private Property.2 The public corporation, we
were told, made possible vast accumulations of capital, but the
widely-dispersed owners of the enterprise had no effective
means of monitoring and controlling their ostensible agents,
the professional managers.
The "agency cost" analysis still reigns supreme in the aca-
demic literature. In this view, the central task for corporate
law and policy is to reduce the divergence of interests between
shareholders and managers, thus improving returns to equity
and, by extension, social welfare. Not surprisingly, then, the
spread of the hostile takeover during the 1980s was heralded
as a providential vehicle for reducing equity's agency costs
What appeared to the uninitiated as imprudently high levels of
debt incurred by successful raiders and "self-raiding" defending
targets, were to the cognoscenti in the business schools and
law schools valuable efficiency enhancing financing tech-
niques5 for aligning the interests of shareholders and manag-
ers.
We are now reaping the crops sown in the 1980s, and are
better able to see that these techniques for reducing agency
2. ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
3. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis
and Evidence, in CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING & EXECUTIVE COMPENSA-
TION 3, 8-9 (John M. Stern et al. eds., 1989); Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Respond.
ing to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1161, 1169-73 (1981). See also
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Comment, The Case for Facilitating Competing Ten-
der Offers, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1028, 1046-50 (1981) (critiquing Easterbrook
& Fischel's analysis).
The takeover phenomenon also had its critics. See, e.g., LOUIS
LOWENSTEIN, WHAT'S WRONG WITH WALL STREET: SHORT-TERM GAIN AND
THE ABSENTEE SHAREHOLDER 119-59 (1988); William W. Bratton, Jr.,
Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of Restructuring,
1989 DUKE L.J. 92; Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of
Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6-33 (1987).
4. A few voices in the wilderness lamented the surge in corporate
indebtedness. See, e.g., Lindley H. Clark, Jr. & Alfred L. Malabre, Jr.,
Borrowing Binge: Takeover Trend Helps Push Corporate Debt and De.
faults Upward, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 1988, at 1; Felix G. Rohatyn, Junk
Bonds and Other Securities Swill, WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 1985, at 30;
John S.R. Shad, The Leveraging of America, WALL ST. J., June 8, 1984,
at 28.
5. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of The Public Corporation,
HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 61 [hereinafter Jensen, Eclipse].
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costs carry a price tag of their own that must figure into the
social welfare calculus. Recent empirical studies suggest that
there is a disturbing linkage between massive corporate lever-
aging and the further decrease in the nation's already low
levels of corporate investment in productive assets and re-
search and development (R&D).' For both actual and potential
targets, takeover-related corporate restructurings may have
hobbled corporate performance and, in the process, American
productivity and competitiveness in the global marketplace.
The academic defenders of the takeover decade remain unde-
terred. They point to gains to target shareholders,' and sug-
gest that the painful dislocations that occurred were necessary
to trim "fat" from bloated American firms and reduce the re-
tention by American managers of "free cash flow" better de-
ployed elsewhere." With the emergence of anti-takeover legis-
lation' and the drying up of credit generally, however, the
search is on for new forces to replace the "discipline" of the
takeover market. The current round of articles urge the em-
powerment of institutional shareholders to fill the monitoring
vacuum.10
6. See, e.g., National Science Foundation, An Assessment of the Im-
pact of Recent Leveraged Buyouts and Other Restructurings on Industrial
Research and Development Expenditures, in Tax Policy Aspects of Mergers
and Acquisitions: Hearings Before The House Comm. on Ways & Means,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 686 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 NSF Study]; cf.
BRONWYN H. HALL, CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING AND INVESTMENT HORI-
ZONS, prepared for Harv. Bus. Sch.-Council on Competitiveness Conf. on
Corp. Time Horizons and Investment (1991) (focusing on effects of highly
leveraged corporate restructurings, rather than takeovers per se) [herein-
after HALL, INVESTMENT HORIZONS]. For discussion of the effects of lever-
aging, see infra notes 131-50 and accompanying text.
7. For reports that takeovers generate substantial gains to target
shareholders, see, e.g., Gregg A. Jarrell, et al., The Market for Corporate
Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. ECON. PERSP., Winter
1988, at 49, 51-53; Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market
for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 4, 10-14
(1983); Steven N. Kaplan, Sources of Value in Management Buyouts, in
LEVERAGED MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 95, 98-
100 (Yakov Amihud ed., 1989). Data concerning the impact on acquiring
firms are "more ambiguous." See Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers:
Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 119, 123 (1992).
8. See, e.g., Jensen, Eclipse, supra note 5, at 61-62.
9. See infra notes 31-46 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise
of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992) [hereinafter
[Vol.45:513516
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The agency costs prescription for the American corporation
is one-sided and incomplete. It ignores other costs-affecting
innovation and competitiveness-that can harm an American
society dependent upon private firms to make long-term invest-
ments in productive assets. Society loses when the managers of
corporate firms, distracted by threats to their security and
power, defensively restructure, thereby incurring debt and
bypassing investments that would spur productivity and gar-
ner market share in an increasingly global economy."
It is time to reexamine the "managerialism" decried by Berle
and Means and their modern-day counterparts. 2 The preoccu-
pation with agency costs has essentially blinded corporate
scholars to these long-term costs to innovation and productivi-
ty. Indeed, within proper limits, there is a case to be made for
a view of the firm that accords substantial independence to
management to act in the long-term best interests of the firm,
even if this long view clashes with the short-term interests of
equity holders.
This article is divided into three parts. Part I briefly reviews
the traditional anti-managerialist conception of the corporation
and the recent legislative shift toward managerialism in reac-
tion to the perceived excesses of the takeover decade. Part II
marshals theory and evidence to suggest that a system that
rewards managers who focus exclusively on the short-term
interests of shareholders disserves the long-term interests of
the corporation. Where markets imperfectly value investments
in certain long-term assets (including research and develop-
ment), managers will act myopically to boost share price by
any available means" in response to shareholders' "liquidity
Agents Watching Agents]; Alfred F. Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Inves-
tor Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 117, 176-77 (1988); George W.
Dent, Jr., Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public Cor-
poration, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 881, 907; Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier
Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional
Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991) [hereinafter Gilson & Kraakman,
Outside Director]; see also Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reex-
amined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 566-75 (1990) (discussing the potential for
institutional shareholders to monitor management) [hereinafter Black,
Shareholder Passivity].
11. Thus, during the takeover decade of the 1980s, levels of corporate
investment in long-term productive assets and spending for research and
development declined in comparison to our main competitors, Germany
and Japan. See infra notes 151-63 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 17-21 and accompanying text, and sources cited
therein.
13. See infra notes 76-150 and accompanying text for a discussion of
1993] 517
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perspective. " 1 The agency costs theorists have been missing
the point. It is precisely when managers are exclusively preoc-
cupied with the short-term liquidity perspective of sharehold-
ers that managers will take actions that undermine the firm's
ability to make essential long-term investments in plant, ma-
chinery and new product development, and to elicit the cooper-
ation of the firm's employees in promoting long-term economic
objectives.
For these reasons, the recent developments in the law that
reveal a shift toward managerialism may facilitate advances in
corporate productivity, but they, too, offer an incomplete, one-
sided solution. This shift toward managerialism deprives
courts and shareholders of the most accessible, easily mea-
sured criterion for monitoring management performance-the
maximization of short-term shareholder value. It threatens,
therefore, to exacerbate the persistent problem of managers
beholden to no one but themselves. An alternative framework
for structuring management incentives for long-term corporate
performance is needed. Accordingly, Part III offers a set of
preliminary proposals to ensure that management indeed acts
in the long-term interests of the firm.
I. ANTI-MANAGERIALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE
Our legal system presents contrasting visions of the corpora-
tion reflecting a conflict that goes to the heart of corporate
governance: Is the corporation an entity distinct from its equity
holders, and is it to that entity (as opposed to those sharehold-
ers themselves) that managers owe duties of care and loyalty?
Or, despite the corporate form, is it simply an aggregation of
persons (principally its owners, i.e., shareholders) to whom
managers owe their exclusive fiduciary duties? If, as this arti-
cle suggests, the well-being of the corporate entity is not neces-
sarily congruent with the short-term wealth maximization of
its shareholders, the choice between these competing models of
the firm- will be anything but academic for courts evaluating
managerial and shareholder "myopia," i.e., decisionmaking distorted to
neglect long-term interests in favor of the short-term.
14. Investors in the securities of public corporations elect to invest in
property characterized in large part by its liquidity. They therefore typi-
cally lack a long-term commitment to the underlying enterprise. See infra




managerial decisions and policy makers formulating the law of
corporations.
A. Theory of the Firm: From Managerialism to "Nexus of
Contracts"
Managerialist theory begins with the post-Berle and Means
understanding of the modern corporation as involving a sepa-
ration of the entrepreneurial functions into ownership/risk-
bearing and control, with control lodged in the corporate man-
ager rather than in the equity holders."' The manager domi-
nates in the managerialist model, 6 a powerful figure, sur-
rounded by widely-dispersed, essentially passive shareholders.
In the broadest sense, the anti-managerialists raise doubts
about the legitimacy of powerful corporate management. Fol-
lowing in Berle and Means' footsteps, corporate theorists have
struggled to construct an "economic" theory to explain the
prevalence of managerialism. The theory ultimately expounded
was "the hypothesis of managerial utility maximization," 7
replete with images of fundamentally self-interested managers,
constrained only by the discipline of the capital and product
markets. "
15. For Berle and Means, with the separation of control from owner-
ship, the modern public corporation relegated its putative owners to a
condition of powerlessness-widely dispersed and incapable of unified
action, at the mercy of. self-aggrandizing managers who could not easily
be removed from office. Berle and Means, supra note 2, at 333-51. In
their view, the classical economic model (that rational utility-maximizing
individuals pursuing their own self-interest in competitive markets, will,
if left alone, achieve efficient results and thereby serve the public good)
could not usefully be applied to the public corporation. Id.
16. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND
GROWTH (1959); ROBIN MARRIS, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF "MANAGERIAL"
CAPITALISM (1964); Felix R. FitzRoy & Dennis C. Mueller, Cooperation
and Conflict in Contractual Organizations, Q. REV. ECON. & Bus., Winter
1984 at 24, 24; Harvey Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiency vs. "X-Efficien.
cy," 56 AMER. ECON. REV. 392, 397-98 (1966); Robin Marris & Dennis C.
Mueller, The Corporation, Competition, and the Invisible Hand, 18 J.
ECON. LIT. 32, 40-44 (1980).
17. MASAHIKO AOKI, THE CO-OPERATIVE GAME THEORY OF THE FIRM
35 (1984). See generally MARRIS, supra note 16; OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON,
THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRETIONARY BEHAVIOR: MANAGERIAL OBJECTIVES
IN A THEORY OF THE FIRM (1964).
18. Denied perfect information in a world of "bounded rationality,"
managers adopt an essentially trial-and-error strategy for problem solv-
ing, which leads not to optimal solutions but rather. to satisfactory ones.
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the
1993] 519
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Managers, it is argued, will pursue corporate growth to
maximize their own utility (i.e., compensation, security, psy-
chic income), even to the exclusion of shareholder wealth maxi-
mization." This obsession with growth is blamed for the ulti-
mately disappointing corporate conglomeration explosion of the
1960s and 1970s, which was later to be undone by takeovers
and restructuring.0 Under this view, managers do not pay
sufficient attention to maximizing shareholder value, and the
central task of corporate law reform is to induce managers to
promote shareholder interests.2
In the last decade, theorists have also advanced a "nexus of
contracts" reformulation of the neoclassical model 2 of the
Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 29 (1986) [hereinafter Coffee, Share-
holders Versus Managers]. Under this theory, managers will not seek to
"profit-maximize," but rather to "profit-satisfice"-i.e., to be profitable
enough to prevent shareholders from disinvesting or intervening. See, e.g.,
HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN: SOCIAL AND RATIONAL 204-05
(1957).
19. For explanations of managers' preference for growth over share-
holder welfare, see Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers, supra note 18,
at 29 (different risk tolerances of managers and shareholders); Jensen,
Eclipse, supra note 5, at 66 (the enhanced prestige and social and politi-
cal power that result from corporate growth "creates a cultural bias to-
ward growth"); Oliver E. Williamson, Managerial Discretion and Business
Behavior, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 1032, 1034 (1963) (personal utility derived
from growth, increased staff).
20. See generally David J. Ravenscraft & F.M. Scherer, The Long-Run
Performance of Mergers and Takeovers, in PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD CORPO-
RATE TAKEOVERS 34 (Murray L. Weidenbaum & Kenneth W. Chilton eds.,
1988); infra note 106 (conglomerate mergers and price earnings ratios).
21. These theories, which largely predate the "takeover decade" of the
1980s, understate the constraints placed on managers by today's markets
for capital and corporate control. Indeed, Part II of this article will sug-
gest there is reason to suspect that the market may be considerably less
efficient (at least in valuing "soft" information about long-term invest-
ment) than is generally believed, and that managers may be overly con-
cerned about short-sighted shareholders whose investment horizons do not
extend beyond current share price on the resale market. See infra notes
72-116.
22. The neoclassical model of the firm begins with a tradition that
views the firm as a "black-box," combining factors of production (inter
alia, capital and labor) with firm-specific resources under the control of
its owner-managers to produce output for the market, thereby maximizing
profits. See Oliver Hart, An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the
Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1758 (1989) ("Neoclassical theory views
the firm as a set of feasible production plans."). The residual (revenue
from sales less payments to the various factors of production), if any, is
520
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firm," writing that corporations "are simply legal fictions
which serve as.a nexus for a set of contracting relationships
among individuals."2' The firm consists entirely of a set of
related contracts among factors of production and attendant
transaction costs. Shareholders are viewed not as "owners" of
the corporation, but as suppliers of financial "input" who "con-
tract" for, inter alia, a variable return (the residual).5
In this model, the firm has no existence or interests beyond
those of the individual contracting parties. It would be impossi-
ble, then, for managers to represent "the corporation." Thus,
the statutes and common law rules requiring them to act in
the "best interests of the corporation" are incapable of mean-
ingful application.26 Because firm ownership is rendered
to be paid to the owner-manager, i.e., the equity holder, who is also
considered the sole bearer of residual risk. See generally Armen A.
Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Eugene F. Fama, Agency
Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980) [here-
inafter Fama, Agency Problems]; Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen,
Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983);
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1.
23. There is considerable literature on the "nexus of contracts" model.
See, e.g., Steven N.S. Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26
J.L. & EcON. 1 (1983); Fama & Jensen, supra note 22; Daniel R. Fischel,
Labor Markets and Labor Law Compared with Capital Markets and Cor-
porate Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1061 (1984); Jensen & Meckling, supra
note 1; OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (University of
Toronto Working Paper No. WSVI-16, 1984). For an overview of the liter-
ature, see Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation,.
GEo. MASON U.L. REV., Summer 1989, at 99. Not all assessments have
been positive. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts"
Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407 (1989); Victor
Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Con-
tract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985); Melvin A. Eisenberg, New Modes
of Discourse in Corporate Law Literature, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 582
(1984).
24. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 310 (emphasis omitted).
25. Shareholders are "more optimistic," Alchian & Demsetz, supra note
22, at 789 n.14, about the firm's prospects than other investors, but do
not otherwise differ from them. Shareholders contract for greater poten-
tial return at greater risk, believing the firm will prosper. Bondholders
are more pessimistic, choosing less risk in return for a more certain
payoff.
26. "[T]he nature and significance of [the] transformation [of corporate
theory] remain obscure because, in some sense, the revolution has simply
replaced one legal metaphor, the trust, with another legal metaphor, the
nexus of contracts." Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Nexus of Contracts Ap-
proach to Corporations: A Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel, 89
19931
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meaningless within the "nexus of contracts" corporation,27 any
concern about the separation of ownership from control is with-
out content. Indeed, this theory dispenses once and for all with
the anti-managerialist critique of corporate governance: since
the firm is not a hierarchical authority-based enterprise, there
is no management "power" at all--only those functions delegat-
ed to managers through sets of negotiated arm's-length trans-
actions.
In the "nexus of contracts" firm, equity has no automatic
claim to a particular role in corporate governance. Although
efficiency concerns are said to dictate that the equity holders
be the monitors,' other efficiency-oriented views are possible
that place the anti-managerialist critique in a very different
light.
29
Admittedly, the "nexus of contracts" model has been criti-
cized as based on unrealistic assumptions that are of limited
utility to shareholders, managers and other participants who
inevitably experience asymmetries of power and information.'0
Despite its problems, however, the nexus of contracts theory
invites a reexamination of the traditional principles of corpora-
COLUM. L. REV. 1449, 1449 (1989).
27. See Fama, Agency Problems, supra note 22, at 290 ("ownership of
the firm is an irrelevant concept"); Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 22, at
789, n.14.
28. Some commentators suggest that this governance structure flows
directly from the need to minimize agency costs within the corporation.
By giving the monitor the claim to the residual (as corporate form tradi-
tionally does), we give her the maximum incentive to monitor well. This
incentive is assured, however, only when the monitor is motivated by her
claim to the residual. See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 22, at 782.
29. Consider, for example, Professor Aoki's vision of management as
performing a critical coordinative role in the "co-operative game" between
shareholders and employees. Aoki, supra note 17, at 61. A co-operative
game is one in which "the players can conclude a binding agreement as
to what outcome will be chosen to exploit the possibility of common in-
terests." Id. This process involves communication and coordinated action,
id., rather than confrontation and rigidity. The manager's function under
such a model is to act as the coordinator of equity and labor inputs, a
more richly textured role than that of the self-interested utility maximiz-
er of the managerialist critique.
30. See, e.g.,.Brudney, supra note 23, at 1405; Robert C. Clark, Agen-
cy Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE
STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55, 61-62 (John W. Pratt & Richard J.
Zeckhauser eds., 1985); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990
DUKE L.J. 201, 231 n.122.
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tion law by loosening the concept of ownership from its com-
mon law roots, and thereby facilitating a fundamental re-eval-
uation of the role of outside equity in the public corporation.
B. Reaction to "Hostile" Takeovers
1. Anti-Takeover Legislation
As a matter of positive law, managers are obliged to act in
the "best interests of the corporation.""1 At least until recent-
ly, this standard was for all intents and purposes synonymous
with the "best interests of the shareholders." 2 Managers are
said to pursue the best interests of the corporation when they
maximize profit," which in turn increases'share value (hence,
shareholder wealth). Under this view, there is little justifica-
tion for management interference with transactions that would
bring shareholders the best possible price for their shares.'
The classic example of such interference involves management
tactics that preclude willing shareholders from accepting hos-
tile tender offers at substantial premiums above market
price.' However, notwithstanding shareholders' desire to sell,
managers are increasingly being permitted to resist such bid-
ders "in the best interests of the corporation."" And, despite
31. See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT 3d § 8.30(a)(3) (1992).
32. See, e.g., A.B.A. Sec. Corp., Banking and Bus. L., Corporate
Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1591, 1601 (1978). The Delaware
courts have repeatedly described management's responsibilities as duties
toward the shareholders and the corporation simultaneously. See, e.g.,
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del.
1939), affd, 19 A.2d 721 (Del. 1941).
33. See THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, § 2.01, Tentative Draft
No. 11 (April 25, 1991) [hereinafter ALI PROJECT]; ROBERT CLARK, COR-
PORATE LAW 17-19 (1986). But see Henry T.C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fidu-
ciary Principles in Corporate Investment, 38 UCLA L. REV. 277, 305-06
(1990) (suggesting that focus on accounting measures, although it benefits
corporation's financial profile, prompts managers to make overly risk-
averse investment decisions that do not maximize gains in shareholder
welfare).
34. Managers have a somewhat broader range of discretion with re-
spect to asset sales than in responding to tender offers. See, e.g.,
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 3.
35. The question whether the market could be mispricing target
shares is central to the debate over management defensive tactics. See
infra notes 76-116 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 47-63 and accompanying text.
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considerable disquiet in academic circles, 7 this essentially
managerialist view continues to gain legal and popular sup-
port.
38
The newest variety of anti-takeover statutes, enacted in
response to the takeovers of the 1980s-the so-called "stake-
holder" statutes3 -depart (often explicitly') from the tradi-
tional premise of shareholder primacy by authorizing the con-
sideration of nonshareholder as well as shareholder inter-
ests."' In addition to permitting directors to consider specified
37. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing
Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028 (1982); Easterbrook & Fischel,
supra note 3; Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets and Courts, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 1931 (1991).
38. See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d
1140 (Del. 1989); Fred S. McChesney and William J. Carney, The Theft
of Time, Inc.?, Regulation, Spring 1991 at 78; infra notes 47-71 and
accompanying text.
39. About 33 states have enacted some form of anti-takeover statute.
These statutes have generated a vast literature (supporting and critical)
in a short period of time. See, e.g., Symposium, Corporate Mal-
aise--Stakeholder Statutes: Cause or Cure?, 21 STETSON L. REV. 1 (1991);
Paul N. Cox, The Indiana Experiment in Corporate Law: A Critique, 24
VAL. U. L. REV. 185 (1990); David A. Millon, Redefining Corporate Law,
24 IND. L. REV. 223, 240-46 (1991); Lyman Johnson & David Millon,
Missing the Point About State Takeover Statutes, 87 MICH. L. REV. 846
(1989); Roberta C. Karmel, The Duty of Directors to Non-Shareholder
Constituencies in Control Transactions-A Comparison of U.S. and U.K
Law, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 61 (1990); Alexander C. Gavis, Comment,
A Framework for Satisfying Corporate Directors' Responsibilities Under
State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes: The Use of Explicit Con-
tracts, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1451 (1990).
40. See, eg., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 515(b) (Purdon Supp. 1992)
("[Tihe board . . . shall not be required . . . to regard . . . the inter-
ests of any particular group [including shareholders] affected by such
action as a dominant or controlling interest or factor."). For a list and
comparative analysis of current stakeholder statutes, see Steven M.H.
Wallman, The Proper Interpretation of Corporate Constituency Statutes
and Formulation of Director Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 163, App. at
194-96 (1991).
41. The Ohio statute makes consideration of shareholder constituencies
mandatory. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (Baldwin Supp. 1989)
("director[s] . . . shall consider the interests of the . . . shareholders
and . . . may consider [other constituencies]"). Connecticut makes consid-
eration of nonshareholder constituencies mandatory. CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 33-313(e) (West Supp. 1992) ("director[s] . . . shall consider . . .
[long-term and short-term interests of the corporation, the shareholders,
and nonshareholder constituencies]"). Most states, however, leave consid-
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nonshareholder constituencies, some statutes expressly autho-
rize directors to consider the short-term and long-term inter-
ests of the corporation 2 and/or its shareholders."
These statutes reflect widespread concern over the substan-
tial disruptions to communities and workers, downgrading of
senior (hitherto investment grade) debt securities, and other
social dislocations that sometimes follow the "bust up" take-
over." Their enactment 5 may herald a shift from an exclu-
eration of the interests of the various constituencies to the directors'
discretion. The new constituencies include employees, creditors, customers
and even communities as legitimate claimants to directors' consideration.
See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 515(a) (Purdon Supp. 1992) (permit-
ting consideration of the effects of corporate action upon "shareholders,
members, employees, suppliers, customers, . . . creditors of the corpora-
tion, . . . [and] communities in which offices or other establishments of
the corporation are located").
Some statutes relieve directors of the obligation to weigh sharehold-
er concerns more heavily than others. See PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
515(b), supra note 40. Accord, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 717(b) (McKinney
Supp. 1993) (expressly rejecting the idea that its stakeholder statute
creates any new fiduciary duties or abrogates any existing ones).
42. The explicit recognition of short-term and long-term interests re-
flects the legislature's determination that there is in fact a difference
between the two measures of welfare. This proposition'is disputed by the
economic theorists who believe that today's values include tomorrow's,
discounted to their present value. See discussion infra notes 76-79 and
accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717(b):
In taking action, including, without limitation, action which may
involve or relate to a change or potential change in the control
of the corporation, a director shall be entitled to consider, with-
out limitation, (1) both the long-term and the short-term interests
of the corporation and its shareholders and (2) the effects that
the corporation's actions may have in the short-term or in the
long-term upon any [specified nonshareholder constituencies.]
Id. (emphasis added). New York's legislature makes explicit the distinc-
tion between the corporation's and its shareholders' interests. The section
includes as relevant considerations not only the usual nonshareholder
interests, but also:
(i) the prospects for potential growth, development, productivity
and profitability of the corporation; . . . (iii) the corporation's
retired employees and other beneficiaries receiving or entitled to
receive retirement, welfare or similar benefits [from the corpora-
tion]; . . . and (v) the ability of the corporation to provide, as a
going concern, goods, services, employment opportunities and
employment benefits and otherwise to contribute to the communi-
ties in which it does business.
Id. §§ 717(bXi), (iii) and (v).
44. Motives for legislation are notoriously slippery and it has been
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sively shareholder-centered model toward an avowedly
managerialist conception of the firm."'
2. Deferential Review of Defensive Tactics in Delaware
Although Delaware has not enacted a "stakeholder" stat-
ute,47 its judiciary has for some time been struggling with the
suggested that these statutes are really the result of lobbying by fright-
ened entrenched management groups. thrown into a startling alliance
with labor. See, eg., Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover
Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111, 134-38 (1987). Nevertheless, other commen-
tators have observed the substantial wealth transfers caused by hostile
takeovers. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable Coalitions: Corporate
Governance As a Multi-Player Game, 78 GEO. L.J. 1495 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter Unstable Coalitions]; Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers, supra
note 18, at 104; Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Epilogue, The Role of the Hostile
Takeover and the Role of the States, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 491, 493. Such
social upheavals are legitimately the concern of the legislature. See, e.g.,
Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers, supra note 18, at 108; Coffee,
Unstable Coalitions, supra, at 1548-49; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Uncertain
Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders, Stakeholders and
Bust.ups, 1988 WIs. L. REV. 435, 446-49; Morey W. McDaniel,
Stockholders and Stakeholders, 21 STETSON L. REV. 121 (1991); Katherine
Van Wezel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under State Nonshareholder
Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REV. 45 (1991); Wallman, supra
note 40.
45. Many anti-takeover statutes seem to fit comfortably within the
contractual model of the corporate enterprise since they permit corpora-
tions to "opt out" of their impact through a charter amendment or by-
law. See, e.g., PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 511(a) and (b) (Purdon Supp.
1992). See also Michael W. Armstrong, At Least 67 Firms Buck Act 36, 9
PHILA. Bus. J., July 30, 1990, at 1 (of 67 corporations that notified state
of intent to opt out, 25 opted out of entire section). Of course, in a feder-
al system, corporations are free to reincorporate under another state's
laws.
46. Such an expanded institutional vision seems not unrelated to the
responsible corporate citizen envisioned in the classic article, E. Merrick
Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1145 (1932). Corporate social responsibility need not be cast solely in
terms of fairness, charity or altruism. A self-interested society struggling
to succeed in a global economy cannot afford to allow the short-term
gains of one group to divert resources necessary for competition in that
economy. It may be that the primacy of short-term shareholder financial
return, rather than a more broadly focused corporate mission, is contrib-
uting at least in part to the loss of productivity, and failure of competi-
tiveness in U.S. industry. See infra Part II.A.
47. Delaware's takeover statute is a so-called "business combination"
statute. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1991). Rather than creating
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tension between exclusive devotion to short-term shareholder
interests and recognition of a reconceptualized corporate enti-
ty." The arena for the struggle in Delaware as elsewhere has
been the hostile takeover.
a. The Unocal Context
The issue is typically presented in litigation challenging
management's tactics in the face of a hostile takeover bid."
Shareholder welfare dominated the reasoning of earlier cases,
many of which nevertheless approved (as benefitting share-
holders) defensive tactics that drove off potential acquirers."
obstacles to takeovers or injecting nonshareholder interests into the delib-
erative mix, Delaware imposes a moratorium on post-takeover transac-
tions without the approval of target management. The provision is not
applicable to takeovers that acquire at least 85% of target shares. Title
28, § 203(aX2).
48. The problem of unbundling the director's duty "to the corporation
and its shareholders" was addressed by Chancellor Allen in a recent
decision of the Delaware Chancery Court:
[T]his particular phrase masks the most fundamental issue: to
what interest does the board look in resolving conflicts between
interests in the corporation that may be characterized as "share-
holder long-term interests" or "corporate entity interests" or "mul-
ti-constituency interests" on the one hand, and interests that
may be characterized as "shareholder short-term interests" or
"current share value interests" on the other?
TW Services, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,334, at 92,178 n.5 (Del. Ch. 1989). For a
thoughtful analysis of the contributions made by Chancellor Allen to this
line of cases, see Stephen J. Massey, Chancellor Allen's Jurisprudence
and the .Theory of Corporate Law, Part V, 17 Del. J. Corp. L. 683 (1992).
49. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del.
1985) (defensive repurchase of shares by target management, excluding
shares of raider); Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227
(Del. Ch. 1988) (defensive restructuring by target management); Ivanhoe
Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987); City
Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988) (defensive
responses by target management, including refusal to redeem poison pill
rights plan).
50. See, e.g., Unocal, 493 A.2d at 958-59; Ivanhoe Partners, 535 A.2d
at 1345; Moran v. Household Intl, Inc. 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985)
(poison pill put in place to protect shareholders from unfair takeover
attempts).
Recent cases have included explicit references to other constituen-
cies beneath the "corporate interests" umbrella. See, e.g., Unocal, 493
A.2d at 955 (directors may justify defensive tactics by considering "the
[takeover's] impact on 'constituencies' other than shareholders (i.e., credi-
tors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally)").
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The relevant point of departure is the Delaware Supreme
Court's decision in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co." In
that case, the court declined to apply the standard business
judgment rule to insulate from liability a target's defensive
repurchase of shares program that excluded the shares owned
by the corporate raider. Before the target management could
claim protection under the business judgment rule, the direc-
tors would have to (a) "show [by proving good faith and rea-
sonable investigation] that they had reasonable grounds for
believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness
existed" 2 and (b) demonstrate that the defensive tactic in
question "is reasonable in relation to the threat posed."" Sub-
sequent cases revealed that hostile offers (including all cash,
all shares offers) might, in theory, pose threats to shareholders
due to their coercive nature or simple inadequacy."
The problem here is one of informational asymmetry. Target
management claims to know that the corporation is worth
more than is being offered by the raider, and fully expects to
achieve those gains; nevertheless, the majority of shareholders
may not believe management and may accept an inadequate
offer as a result." For some Delaware courts after Unocal,
this kind of threat to shareholders did not justify open-ended
defensive tactics as long as management had adequate time to
address the issues. Thus, for a time, there seemed reason to
doubt whether tactics that would permanently preclude willing
shareholders from accepting hostile bids could pass the Unocal
test. However, the recent cases of TW Services, Inc. Sharehold-
ers Litigation,"' and Paramount Communications v. Time,
Inc., 7 suggest a reconsideration is taking place.
This view was subsequently qualified in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 1986) (consideration of
nonshareholder constituencies appropriate only if "there [is] some ratio-
nally related benefit accruing to the stockholders"); Mills Acquisition Co.
v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1282 n.29 (Del. 1987) (consideration of
non-shareholder constituencies appropriate only if there is "some reason-
able relationship to general shareholder interests").
51. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
52. Id. at 955.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., City Capital, 551 A.2d at 797-98.
55. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 953.
56. [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) q 94,334.
57. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
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b. Acknowledging Threats to the "Corporate Entity":
TW Services and Paramount
In both TW Services and Paramount, the Delaware courts
sustained management efforts to thwart unwanted takeovers.
These decisions openly recognize that management may act to
avert a threat to the "corporate entity.""8 Chancellor Allen
explained in Paramount that Delaware precedents "did not
establish that... [the] corporate entity has no distinct legally
cognizable interest that the... [all cash, all shares offer] en-
dangers." 9 A hostile offer could pose a threat to corporate
long run values' that would justify defensive tactics, even if
those tactics negatively affected short-term share price.
The Delaware Supreme Court, on appeal in Paramount,
affirmed the result on different reasoning. Under section
141(a) of the Delaware code, 1 the court reasoned, directors
have the "authority to set a corporate course of action, includ-
ing time frame, designed to enhance corporate profitability. '
Therefore, they deemed short-term versus long-term focus an
irrelevant consideration. "[D]irectors, generally, are obliged to
charter a course for a corporation which is in its best interest
without regard to a fixed investment horizon .... [They are]
not under any per se duty to maximize shareholder value in
the short term, even in the context of a takeover. ""
c. The Revlon Exception
In both TW Services and Paramount, the Delaware courts
58. Paramount, slip op. at 72.
59. Id.
60. See also TW Services at 92,178 & n.6 ("directors, in managing
the business and affairs of the corporation, may find it prudent (and are
authorized) to make decisions that are expected to promote corporate
(and shareholder) long run interests, even if short run share value can
be expected to be negatively affected"; such decisions might involve re-
search and product development, personnel training and compensation,
charitable and community financial support) (citations omitted).
61. The section provides in pertinent part:
(a) The business and affairs of every corporation organized under
this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a
board of directors; except as may be otherwise provided in this
chapter or in its certificate of incorporation.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (Supp. 1991).
62. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1150.
63. Id. (emphasis added).
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deferred to management's discretion in deciding to repel the
takeover bid.' There is, however, a set of circumstances in
which Delaware law apparently obliges directors to maximize
short-term gain for its shareholders: when the directors have
put the corporation "in play," i.e., when it is "apparent to all
that the break-up of the company [is] inevitable."' In Revlon,
the Delaware court decided that, since the target board itself
had put the corporation "in play," its defensive strategies were
inconsistent with its fiduciary duty to conduct a fair auction
and to obtain the highest share price for its shareholders.'
Other constituencies and concerns fell out of the picture entire-
ly.
Although the court in Revlon overrode the board's defensive
strategies against the hostile bidder, Pantry Pride, the board
itself had initiated the auction process (essentially conceding
that Revlon would be sold to someone) by agreeing to a friendly
leveraged buyout by Forstmann Little and Co.7 The court
reasoned that once the board made the business decision to
break up the corporation, the board's duty was transferred
64. The courts did so for different reasons. In Paramount, the court
was satisfied that management met its burden under the Unocal test.
Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1154. In TW Services, the court concluded that
the tender offeror's merger condition was critical; mergers are traditional-
ly straightforward business decisions committed to board discretion and
therefore, 'the board's decision with respect to it [would be] reviewed
under the traditional business judgment approach." [1989 Transfer Bind-
er] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 9 94,334, at 92188..
Professors McChesney and Carney disapprove of all the "dubious
bits of judicial intervention" undertaken by the Delaware courts, includ-
ing Unocal. In their view, all such departures from the business judg-
ment rule-a rule according deference to managers' decisions in the ab-
sence of self-interest--are unwarranted since the "rationale for the busi-
ness judgment rule is just as applicable in takeover cases as in others"
and courts cannot distinguish self-interested transactions from disinterest-
ed ones. See McChesney & Carney, supra note 38, at 82.
65. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. The easy cases involve target corpora-
tion board action that clearly establishes the company is "for sale." At
that point, the "directors' role change[s] from defenders of the corporate
bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stock-
holders at a sale of the company." Id.
66. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 177.
67. The Revlon board was attempting to defeat a hostile takeover by
Pantry Pride, Inc. Id. at 177. It was enjoined from consummating, inter
alia, a lock-up option with its "white knight," Forstmann Little and Co.,
and a promise to deal with it exclusively. Id. at 184-85.
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from "the corporation" to its shareholders."
Much has been written about the difficulty of determining
which actions trigger Revlon.' Perhaps the focus should be
redirected from the kind of transaction0 to the ultimate
decisionmaker. In Paramount, the Delaware Supreme Court
rejected plaintiffs' Revlon claim because of "the absence of any
substantial evidence to conclude that Time's board, in negotiat-
ing with Warner, made the dissolution or break-upof the corpo-
rate entity inevitable .... "' The operative words here are
"Time's board"-the court recognizing that the ultimate dispo-
sition of a corporation's future should, in the first instance, be
a matter for its own board's discretion. Seen in this light, and
given the Revlon board's initial responsibility for putting the
corporation in play, the Revlon analysis will yield an appropri-
ate application of deferential managerialism that allows a
target board to decide whether its long-term corporate strate-
gies should prevail over short-term gains.
II. THE COSTS OF SHORT-TERM DECISIONMAKING
The enactment of state "stakeholder" statutes and the Dela-
ware courts' increased receptivity to defensive tactics by target
managements have disturbed many academic commentators.
Professor Michael Jensen worries that, with the apparent de-
68.
The Revlon board's authorization permitting management to ne-
gotiate a merger or buyout with a third party was a recognition
that the company was for sale The duty of the board had thus
changed from the preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to
the maximization of the company's value at a sale for the
stockholders' benefit.
Id. at 182 (emphasis added).
69. An interesting question under this analysis is what (in addition
to management's decision to initiate bidding or its abandonment of long-
term planning to seeking an alternative break-up transaction in the face
of a hostile bid) triggers Revlon. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier
•Kraakman, What Triggers Revlon?, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 37 (1990);
Portia Policastro, Note, When Delaware Corporate Managers Turn Auc.
tioneers: Triggering the Revlon Duty After the Paramount Decision, 16
DEL. J. CORP. L. 187 (1991). Professor Massey concludes that the cases
reveal no "settled, considered view of what triggers Revlon." Massey,
supra note 48, at 772.
70. Some cases focus on "change of control," others on "sale" of the
corporation or its control, others on the "inevitable breakup" of the corpo-
ration. See Massey, supra note 48, at 769-73 and nn. 406-28.
71. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1150 (emphasis added).
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mise of the "hostile" takeover, managers will retain "free cash
flow" with which to pursue their self-interested agenda, rather
than releasing funds that could be better deployed else-
where.' Professor Jeffrey Gordon, in a recent piece on the
Paramount decision, fears that the legal and popular culture
may be rejecting the virtues of free markets."' The literature
abounds with diagnoses of "shareholder passivity" and calls to
empower institutional investors as the new vanguard to moni-
tor wayward corporate managers for the sake of maximizing
share value (and in the process, allocative efficiency).
4
As the discussion below reveals, there are significant costs
associated with legal rules or takeover threats that compel
managers to be concerned exclusively with maximizing short-
term values for the firm's equity holders, a constituency that
tends to devalue long-term investment goals in favor of short-
term financial profits. If managerial horizons are reduced in
this manner, the firm will underinvest in research and devel-
opment and other long-term productive assets; it will also act
opportunistically with employees who have made firm-specific
investments in the firm, inducing, in turn, less than optimal
effort and cooperation from these workers. These costs, re-
ferred to below as problems of "investment horizon" and "labor
noncooperation," detract from the productive capacity of the
firm and, by extension, the productive capacity of our national
economy."
72. See Jensen, Eclipse, supra note 5, at 66-67 (managers retain cash
to increase the size of their companies, which in turn enhances the "so-
cial prominence, public prestige, and political power of senior executives").
73. See Gordon, supra note 37, at 1971-82.
74. See, e.g., Black, Agents Watching Agents, supra note 10, at 813;
Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, supra note 10; Conard, supra
note 10, at 126-30; Dent, supra note 10, at 903-07; Gilson & Kraakman,
Outside Director, supra note 10, at 877-78.
75. In the analysis that follows, I do not address the merits of as-
suming that social welfare can be equated with profit-maximization for
the firm. This is hardly an indisputable assumption. Certain decisions
such as plant closings impose external costs on affected communities.
Such communities may have made firm-specific commitments of property
and resources, may have forgone tax payments in exchange for assuranc-
es of continued corporate residence now to be abandoned, and may now
be forced to assume the welfare costs of displaced workers, suppliers or
customers. Indeed, one may ask whether the avoidance of these costs by
the firm (in the long or short term) does not shift them less efficiently to
the government and the public. An overall assessment of social welfare
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A. The Problem of Investment Horizon
1. Managerial Myopia
a. Imperfect Markets: Valuation of Long-term
Investments
For adherents of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH),"
any discussion of short-term versus long-term interests is mis-
guided." Common stock prices should, in a perfectly efficient
market, reflect the sum of all dividends and other payouts
expected to be paid in the future, discounted to their present
value." Under this view, pursuit by managers of gain for
shareholders (e.g., enhanced share value) inevitably leads to a
"bigger pie" overall, and any quibbling about social disloca-
could not overlook these costs, and would consider the advisability of
imposing some portion of them upon the firm.
76. The hypothesis was formulated in the 1960s, see, e.g., Benoit
Mandelbrot, Forecasts of Future Prices, Unbiased Markets, and "Martin-
gale" Models, 39 J. BUS. 242 (1966); Paul A. Samuelson, Proof that Prop-
erly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly, 6 INDUS. MGMT. REV. 41
(1965), reprinted in 3 THE COLLECTED SCIENTIFIC PAPERS OF PAUL A.
SAMUELSON 782-90 (Robert C. Merton ed., 1972); see also Eugene F.
Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970), and continues to dominate the literature.
See, e.g., JAMES H. LORIE ET AL., THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND
EVIDENCE (1973); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory
Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 680-82
(1984); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of
Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984); Christopher P. Saari, Note,
The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory, and the Regu.
lation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1031 (1977).
77. As Professor Macey observes:
[Tihe distinction between maximizing firm value for the present
versus maximizing firm value for the future is wholly false.
What matters in determining the value of a firm's shares is the
present value of all flows-present and future.
Jonathan R. Macey, State Anti-Takeover Legislation and the National
Economy, 1988 Wisc. L. REV. 467, 481. But see Thomas L. Hazen, The
Short-Term/Long-Term Dichotomy and Investment Theory: Implications
for Securities Market Regulation and for Corporate Law, 70 N. CAR. L.
REV. 137, 139 (1991) (distinguishing throughout between short-term
shareholder interests and long-term corporate interests).
78. See, e.g., R.A. BREALEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO RISK AND RETURN
FROM COMMON STOCKS 67-68 (2d ed. 1983); VICTOR BRUDNEY & MARVIN
CHIRELSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 479-482 (2d
ed. 1987); BENJAMIN GRAHAM ET AL., SECURITY ANALYSIS: PRINCIPLES AND
TECHNIQUE 480-481 (4th ed. 1962).
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tion" or effect upon investment horizons (since the short term
is the discounted long term in an efficient capital market)
betrays a misunderstanding of the economic principles at work.
However, recent studies concerning the EMH, in particular
the semi-strong form of the hypothesis,' suggest that such
strong assumptions8 of market efficiency are misplaced. 2
79. In economic terms, questions concerning possible wealth transfers
from nonshareholder corporate constituencies to shareholders as a result
of managerial decisionmaking concern the distribution of wealth, rather
than efficiency per se. See, e.g., Jensen, Eclipse, supra note 5, at 71
($300 million diminution in value to pre-LBO bondholders deemed a
"small sum" compared to wealth created by LBO). On the distinction
between efficiency (viewed in terms of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion as
transactions where aggregate benefits outweigh the aggregate costs of
achieving those benefits) and equity, see generally A. MITCHELL POLINSKY,
AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7 (1983); see also Coffee,
Shareholders Versus Managers, supra note 18, at 104-105.
80. There are three versions of the hypothesis. (1) The strong form
asserts that all information (including non-public information) is reflected
in stock price. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 270 (3d ed. 1988) ("prices reflect not
just public information but all information that can be acquired by pains-
taking fundamental analysis of the company and economy") (emphasis in
original). (2) The weak form asserts that all information concerning past
price movements is reflected in present stock price. See id. at 270-72. (3)
The form that has predominated is the semi-strong form, which asserts
that current prices incorporate and adjust to reflect all publicly available
information. See id. at 270; JACK CLARK FRANCIS, INVESTMENTS: ANALYSIS
AND MANAGEMENT 651 (4th ed. 1986) ("The semi-strong efficient market
hypothesis requires that all available relevant public information . . . be
fully reflected in security prices") (emphasis in original).
81. Some proponents of market efficiency conclude that trading itself
does not influence efficient pricing. For example, finance theory posits
that demand for shares is highly (perhaps perfectly) elastic. See, e.g.,
Brealey & Myers, supra note 80, at 296-98. Thus, investors should be
able to buy or sell large quantities of shares without affecting market
price. See, eg., Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents,
Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT.
REV. 309, 335-36; Gilson & Kraakman, Mechanisms of Market Efficiency,
supra note 76, at 629-34. The notion of perfectly elastic demand has
gained currency through the prevailing Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM), one premise of which is that investors share identical estimates
of the risks and returns of particular stocks. By contrast, Professor Stout
offers a "heterogeneous beliefs" model of stock pricing that recognizes
that investor "estimates of stock value may differ widely." Lynn A. Stout,
Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair Value, and
Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235, 1245 (1990). Under this model, which
she suggests is supported by empirical evidence, the demand for shares
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Market pricing of shares, while generally informationally effi-
cient in reflecting currently available public information,"
may not be quite as efficient as is widely believed when it
comes to fundamental valuation."' In other words, under this
is "downward-sloping" and large transactions do alter stock prices.
82. See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets,
Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 764
(1985) ("[T]he legal rush to embrace and apply the efficient market hy-
pothesis has been overly precipitous and occasionally unwise."). Recent
scholarship has cast doubts on both EMH's empirical and theoretical
claims, see, e.g., Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Im-
possibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393
(1980); Symposium on Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Effi-
ciency, 6 J. FIN. ECON. 95 (Michael C. Jensen ed., 1978); Stephen J.
Brown & Christopher B. Barry, Anomalies in Security Returns and The
Specification of The Market Model, 39 J. FIN. 807 (1984); Donald B.
Keim & Robert F. Stambaugh, A Further Investigation of The Weekend
Effect in Stock Returns, 39 J. FIN. 819 (1984); William K.S. Wang, Some
Arguments that the Stock Market Is Not Efficient, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
341 (1986). See also Julie Rohrer, Ferment in Academia, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR, July 1985, at 79; George Anders, Some "Efficient Market"
Scholars Decide It's Possible to Beat the Averages After All, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 31, 1985, at 11. For an article questioning the extent to which pric-
ing efficiency leads to allocative efficiency and suggesting therefore that
the "current preoccupation with nurturing efficient stock market pricing
seems unwarranted ... [or] at least misdirected," see Lynn A. Stout,
The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock
Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 707
(1988).
83. Under the "semistrong" form of the efficient market hypothesis,
share price reflects all publicly available information, but does not reflect
nonpublic information. Accordingly, those privy to inside information
(such as corporate managers) should be able to assess a firm's value
more accurately than the uninformed market. See John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor,
91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1330, n.206 (1991) [hereinafter Liquidity Versus
Control]; infra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., Reinier Kraakman, Discounted Share Price as a Source
of Acquisition Gains, in CORPORATE LAW AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 29, 36-
37 & n.20 (Lucian Bebchuk ed., 1990); Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note
82, at 825-30; see also Gardner Ackley, Commodities and Capital: Prices
and Quantities, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 3-7, 12-14 (1983); Louis
Lowenstein, Management Buyouts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 730, 752-53 (1985);
Robert J. Shiller, Stock Prices and Social Dynamics, BROOKINGS PAPERS
ON ECON. ACTIVITY 457, 481-88 (1984); Wang, supra note 82, at 347-49.
One commentator has suggested that an efficient market is "one in
which price is within a factor of two of value, i.e., the price is more than
half of value and less than twice value .... By this definition, I think
almost all markets are efficient almost all of the time. 'Almost all' means
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view, share prices can be "poor estimates of the expected value
of corporate assets."' Managers, defending against hostile
takeovers, have long claimed that shares are undervalued by
the market;"8 moreover, challenges to the market's fundamen-
tal-valuation efficiency increasingly appear in the literature.87
Indeed, there is reason to believe that the market may do a
particularly poor job in pricing investments in long-term pro-
ductive assets, such as research and development expendi-
tures; and in a world of imperfect markets the dichotomy be-
at least 90%." Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529, 533 (1986) (presiden-
tial address to American Finance Association).
85. Kraakman, supra note 84, at 37.
86. Corporate executives, "feel themselves pushed in the short-sighted
direction, against their own better judgment, by the fear that develop-
ment and investment policies oriented toward the long term will be un-
dervalued by the market and leave their firm vulnerable to takeover."
MICHAEL L. DERTOUZOS ET AL., MADE IN AMERICA: REGAINING THE PRO-
DUCTIVE EDGE 62 (1989) [hereinafter MADE IN AMERICA]. If the market
undervalues shares, then even substantial premiums above market price
may not give shareholders the intrinsic value of their shares. It has been
suggested that the willingness of courts to sustain defensive tactics to
hostile takeover bids, see supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text, im-
plicitly acknowledges this undervaluation theory. See Wang, supra note
82, at 398-99 & n.182. For a discussion of managerial myopia in the face
of discounted share prices, see infra notes 99-115 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., Shiller, supra note 84, at 457; Robert J. Shiller, Do
Stock Prices Move Too Much to be Justified by Subsequent Changes in
Dividends?, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 421 (1981); Lawrence H. Summers, Does
the Stock Market Rationally Reflect Fundamental Values?, 41 J. FIN. 591
(1986); cf. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The New Theory of the
Firm: Equilibrium Short Horizons of Investors and Firms, 80 AM. ECON.
REV., 148, 148 (1990) (arbitrageurs trade "based on knowledge that the
price of an asset is different from its fundamental value").
The economist John Maynard Keynes also questioned the "funda-
mental values" efficiency of the stock market, suggesting that stock prices
really reflect predictions about future investor preferences rather than
intrinsic share value. See JOHN M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF
EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 153-58 (1936) (investment in stock
market resembles beauty contest competition, where competitors attempt
to predict average preferences of other competitors, so that "each ...
pick[s] not those faces which he himself finds prettiest, but those which
he thinks likeliest to catch the fancy of other[s]"). See also Lowenstein,
supra note 84, at 752-53 ("high turnover makes sense only if investors
are paying a high degree of attention to what their fellow investors are
about to do and to the short term expectations that motivate them, and
paying less attention to asset values and other measures that would
influence a buyer-or seller--of the business as a whole").
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tween the short and long term becomes clearer. The most im-
mediate problem is informational asymmetry." Managers
have access to non-public information about the firm's future
plans and the likely yield on long-term investments."9 Ideally,
managers would disclose all of the information the market
needs to know in order to price accurately the firm's shares.
However, this information cannot be costlessly or readily dis-
seminated to shareholders. Through public disclosures, manag-
ers risk revealing proprietary information to competitors.'
Even were corporate managers prepared to assume the risk of
benefitting their competitors by revealing proprietary informa-
tion, the not unreasonable expectation of either private litiga-
tion or governmental enforcement actions under a variety of
theories based on securities fraud (for either revealing too
much or too little, too optimistically or too pessimistically or in
violation of the insider trading prohibitions) would prove a
powerful disincentive to such disclosure."
One advantage of having financial intermediaries on the
board (for example, bankers or professional directors selected
by institutional investors)r is the possibility of conveying
more complete information concerning innovative and promis-
ing, albeit risky or unconventional, long-term investments with
less fear of breached confidences.' Nevertheless, such share-
holders would still have to be willing to "accept some market
penalty," during the period of confidentiality, when the market
discounted management's agenda.94 The short-term invest-
ment horizon of shareholders, including those of many insti-
88. Admittedly, perfectly efficient markets could exist in a
Panglossian world of cost-free access for all to all available information, a
world without transaction costs, and where market participants share
homogeneous expectations; however, the EMI- "purports to make a strong
statement where some of these conditions are not present." Gordon &
Kornhauser, supra note 82, at 771.
89. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES:
ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 145-48 (1975) (managers have
more complete access to intracorporate information, including information
concerning investment proposals and strategies, than capital markets).
90. See, e.g., Liquidity Versus Control, supra note 83, at 1331.
91. See infra note 331 and accompanying text.
92. See infra notes 336-47, 374-84 and' accompanying text.
93. But see infra notes 387, 392 and accompanying text for discus-
sion of regulatory obstacles, including possible insider trading or lender
liability provisions, to involvement in corporate governance by financial
institutions.
94. Liquidity Versus Control, supra note 83, at 1332.
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tutional investors, makes such a scenario unlikely. 5
Accordingly, it has been suggested that because shareholders
cannot observe the inner workings of the firm and must rely
on imperfect financial summaries, a costly signaling process
occurs. Managers may, for example, sell valuable assets or
abort investment projects that have little effect on current
earnings and are undervalued by shareholders. Such actions
may boost earnings but, had a longer horizon permitted pro-
jected long-term yields to materialize, shareholders would in
fact have obtained a far greater return on their investments.9
The liquidity perspective of shareholders, 7 as exacerbated by
takeover threats, fuels this myopic process.98 '
95. For further discussion of the role of financial intermediaries, see
infra notes 314-31, 374-94 and accompanying text.
96. See Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia,
96 J. POL. ECON. 61, 74-78 (1988); Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient Capital
Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior, 104
Q.J. ECON. 655, 668 (1989) [hereinafter Stein, Efficient Capital Markets];
see also Liquidity Versus Control, supra note 83, at 1331-32; DUNCAN
FOLEY & WILLIAM LAZONICK, CORPORATE TAKEOVERS AND THE GROWTH
OF PRODUCTIVITY 3-4 (Dept. of Econ., Barnard College Working Paper No.
91-01, 1990); cf. LucIAN ARYE BEBCHUCK & LARS A. STOLE, Do SHORT-
TERM MANAGERIAL OBJECTIVES LEAD TO UNDER- OR OVER-INVESTMENT IN
LONG-TERM PROJECTS? (Harvard Law School Program in Law and Eco-
nomics Discussion Paper No. 87, 1991) (short-term managerial objectives
may lead to underinvestment or over-investment in long-run projects,
where the market has incomplete information).
Consider also the incentive structure of arbitrageurs, who trade
"based on knowledge that the price of an asset is different from its fun-
damental value." Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 87, at 148. Arbitrageurs
purchase assets that are underpriced in order to reap the profits when
the "mispricing" disappears. Professors Shleifer and Vishny suggest that
arbitrage in short-term assets is less expensive than arbitrage in long-
term assets, and that long-term assets must be more mispriced in equi-
librium than short-term assets for net returns to be equal. Arbitrageurs
will, therefore, tend to "cluster[] on the trading of short-term assets." Id.
at 153. This clustering will, in turn, lead to "systematically more accu-
rate pricing of short-term assets than of long-term assets, even though
efficient capital allocation and managerial evaluation might be better
served by the opposite bias." Id.
97. See infra notes 117-30 and accompanying text.
98. See Stein, supra note 96, at 63 (if managers believed their share-
holders were patient-"would not be discouraged by a low earnings re-
port"-they would not act myopically out of fear that impatient share-
holders will dump their shares, which would lower share price still fur-
ther); Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 87, at 151 (managers may choose
short-term over long-term investment projects since long-term projects
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b. Reactions to Discounted Share Price
In an efficient market, it is presumed that shares trade at
prices that "fully and accurately reflect the value of the firms'
allow equity to be "more mispriced" and threaten their jobs); Coffee,
Shareholders Versus Managers, supra note 18, at 63 (because the threat
of takeovers is "constant and unrelenting," managers may divert their
attention away' from the long-term best interests of the corporation and
instead focus 'on defensive tactics).
The account given above and in the text is sharply disputed. Cer-
tain event studies have investigated the immediate effect on stock prices
of announcements of increases in research and development (R&D) spend-
ing and report positive price effects. See, e.g., J. Randall Woolridge, Com-
petitive Decline and Corporate Restructuring: Is a Myopic Stock Market to
Blame?, 1 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 26, 33 (1988) (45 announcements, 30-
day increase of 1.5%); John J. McConnell & Chris J. Muscarella, Corpo-
rate Capital Expenditure Decisions and the Market Value of the Firm, 14
J. FIN. ECON. 399, 419-20 (1985) (study of 658 capital expenditure an-
nouncements (including only eight announcements of changes in R&D
expenditures) and reporting that increases/decreases in planned capital
expenditures were associated with significant positive/negative share price
effects).
The significance of these event studies should not be overstated. Al-
though such studies report positive reactions to certain investment deci-
sions, they prove nothing about the appropriateness of the magnitude of
market movement relative to potential benefits. As Professor Bronwyn
Hall, a leading researcher in the area, explains, these studies argue only
against "extreme market myopia," but say nothing about whether the
market's response is of the "right order of magnitude." BRONWYN H.
HALL, THE IMPACT OF CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING ON INDUSTRIAL RE-
SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 88 (National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper No. 1476, 1990) (emphasis added) [hereinafter CORPORATE
RESTRUCTURING]. Thus, if the share price increase is not sufficiently
reflective of the expected present discount value of investment returns,
the market may be discriminating against such investments. Moreover,
these event studies typically involve small samples-see, e.g., the extreme-
ly small sample of R&D announcements studied in McConnell &
Muscarella, supra-which raise questions of statistical significance. See
comments of F.M. Scherer in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS AND TARGETS: THE IM-
PACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 27 (J. Coffee, Jr. et al. eds., 1988) (esti-
mating that there are in any given year 20,000 R&D projects underway,
but above noted studies typically concern only a small sample of formally
announced projects). Furthermore, there may be a selectivity bias to
these studies, for it seems reasonable to assume that where a firm de-
cides to make a formal announcement of R&D expenditures (as opposed
to the myriad decisions to implement R&D expenditures not formally
announced), such announcements involve particularly promising and easi-
ly comprehensible research projects, and few costs in terms of tipping off
competitors.
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assets and expected earnings."" There should be few "bar-
gains" because traders will bid the price up to, but theoretical-
ly not higher than, its true value."° However, the last fifteen
years have witnessed corporate takeovers in which enormous
premiums above market price were offered for shares.10' To
these raiders at least, the shares did not reflect the true value
of the underlying assets.'" These discounts in share price are
believed to reflect what Professor Kraakman terms the mana-
99. Stout, supra note 81, at 1235; Kraakman, supra note 84, at 29-
30. Despite the theoretical connection between share price and underlying
asset values, share prices for certain corporations frequently fall below
market value for underlying assets-e.g., closed-end investment funds,
holding companies and natural resource firms. See, e.g., Burton G.
Malkiel, The Valuation of Closed-End Investment--Company Shares, 32 J.
FIN. 847 (1977); Rex Thompson, The Information Content of Discounts
and Premiums on Closed-End Fund Shares, 6 J. FIN. ECON. 151 (1978).
Since, as Professor Kraakman points out, these are corporations whose
underlying assets are, if anything, more visible than other corporations,
it seems unlikely that they are "anomalous" as often described. It seems
reasonable to infer that such discounts are not in fact anomalies but
rather that security prices frequently discount expected cash flows from
corporate assets. Kraakman, supra note 84, at 29-30. "[Wlhy suppose that
discounts perversely exist only where they can be seen and nowhere
else?" Id. at 46.
100. See Ravenscraft & Scherer, supra note 20, at 37. Thus, in an
"efficient" market, takeovers should not typically be motivated by the
belief that shares are undervalued, although, as the authors explain,
raiders might (wrongly) believe shares were undervalued and pursue the
takeover anyway. Id. Moreover, certain definitions of "efficiency" encom-
pass a fairly wide range of values-e.g., price within a factor of two of
value, Black, supra note 84, at 533-which would permit substantial
gains to be made by those who located undervalued securities even in an
efficient market. Id.
101. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41
STAN. L. REV. 597, 601 (1989) (premiums averaging 50% above market in
1980s); Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications
of 'Discounted' Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
891, 892 (1988) (premiums averaging 50% above market). Indeed, one of
the perceived strengths of the takeover is its ability to narrow the gap
between share price and asset value for individual shareholders. See, e.g.,
Kraakman, supra note 84, at 69 n.130 ("takeovers' arbitrage between
asset and securities markets [thereby correcting] share prices").
102. See Kraakman, supra note 101, at 891-908; Kraakman, supra
note 84, at 40-46. Although it has been noted that the discount in share
price begins to narrow or disappear during "long-term bull markets,"
Professor Kraakman observes that their demise has proven greatly exag-




Managers, so the theory goes, frequently misuse their power
to direct "free cash flow." " They fail to reallocate resources
to their most productive uses (which may be outside the corpo-
ration that generated the cash flow)," retaining surplus
rather than distributing it to shareholders or profitably invest-
ing it. There are various explanations offered for this behavior,
including managers' fundamental risk-aversion" or self-in-
terested desire for corporate growth (i.e., prestige, compensa-
tion, etc.). 7 Whatever the reasons, shareholders will discount
103. Kraakman, supra note 84, at 30, 35-36.
104. See, Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flows, Corpo-
rate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS AND PROCEED-
INGS), May 1986, at 323 [hereinafter Jensen, Free Cash Flows]; Jensen,
Eclipse, supra note 5, at 66-67; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Two
Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 650, 652-54
(1984) (the interests of averse managers, who are not the residual claim-
ants of the firm's income, may diverge from the interests of other partici-
pants in the corporate venture); Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers,
supra note 18, at 16-24 (discussing how a manager's overinvestment in
the firm leads to less diversified portfolios than individuals' or institu-
tional investors' portfolios).
105. But see FOLEY & LAZONICK, supra note 96, at 1 (such criticisms
contain no theory of the firm as an innovator that, through the develop-
ment and utilization of the productive resources at its disposal, can gen-
erate economic outcomes superior to those reached through a purely mar-
ket-directed process").
106. Unlike shareholders, who can minimize risk through a diversified
investment portfolio, managers are overinvested in one enterprise. Indeed,
one explanation for the "conglomeration" boom of the 1960s and 1970s
suggests that risk-aversion led managers to create "diversified portfolio[s]
within their firms." Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers, supra note 18,
at 20. See id. at 16-24; Yakov Amihud & Baruch Lev, Risk Reduction As
A Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers, 12 BELL J. ECON. 605
(1981) (stating that conglomeration is more likely in manager-controlled
firms than in owner-controlled firms); see also Note, The Conflict Between
Managers and Shareholders in Diversifying Acquisitions: A Portfolio Theo-
ry Approach, 88 YALE L.J. 1238, 1243 (1979) (stating that diversification
internally or through acquisition reduces a manager's risk). But see
Jerome B. Cohen, Some Economic Aspects of Conglomerate Mergers, in
CONGLOMERATES AND CONGENERICS 45, 51 (1970) (finding that conglomer-
ate acquisitions were financially motivated because "[a]ny time a company
buys another [with] a lower price-earnings ratio, earnings per share of
the merged company will inevitably be higher than those of the acquiring
company in the previous year").
107. See Jensen, Free Cash Flows, supra note 104, at 323; Jensen,
Eclipse, supra note 5, at 66. But see FOLEY & LAZONICK, supra note 96,
at 34-35 (self-interest will prompt managers to pursue innovative strate-
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corporate share prices accordingly when managers engage in
such behavior. Under this explanation, hostile takeovers in-
volving substantial premiums"° for shares punish waste-
ful, 10 "overly risk-averse""0 or self-interested managers and
liberate this cash flow (as well as redeploying the underlying
assets) for productive investment."'
If the market, however, is doing a poorer job of pricing
shares than is commonly presumed (in part because it inaccu-
rately prices long-term capital returns), then takeovers may be
occurring even in corporations that are efficiently managed."'
This might justify a different range of regulatory responses
than would be appropriate if the market were perfectly effi-
cient at fundamental valuation and the pricing of investments
in long-term productive assets, and managers were simply
misinvesting." Indeed, if well-managed corporations are at
risk of takeover because of unwarranted share price discounts,
gies to ensure competitive advantage for their firm).
108. Another explanation has been offered for the takeover premium:
price pressure. Where bidders "corner the market" for shares, the process
of buying up larger and larger quantities of stock "should inevitably bid
up the market price." Stout, supra note 81, at 1236.
109. See, e.g., Jensen, Free Cash Flows, supra note 104, at 328 (stat-
ing that reductions in investment, inter alia, following hostile takeovers
and leveraged buyouts eliminate inefficient investment by corporate man-
agement). But see Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 87, at 152 (suggesting
that some cuts in investment eliminate good long-term projects that were
responsible for market underpricing).
110. Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers, supra note 18, at 27.
111. See also Joseph A. Grundfest, Subordination of American Capital,
27 J. FIN. ECON. 89, 89 n.20 (1990) (in an economy with high costs of
capital, free cash flow may prompt hostile takeovers, as corporations seek
to control valuable capital); infra notes 185-201 and accompanying text.
112. See Kraakman, supra note 84, at 68; see also Warren E. Buffett,
et al., Hostile Takeovers and Junk Bond Financing: A Panel Discussion,
in KNIGHTS RAIDERS AND TARGETS, supra note 98, at 11, 13 [hereinafter
Buffett Remarks] (remarks of panelist Warren E. Buffett):
[Olver a good many of [the past] 44 years and a good many of
the past 10 years, the very best managed companies I know of
have very frequently sold in the market at substantial discounts
from what they were worth that day on a negotiated basis. It
isn't just the weak managements or the companies that are not
meeting their potential that are vulnerable to takeovers because
of market disparities from negotiated business value.
Id.
113. See, e.g., Kraakman, supra note 84, at 64-71; Stout, supra note
81, at 1284-95.
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even managers of corporations not targets of actual or threat-
ened takeovers may act myopically"' in a defensive effort to
narrow that discount."5 In an atmosphere of "revolving-door
ownership""' managers may be tempted to raise share price
any way they can, even by forgoing research and development
programs or excessively leveraging the firm, to the detriment
of its long-term performance.
2. Shareholder Myopia: The Liquidity Perspective.
Shareholders of public corporations purchase ownership
interests in a business enterprise, 7 but they neither wish to
114. For Professor Jensen, myopic behavior by managers will occur
when they are not adequately concerned with share price because their
compensation is keyed to accounting earnings rather than share price.
See Jensen, supra note 3, at 10-11. A reform of managerial compensation
in the direction Jensen suggested is certainly desirable. However, if, as
Jeremy Stein suggests, managers may engage in inefficient
decisionmaking because they are overly concerned about current share
prices, see Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, supra note 96, at 656, it is
difficult to understand why making managers more attentive to current
share price mitigates the tendency to myopic behavior. Stein's diagnosis
argues for measures to ensure that managers remain long-term share-
holders. For a discussion on reform of executive compensation, see infra
notes 395413 and accompanying text.
115. The spillover or demonstration effects of takeover pressures on
firms that are not yet targets of hostile bids complicate attempts to draw
conclusions from empirical research. Empirical studies essentially compare
the R&D spending levels of companies involved in mergers or takeovers
with spending levels of companies not so involved. However, the fact that
"both groups may have declined and there may be no obvious difference
between the two groups that is evident after the decline," ACADEMY IN-
DUSTRY PROGRAM, CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING AND INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH
AND DEVELOPMENT 84-85 (1990) [hereinafter NAS, CORPORATE RESTRUC-
TURING] (remarks of Kenneth S. Flamm), is consistent with an hypothesis
of demonstration effects. Indeed, proponents of takeovers credit the dem-
onstration effect of hostile bids (the "self-raiding" to avoid a takeover)
with achieving much of the efficiency gains (decreased agency costs) of
the takeover era. See, e.g. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 3, at 1169-
73 (discussing the influence of the bidding process on agency costs).
116. See Buffett Remarks, supra note 112, at 14. Professor Coffee has
emphasized the undesirable effects of the "constant and unrelenting"
threat of takeovers on managerial decisionmaking. See Coffee, Sharehold-
ers Versus Managers, supra note 18, at 63. One possible technique for
addressing this concern would be "takeover windows" at spaced intervals,
written into corporate charters. See id. at 63 n.175; Martin Lipton &
Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Governance: The
Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 225-26, 240-
45 (1991), discussed infra note 272.
117. The bulk of public shareholding today consists of institutional
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operate that business nor do they act like its owners."8 They
invest in securities precisely because they do not choose to
become owners of some other, less liquid investment proper-
ty." Unlike owners of businesses, owners of corporate securi-
ties tend to have a transient relationship to the underlying
business.2 They do not feel an owner's commitment to the
corporation and, if they believe management is performing
poorly, 2' they typically sell their shares rather than attempt to
investors. See, e.g., NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, 1990 SURVEY OF
SHAREOWNERSHIP (reporting, inter alia, that there are over 25 million
mutual-fund holders, and investment companies manage almost $1.5
trillion in assets). Although institutional investors frequently purchase
large blocks of shares (as compared to the decreasing pool of individual
shareholders), they still own relatively small percentages of any single
corporation. Moreover, our system of regulating financial institutions pre-
vents such institutions from increasing their equity positions to the point
of acquiring control. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of Ameri-
can Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 11 (1991). See infra notes
218-20, 317-23 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 3, at xii ("[S]hareholders have
increasingly come to think of their stocks as a financial commodity,
something divorced from the underlying business, assets to be traded
rather than investments to be owned.").
119. See FRED E. BALDWIN, CONFLICTING INTERESTS 38 (1984) (sug-
gesting that the nature of property affects the attitude and relationship
of owners to that property and concluding that shareholders, as owners
of liquid property, feel less responsibility for actual business).
120. Compare Berle & Means' description of the orientation of the
owner of non-liquid property:
The owner of non-liquid property is, in a sense, married to it. It
contributes certain factors to his life, and enters into the fixed
perspective of his landscape. If [the piroperty is a business] he
lives with it, works at it, builds his life at least partly around it
with an agent ... devised to run it in his absence. These are
the bases of association and interests, of desires, ambitions, fears,
troubles. At the same time, the quality of responsibility is always
present . . . . [Tbo translate property into liquid form the first
requisite is that it demand as little as possible of its own-
er . . . .The separation of ownership from management and con-
trol in the corporate system has performed this essential step in
securing liquidity.
Berle & Means, supra note 2, at 284-85.
There are, of course, exceptions to this rule. See, e.g., Ron Suskind,
Legend Revisited: Warren Buffett's Aura as Folksy Sage Masks Tough,
Polished Man, WALL. ST. J., Nov. 8. 1991, at Al (depicting Buffett as the
"standard bearer for long-term investing and the perfect antidote to the
get-rich-quick schemers of Wall Street").
121. Moreover, they measure the adequacy of management perfor-
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intervene.'"
Shareholder passivity, then, so troubling to commentators
and theorists," in large part reflects the reality of what
shareholders do and do not choose to invest in:"' they "own"
an entitlement to an income stream (dividends, when and if
declared by the board of directors) and they "own" any appreci-
ation (or loss) in the value of their shares on the resale mar-
ket. This ownership interest is typically part of a diversified
portfolio of equally liquid investment securities. Shareholders
do not directly own or control the disposition of the decidedly
non-liquid underlying assets of the corporation nor direct cor-
porate employees in the way the proprietor of a grocery shop
owns her inventory and equipment and directs her clerks.
Public shareholders, unlike bona fide entrepreneurs, thus tend
to share a distinctly "liquid" perspective concerning the con-
tents of their investment portfolios. With some qualification,
institutional investors also share a similar perspective. 5
mance by short-term performance gains. See infra notes 326-30 and ac-
companying text.
122. See Gilson & Kraakman, Outside Director, supra note 10, at 886-
90 (suggesting that selection of professional outside directors through a
clearinghouse may help overcome the collective action problem); infra
notes 348-49 and accompanying text. Given problems of free riding and
collective goods, the shareholders' liquidity perspective is both rational
and predictable. All shareholders benefit from the collective good of ac-
tive, responsible (and costly) monitoring of management. However, al-
though the monitor-shareholders cannot capture all of the benefits of
their monitoring, they do bear all of the costs. Economically "rational"
shareholders will prefer to let others monitor for them-to free ride when
corporate performance is satisfactory, and to sell (rather than monitor)
when it is not.
123. See sources cited in supra note 10; Grundfest, supra note 111
(discussing the inability of investors to monitor management and control
assets).
124. See Henry K. Manne, The "Higher" Criticism of The Modern
Corporation, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 399, 402 (1962) (investor is risk-taker,
having no desire to control business, who purchases future income
stream). The difference between purchasing stock, bonds or any other
property is "more one of acceptable risk and potential profitability than it
is a question of control or lack of it." Id. at 406.
125. It is an oversimplification to paint all shareholders with the
same "short-term" brush. See infra notes 325-31 and accompanying text.
Indeed, some institutional investors may have a more long-term perspec-
tive because their large holdings are relatively less "liquid," i.e., the act
of disinvesting may itself affect price negatively. However, fund managers
still lack "long-term loyalty" to corporations and rapidly turn over their
portfolio holdings in an effort to maximize their current value "since this
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The "liquidity" perspective,2 however beneficial to the for-
mation and growth of a capital market system, tends to focus
public investors on the short term-on this quarter's earnings
profile, on today's share price. Shareholders can rationally
conclude that (by trading) they capture the benefit of any man-
agerial decisions that drive the share price up on a given
day. 7 If that price increase results, for example, from short-
sighted failures to make adequate investments in research and
development or other long-term capital assets such as a well-
trained and educated workforce,'28 the future cost in terms of
decreasing productivity and competitiveness will fall on some-
one (indeed, everyone) else. Short-term decisionmaking will
have lasting deleterious effects on the corporation and the
economy if managers increasingly decide to forego long-term
investments in favor of short-term financial shareholder
gains."' Such a perspective would be unwise for the owner of
is the main criterion against which their own performance is judged."
MADE IN AMERICA, supra note 86, at 62. See Liquidity Versus Control,
supra note 83, at 1325 nn.194-95, 1326 (noting that professional money
managers' performance is reviewed monthly or quarterly, leading them to
adopt short-term performance objectives and to avoid costs that "do not
affect their current competitive standing vis-a-vis their peers");
Pensionforum: Dismay Over Short-termism, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Mar.
1991, at 139, 139 (over 90% of pension funds review performance of
outside money managers at least quarterly; only 5.6% review performance
semiannually; 3% review performance annually); Lipton & Rosenblum,
supra note 116, at 207 (citing authorities).
126. Professor Shubik refers to the "mass, anonymous liquid market
for the exchange of financial paper." Martin Shubik, Corporate Control,
Efficient Markets, and the Public Good, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS AND TAR-
GETS, supra note 98, at 31, 45.
127. Cf. Liquidity Versus Control, supra note 83, at 1327 & nn.200-01
(shareholders often accept disfavored managerial proposals, e.g.,
antitakeover proposals, when linked to "sweeteners" such as large divi-
dends or stock repurchases because they expect to receive the gain and
then sell their shares).
128. See infra notes 151-58 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., findings recited in Senator Sanford's recent bill, entitled
the "Long-Term, Investment, Competitiveness, Pension Protection and
Corporate Takeover Reform Act of 1991." S. 1679, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991) (stating that the current short-term focus, arising partially from
the takeover environment, leads to lack of R&D investment and increased
debt and is contrary to America's need to maintain worldwide competitive
position and economy); MADE IN AMERICA, supra note 86, at 62. For a
discussion of the empirical literature concerning, e.g., R&D spending, see
infra notes 157-84 and accompanying text.
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a shop or manufacturing firm, given the relative non-liquidity
of businesses as opposed to stocks. It is also unwise for a na-
tional economy that relies on private firms to make invest-
ments in long-term productive capacity,"4 despite the ratio-
nality of individual shareholders' decisions and possible short-
term increases in personal wealth.
3. Effects of Shareholder and Managerial Myopia
a. Excessive Leveraging
It is universally conceded that there has been a dramatic
increase in indebtedness in the United States both for the
nation as a whole, and within public corporations. ' Much of
the responsibility for this shift toward debt '32 has been
charged to a system of tax laws. 3 that creates financial in-
centives to choose debt over equity; interest payments are
deductible while dividend payments are not. 3' (Indeed, the
130. See MADE IN AMERICA, supra note 86, at 10; infra notes 151-84
and accompanying text.
131. Combined borrowings of nonfinancial institutions neared $2 tril-
lion in 1988, increased from $835 billion in 1979. See Jensen, Eclipse,
supra note 5, at 67 (citing Federal Reserve Board, Balance Sheets of U.S.
Economy).
132. See supra note 4; Roberta S. Karmel, Is It Time for a Federal
Corporation Law?, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 55, 70-71 & nn.94-95 (1991) (ratio
of nonfinancial corporate debt to nonfinancial corporate gross domestic
product rose from 52% in 1982 to over 67% by end of 1988); John
Floegel, Note, Equity Financing for Public Corporations: Reasons and
Methods to Encourage It, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1411, 1412 n.5 (1990) (debt
of nonfinancial corporations in United States increased by $840 billion;
equity decreased by $300 billion; interest on the debt incurred in recent
takeovers equals 26% of internal, cash flow (all-time high)); Henry
Kaufman, Halting the Leverage Binge, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Apr.
1989, at 23, 23 (comparing 15.4% annual growth in debt to 8.4% average
annual growth in debt over previous six economic cycles). The tide seems
to have turned somewhat recently, however, as corporations have begun
increasingly to make public equity offerings.
133. See, e.g., CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING, supra note 98, at 123 n.56;
Lipton, supra note 3, at9-11.
134. But see Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capi-
tal, Corporation Finance and the Theory of-Investment, 48 AM. ECON.
REV. 261 (1958). The Modigliani and Miller theory suggests that the cost
of capital ought to be (in fact is) independent of capital structure. The
thesis depends, however, on certain important, controversial assumptions
including the existence of perfect capital markets, where information is
costless and available for all investors; zero. transaction costs; firms that
are classifiable into "equivalent return" groupings within which all have
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overall effect of the various tax reforms of the early 1980s, it is
claimed, has been to make debt capital one-half as expensive
as equity capital.)"5 It is, then, economically rational for cor-
porations to prefer maximum leverage short of an unacceptable
risk of bankruptcy."6
Whereas corporations have always borrowed in order to
invest in positive net present value (NPV) assets, recently
corporate raiders and corporations have been aggressively
the same degree of business risk; and the absence of corporate income
tax. See J.C. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 239-50
(4th ed. 1977). Van Home explains, however, that the picture changes
somewhat when we introduce factors like corporate taxes and bankruptcy
costs and indeed is "on weaker ground" when leverage is extreme. Id. at
243. Since interest payments are deductible to the corporation, "leverage
lowers the weighted-average after-tax cost of capital [even under the
Modigliani & Miller theory]." Thus, corporations can in fact lower the
cost of capital by increasing leverage until they reach a point of extreme
leverage where the combination of leverage costs and bankruptcy costs
causes the cost of capital to begin to rise again. Id.
135. CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING, supra note 98, at 123 n.56; see gen-
erally Katherine Schipper & Abbie Smith, Effects of Management Buyouts
on Corporate Interest and Depreciation Tax Deductions, 34 J.L. & ECON.
295 (1991) (cited in HALL, INVESTMENT HORIZONS); Myron S. Scholes &
Mark A. Wolfson, The Effects of Changes in Tax Laws on Corporate Re-
organization Activity, 63 J. Bus. L. 141 (1990).
For a discussion of the impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on
R&D spending in the United States, see JAMES R. HINES, JR., ON THE
SENSITIVITY OF R&D TO DELICATE TAX CHANGES: THE BEHAVIOR OF U.S.
MULTINATIONALS IN 'THE 1980s, (National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper No. 3930, 1991).
136. Increased leveraging of U.S. corporations has increased the risk
of bankruptcy. See infra notes 247, 305-09 and accompanying text. Al-
though U.S. corporations remain less highly leveraged (in terms of debt-
to-equity ratios) than their average Japanese and German counterparts,
their risk of financial distress is considerably greater in part because of
the policy of governmental non-intervention and the lack of stable and
intense corporate debtor-creditor relationships such as those that prevail
in Japan and Germany. See infra notes 202-42 and accompanying text.
In addition, the relatively higher interest rates in the U.S., which con-
tributed to the relatively higher cost of capital for U.S. corporations, have
also increased financial risk.-See infra notes 185-201 and accompanying
text (cost of capital). The situation in Japan may be changing. See Clay
Chandler, Basically Sound: It's Hit a Rough Patch, But Japan's Economy
Is Still Enviably Robust, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 1992, at Al (noting that
although Japanese corporate profits are falling and the rate of bankrupt-
cies is mounting, unemployment remains at just over two percent, infla-
tion at well under three percent and there hasn't been a Japanese bank
failure "since World War II").
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borrowing to finance hostile takeovers and defensive corporate
restructurings,"' as well as to satisfy demands for high rates
of return by institutional investors.3 ' Corporations borrowed
funds which were distributed to shareholders as dividends,
share repurchases or takeover premiums.' 9 As one commen-
tator recently observed, "[t]he net effect was the opposite of
capital formation: it was a liquidation of industry.""'0
Some commentators see this increase in corporate leveraging
as a valuable efficiency enhancing mechanism.14 1 Professor
Jensen, for example, suggests that LBOs (indeed, increased
indebtedness generally) have generated "remarkable gains in
operating efficiency, employee productivity, and shareholder
137. Much of this debt was incurred by companies and individuals
engaged in making acquisitions. See HALL, INVESTMENT HORIZONS, supra
note 6, at 6-7. Additional debt was undertaken defensively, by managers
intent on preventing unwanted takeovers. Moreover, if high debt levels
were believed to succeed in fending off hostile takeovers, no doubt other
corporations which were not the targets of an immediate takeover threat
engaged in similar tactics. For a discussion of demonstration effects, see
supra note 115.
138. See Karmel, supra note 132, at 70. Debt issues have exceeded
net equity issues by American nonfinancial corporations in every year
since 1984. See Alan J. Auerbach, Tax Policy and Corporate Borrowing,
in PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE: ARE THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN
DEBT AND EQuITY DISAPPEARING? 136 (R. Kopcke & E. Rosengren eds.
1989).
139. Id.
140. Id. Moreover, the enormous transaction costs generated by these
restructurings "siphoned money from our industrial base into investment
banking and attorney fees." Id.
141. It has been suggested that the increased risk of bankruptcy in
highly leveraged firms is a strength of leveraging rather than a weak-
ness. Since even relatively minor decreases in cash flow may trigger
default on existing debt service, bankruptcy is likely to occur at a rela-
tively early point in a firm's downward spiral, preserving substantial
assets for creditors. See Jensen, Eclipse, supra note 5, at 67. Unfortu-
nately, however, the risk of financial failure for U.S. corporations ac-
counts in part for the uncompetitively high cost of capital. Investors, well
aware of the low probability of government bailout or rescue by creditors
outside of the costly bankruptcy system, demand ex ante risk premiums
that raise capital costs far above those enjoyed by competitor corporations
in Japan and Germany. See infra notes 224-27, 305-06 and accompanying
text. But cf. Patrick A. Murphy, Plans Can Succeed, Sometimes, NAVL
L.J., Apr. 15, 1991, at 19 (discussing recent increase in use of "prepack-
aged" Chapter 11 bankruptcy plans by highly leveraged corporate debtors,
whereby time spent in costly bankruptcy proceedings is substantially




value""2 because "debt creation without retention of the pro-
ceeds of the issue" will limit managers' ability to retain earn-
ings. '" At the same time, however, this increased corporate
debt load may result in underinvestment in long-term, often
initially low-return investments.1" One important area for
such concern is corporate R&D spending."5
Although it seems unlikely that takeovers or changes of
control per se necessarily result in decreased R&D spending, it
has recently been established that there is a demonstrable
"link between leverage and reduced R&D spending.""" In-
deed, the recent increase in highly leveraged takeover-related
restructuring seems directly connected to a substantial decline
in R&D growth in affected corporations."17 Levels of post-re-
142. Jensen, Eclipse, supra note 5, at 61-62. For further discussion of
leveraged buyouts, see infra notes 296-313 and accompanying text.
There is debate in the literature over whether hostile takeovers,
including highly leveraged takeovers, are value-creating or value-transfer-
ring transactions. Compare, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Sum-
mers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS:
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 34, 53 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988) (suggest-
ing that some takeovers involve redistribution of value from stakeholders
to shareholders, rather than the creation of new value), with Michael C.
Jensen, Takeovers: Folklore and Science, HARV. BUS. REV. 109, 112-15
(Nov.-Dec. 1984) (increases in target share price indicate greater efficien-
cy of merged corporations).
143. Jensen, Eclipse, supra note 5, at 67 (emphasis in original)
("[d]ebt is in effect a substitute for dividends"). But see FOLEY &
LAZONICK, supra note 96, at 19 (retained earnings and depreciation re-
serves disgorged in the 1980s constitute "the financial foundations for
long-term investment strategies"). Acknowledging that empirical research
has not yet been undertaken concerning the reallocation of this disgorged
"free cash flow," Professors Foley and Lazonick suggest that some of it
may well have "flowed abroad [and that] such alternative uses of resourc-
es may increase the social welfare of Americans in the short run while,
by undermining domestic innovation, contributing to a decline in their
social welfare in the long run." Id. at 25.
144. See, e.g., HALL, INVESTMENT HORIZONS, supra note 6, at 23;
FOLEY & LAZONICK, supra note 96, at 19.
145. For discussion of the empirical data concerning R&D spending
levels in the era of "leveraging," see supra note 6; infra notes 146-48,
156-63 and accompanying text.
146. CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING, supra note 98, at 123; see also
HALL, INVESTMENT HORIZONS, supra note 6, at 7-9.
147. For example, during the Owens-Corning defensive restructuring
in 1986, the firm reduced its workforce from 28,000 to 15,000. See Robert
O'Brien & Richard Kline, An Rx for Jobs Lost Through Mergers, N.Y.
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structuring debt have sometimes been so high that virtually all
available cash flow must be used to service that debt."' Little
or no cash may be available for seemingly discretionary invest-
ment (such as R&D research) without recourse to additional
outside financing.
In a world of allocationally efficient markets and perfect
information, the need to resort to external financing would
raise no concerns because it would be possible to identify with
confidence any positive NPV research project. Such a project
would attract adequate funding from rational investors. Unfor-
tunately, there is reason to doubt both assumptions. The mar-
ket, whatever its efficiency in valuing financial assets, may be
considerably less efficient at valuing real assets."" Moreover,
as discussed above, there are significant informational asym-
metries between managers and the market."" It is therefore
impossible to conclude with confidence that all the "good" in-
vestment projects are still being undertaken and investment
levels have decreased only because the "bad" (or redundant)
projects are unable to obtain financing.
b. Diminished Investment Levels
It is widely conceded and deplored that the United States
has increasingly lost competitive ground to other industrial
nations."' There is alarming underinvestment in long-term
TIMES, Feb. 22, 1987, § 4, at 23. These reductions included cutting R&D
spending in half and firing 480 research employees. See Jack Willoughby,
What a Raider Hath Wrought, FORBES, Mar. 23, 1987, at 56. For anec-
dotal accounts of the effects of LBOs on R&D spending, see LBOs:
Friend or Foe of Industrial Research?, RES. & DEV. Apr. 1989, at 13;
What are LBOs Doing to R&D?, CHEM. WK., Feb. 15, 1989, at 26 (citing
a National Science Foundation survey finding decreased R&D spending
with increased LBOs and other restructurings); Lester C. Thurow, US
Can't Compete if Finance Continues as the Master of Industry, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 1985, Pt. 5, at 3 (arguing that the debt load from LBOs
reduces the funds available for R&D). Again, the effects are felt within
the target and acquiring firms themselves, but demonstration effects
resonate in other corporations as well. See supra note 115.
148. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 76-98 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
151. The MIT Commission on Productivity conducted detailed studies
of eight manufacturing sectors of the economy: automobiles, chemicals,
commercial aircraft, computers-semiconductors-copiers, consumer electron-
ics, machine tools, steel, and textiles, and compared performance in these
industries with competitors abroad. MADE IN AMERICA, supra note 86.
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productive assets,"2 and our "stock of knowledge capi-
"The verdict is that American industry indeed shows worrisome signs of
weakness. In many important sectors of the economy, U.S. firms are
losing ground to their competitors abroad." Id. at 8.
152. See, e.g.; Lucinda Harper, U.S. Businesses Trim Capital Spending
Plans, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 1991, at A2 (Commerce Department survey
reports that companies plan a "tiny 0.5% increase in capital spending
[including new plants and equipment] in 1991, the smallest increase in
five years," after-tax profits in the April-June 1991 quarter were at the
lowest level since 1989 and "[pirofitability is a major determinant in
capital spending" (quoting Robert Diehl, domestic economist for Northern
Trust Co.)). The percentage of gross national product set aside for capital
investment in the United States over the last twenty years (10%) has
lagged far. behind that of competitor nations like Japan (approximately
33%) and West Germany (20%). See Irwin L. Kellner, Times Board of
Economists: Investment is Path to Productivity, L.A. TIMES, June 18,
1989, § 4, at 2. Indeed, the national rate of investment in plant and
equipment has been lower in the 1980s than that of any sustained period
since World War II. Id. See Ralph Landau & George N. Hatsopoulos,
Capital Formation in the United States and Japan, in THE POSITIVE SUM
STRATEGY 583, 590-91 & fig. 1 (Ralph Landau & Nathan Rosenberg eds.,
1986) (Japanese investment in manufacturing sector is at two to two and
one-half times U.S. rate of investment in capital per worker). Moreover,
the decline in the rate of capital spending shows little sign of reversal.
See, e.g., Louis Uchitelle, Capital Spending Unlikely to Surge, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 24, 1992, at D2 (net new investment, i.e., capital expendi-
tures beyond cost of replacing existing equipment, has declined to less
than five percent GDP as firms seek higher profits from existing oper-
ations rather than expanding in hopes of increasing market share).
Current productivity of non-agricultural workers also lags behind
the earlier anticipated growth rate of 1.9% at a 0.5% seasonally adjusted
annual rate. Harper, supra. See BENJAMIN M. FRIEDMAN, DAY OF RECK-
ONING 7, 207 (1988) (since 1979, overall productivity growth in non-farm
sector averaged just 1.1% per year). The comparative figures concerning
manufacturing labor productivity are indeed discouraging. The U.S. in-
crease in manufacturing labor productivity from 1989 to 1990 was 2.5%,
lagging behind Japan (3%) and West Germany (4%). BUREAU LAB. STAT.,
U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, RELEASE No. 91-406, at 1-2 (Aug. 20, 1991). More-
over, the U.S. gain resulted from a 2.0% decline in labor input (mea-
sured by hours worked) and only a 0.4% increase in manufacturing out-
put. Id. By contrast, the gains in Japan and Germany reflected output
gains of 4.5% and 5%, respectively, accompanied by smaller increases in
labor hours. Id. The decrease in productivity gains began in the late six-
ties, but accelerated during the late 1970s. In addition, the United
States' productivity growth increasingly lags behind other industrial na-
tions. Although it is impossible to assign blame for lagging productivity
to any one factor, our lagging national productivity rate coincides with
our declining national investment rate when compared to the investment
rates of competitor nations. See FRIEDMAN, supra, at 187-208.
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tal"1 ---arguably as important for competitive industrial suc-
cess as physical capital, " although not readily "inventoried
by accountants or valued by appraisers" 55-is also at risk.
For our stagnant economic growth rate to improve, we must
increase the rate of "technical change" ' through R&D invest-
ment and improve the quality of our labor force (human capi-
tal) through training and education. Unfortunately, we are
failing to do either. There has been a disturbing decrease in
long-term capital investment in general and in the growth of
aggregate corporate R&D spending since the mid 1980s in
particular. ' Moreover, the United States educational system
The MIT Commission on Industrial Productivity describes the pro-
cess whereby "American industry lost its dominant position" in the semi-
conductor-computer-copier industry (where U.S. has dropped from 60% to
40% of market share in one decade) in part as follows. When product
demand began to fall, many small American microelectronics firms decid-
ed to forego investment in order to maintain profit margins. During this
period of decreased demand, Japanese companies (which had sometimes
purchased proprietary knowledge from the American firms) increased
their plant capacity and were ready to begin production when the next
cycle of recovery began. By the time American firms began expanding
their capacity again, it was too late. Profits generated from these too-
little, too-late efforts were inadequate to finance the next generation of
industrial plants and "[tihe contest was between small, single-product,
inexperienced, under-financed American start-ups and the heavyweights of
Japanese industry. David did not defeat Goliath." Made in America, su-
pra note 86, at 10.
153. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Keynote Address at The National Acad-
emy of Sciences' Symposium on Corporate Restructuring and Industrial
Research (Oct. 11, 1989), in NAS, CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING, supra note
115, at 4 [hereinafter Grundfest Remarks]. This knowledge capital con-
sists of technical expertise, trade secrets, patents, productive processes,
research and development efforts, etc., resting upon the base of an edu-
cated and capable workforce. Id. at 3-4.
154. See, e.g., BRONWYN H. HALL & FUMIO HAYASHI, RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT AS AN INVESTMENT 2, 33 (National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper No. 2973, 1989).
155. Grundfest Remarks, supra note 153, at 4.
156. Landau & Hatsopoulos, supra note 152, at 585; see also Edwin
Mansfield, Microeconomics of Technological Innovation, in THE POSITIVE
SUM STRATEGY 307, 308 (Ralph Landau & Nathan Rosenberg eds., 1986).
157. See Grundfest Remarks, supra note 153, at 4-5; Tax Policy As-
pects of Mergers and Acquisitions: Hearings Before The House Comm. on
Ways & Means, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 686 (1989) (remarks of Erich
Bloch, Director, National Science Foundation, before the House Ways and
Means Committee, Mar. 14, 1989) [hereinafter Bloch Testimony]. Bloch
reported that 70% of total U.S. R&D is performed by industry, and that
there has been a dramatic decline in the growth of that spending after
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continues poorly to prepare its citizens for the demands of a
competitive economy.58
Aggregate corporate R&D spending was approximately 1.9%
of gross national product (GNP) at the end of 198759 com-
pared to significantly higher R&D spending levels in both West
Germany and Japan."w Moreover, U.S. R&D expenditures...
are also growing at a slower rate than comparable expendi-
tures by our competitors," and indeed may now be on a de-
1985. He also referred to a National Science Foundation (NSF) study
finding that while R&D spending climbed on average 5.8% per year be-
fore 1985, in 1987 there was zero real growth over spending levels in
1985 and 1986, after allowing for inflation. See discussion infra notes
159-63 and accompanying text. See also Gene Koretz, Business Talks a
Better R&D Game Than It Plays, Bus. WK., Aug. 21, 1989, at 20 (esti-
mated real outlays on R&D will increase by under 1% in 1989, compared
to 1.3% in 1988 and 3.7% in 1987); Robert Cassidy, Research Funding for
1989 Won't Even Reach $131 Billion, RES. & DEV., Jan. 1989, at 47;
Ralph E. Winter, Research Spending in US to Slow in 1989, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 21, 1988, at B3.
158. See generally P. Roy Vagelos, The Sorry State of Scientific Edu-
cation, SCI. AM., Oct. 1989, at 128 (arguing that the United States edu-
cational system fails to produce students literate in science and mathe-
matics); see also MADE IN AMERICA, supra note 86, at 21-22.
159. Grundfest Remarks, supra note 153, at 5. These figures do not
include defense-related military R&D spending, -because nondefense R&D
is more directly related to national industrial competitiveness issues than
is military R&D spending. Id. at 5 n.10. Nondefense R&D spending as a
percentage of GNP in the U.S. stayed at 1.9% at the end of 1989. See
National Science Board, Science and Engineering Indicators-1991 (U.S.
G.P.O. 1991), at 4, fig. 0-2; 109 [hereinafter cited as S&E INDICATORS].
160. West Germany's nonmilitary R&D spending in 1987 was approxi-
mately 2.6% of GNP; in Japan, it was 2.7% of GNP. See Grundfest Re-
marks, supra note 153, at 5. In 1989, however, nondefense R&D spend-
ing had risen to 2.8% of GNP in Germany and 3.0% of GNP in Japan.
See S&E INDICATORS, supra note 159, at 108.
161. The rate of increase in nondefense R&D spending in Japan is
striking. Japanese nondefense R&D spending as a percentage of total
U.S. nondefense R&D spending has increased from 35% in 1972 to 58%
in 1989. See S&E INDICATORS, supra note 159, at 108. In fact, some
reports suggest that total Japanese industrial R&D spending in 1990 may
have surpassed total industrial R&D spending in the U.S. See infra note
163.
162. See Missed Opportunities: R&D-A Bigger Push in Japan, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 14, 1988, at R21; see also Lindley H. Clark & Alfred L.
Malabre, Slow Rise in Outlays for Research Imperils U.S. Competitive
Edge, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 1988, at Al (rate of corporate spending has
slowed markedly, imperiling U.S. competitive stance in world markets).
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cine compared to the 1970s."=
There is abundant anecdotal evidence suggesting that short-
ened investment horizons (as evidenced by the decreased
growth of corporate investment in research and development)
have coincided with the dramatic increase in highly leveraged
takeover and/or defensive activity.'" The evidence from the
One interesting study of 200 Japanese and U.S. corporations has
concluded that while Japan has obtained relatively higher rates of return
from' applied R&D, the U.S. has obtained relatively higher rates of return
from basic R&D. See Edwin Mansfield, Industrial R&D in Japan and the
United States: A Comparative Study, AM. ECON. REV., May 1988, at 223,
225. Because of the higher rate of return, to Japanese corporations for
applied research, R&D intensity (ratio of R&D spending to sales) in man-
ufacturing firms has increased more rapidly in Japan than in the U.S.
See id. In contrast to the practices of the 1970s, Japanese corporations
now seem to devote "about as large a percentage of their R&D expendi-
tures to relatively risky and long-term projects" as U.S. corporations. Id.
at 225 & Table 2. Moreover, although increases in the size of U.S. corpo-
rations result in less than proportionate increases in R&D expenditures
aimed at new processes and products, the opposite is true in Japan,
where increases in size tend to result in disproportionately large increas-
es in R&D spending. See id. at 227.
163. See, e.g., William J. Broad, Research Spending is Declining in
U.S. as it Rises Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1992, at Al (U.S. spending
on R&D, after peaking in 1989, has steadily declined). A draft report of
the U.S. Competitiveness Policy Council suggests that NSF's use of con-
version tables to equalize price levels among countries may disguise the
fact that Japan now actually spends more on industrial research than we
do. See William J. Broad, Japan Seen Passing U.S. in Research by In-
dustry, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1992, at C1.
There is disagreement over whether a comparison of spending levels
is meaningful. The NSF projects Japanese R&D spending at levels con-
siderably lower than those in the U.S., using a purchasing power parity
exchange rate calculated by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development that involves a higher yen-to-dollar ratio. See S&E
INDICATORS, supra note 159, at 341 appendix table 4-26.
164. See, e.g., NAS, CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING, supra note 115, at 25
(remarks of Stuart E. Eizenstat) (discussing poll of 476 of largest U.S.
industrial corporations revealing that R&D budgets of most would not be
growing as fast in the next three years as they had in previous three;
also, Industrial Research Institute survey of 161 R&D directors reporting
that R&D funding as percentage of sales was expected to continue to
drop); Hostile Takeovers and Junk Bond Financing, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS
AND TARGETS, supra note 98, at 22 (remarks of Michael D. Dingman,
Chairman and CEO of the Henley Group, Inc.) (under short-term perfor-
mance pressure, managers "cut back on [their] long-term development
and other things that have a long-range payback, the investments that
ultimately produce the big wins"); NAS, CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING,
supra note 115, at 104 (remarks of Gregg Jarrell); id. at 54-55 (remarks
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empirical studies is somewhat more mixed, but is nevertheless
troubling in its implications.
In 1989, the National Science Foundation (NSF) published
the results of its "Assessment of the Impact of Recent Lever-
aged Buyouts and Other Restructurings on Industrial Research
and Development Expenditures."" The NSF Study reported
that, following 10 years of increases averaging 5.8% annually
in corporate R&D funding, real growth has "all but disap-
peared." Of the 200 R&D-performing companies surveyed,'"
which accounted for nearly 90% of total corporate R&D spend-
ing, 33 firms had recently merged into 16 firms; and an addi-
tional 8 firms were involved in leveraged buyouts (LBOs) or
other restructurings. These two groups of firms accounted for
nearly 20% of total corporate R&D spending in 1987 ($9.2
billion and $600 million, respectively). Whereas all other R&D-
performing companies reported a 5.4% increase in R&D spend-
ing between 1986 and 1987, these 24 firms had a combined
5.3% reduction in R&D spending during the same period. The
merged firms together 7 had a 4.7% annual reduction in their
own R&D expenditures during a period when R&D spending
by all U.S. corporations increased 3.3%. The LBO/restructured
firms ' " experienced a total decline in R&D spending during
the same period of 12.8%."
of I. MacAllister Booth, President and CEO of Polaroid Corporation).
Of course, there are also reports to the contrary. See, e.g., KNIGHTS,
RAIDERS, AND TARGETS, supra note 98, at 25-26 (remarks of Warren
Buffett and Michael Jensen); NAS, CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING, supra
note 115, at 37 (remarks of Michael Tokarz) (reporting that the R&D
budget of Duracell Corp. is "dramatically higher under private ownership
than it was under public ownership ... [blecause management runs the
company and we are the owner and we want long-term value apprecia-
tion").
165. 1989 NSF Study, supra note 6.
166. Significantly, the survey did not include any companies that sold
off substantial R&D performing divisions during the relevant period. Such
companies reported "drastic reductions" in R&D spending, but were omit-
ted from the study because the acquired divisions could not be "tracked"
after their acquisitions. Id. at 681.
167. Of the sixteen mergers, nine firms reported significant reductions
in their R&D budgets, three reported little or no change, and four had
increases. Id. at 686.
168. All eight of the firms involved in LBOs or defensive
restructurings experienced significant reductions in R&D spending. Id.
169. Id. LBO/restructured firms posted a decline in R&D spending
even in industries where R&D spending increased significantly during the
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These results7 ' raise a "warning flag""' about the pros-
pects for nonmilitary R&D in the United States. For present
purposes, the question is whether the law governing U.S. cor-
porations (and perhaps other financial institutions) has con-
tributed to this increasingly negative aspect of corporate per-
formance."
relevant period. For example, whereas the chemical industry (including
pharmaceuticals) increased R&D spending by 9.8%, R&D spending in the
affected chemical companies increased by only 4.5/--less than half the
increase in the industry as a whole. The decline in R&D spending, pre-
dictably, also affected employment of R&D personnel. During the same
period, the twenty-four LBO/restructured firms reported drops in the
employment of R&D scientists and engineers of 4.1%, whereas total in-
dustrial employment of R&D scientists and engineers increased 1.8%. See
id. at 687.
170. Other studies concerning the impact of takeovers on R&D spend-
ing had demonstrated little or no decrease in R&D intensity (the ratio of
R&D spending to sales). See, e.g., FRANK R. LICHTENBERG & DONALD
SIEGEL, THE EFFECTS OF LEVERAGED BUYOUTS ON PRODUCTIVITY AND
RELATED ASPECTS OF FIRM BEHAVIOR 30 (National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper No. 3022, 1989); Bronwyn H. Hall, The Effect of
Takeover Activity on Corporate Research and Development, in CORPORATE
TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES, 69, 93 (Alan J. Auerbach ed.,
1988) [hereinafter Hall, The Effect of Takeover Activity] ("[T]he existing
data (through 1985) provide very little evidence that acquisitions cause a
reduction in R&D spending .... At the individual industry level the re-
sults were too imprecisely measured to draw solid conclusions.").
The apparent discrepancy between the findings of the 1989 NSF
Study, supra note 6, with regard to aggregate R&D spending and those
of the studies above, with regard to R&D intensity, may result from the
decreases in firm size (and sales) that occur after a takeover. Thus, R&D
intensity may not decrease despite a considerable decline in overall R&D
expenditures. See NAS, CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING, supra note 115, at
83-84 (comments of Kenneth S. Flamm).
Professor Hall has completed two additional studies that focus on
the effects of highly leveraged corporate restructuring (rather than take-
overs per se) on R&D spending. Both studies conclude that there is
strong evidence of a link between leverage and decreased R&D spending.
See CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING, supra note 98, at 123; HALL, INVEST-
MENT HORIZONS, supra note 6, at 24-25; infra notes 173-82 and accompa-
nying text.
171. Bloch Testimony, supra note 157, at 688.
172. Although it has been suggested that mergers combining small
"innovative" enterprises with larger financially strong corporations may
yield intensified R&D efforts, several studies concerning the results of
merger activity "provide[] no support for this hypothesis." Ravenscraft &
Scherer, supra note 20, at 44 ("Lines of business originating from merg-
ers had significantly lower company-financed R&D to sales ratios [short-
falls of 5 to 8.5%] than product lines with similar market shares in the
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Through information concerning 2500 publicly-traded manu-
facturing firms from 1976 to 1987 compiled in a master data
foe, " Professor Bronwyn Hall'7' has advanced our under-
tanding of the legacy of the takeover decade. Her 1990 study
Jf', the subset of corporations that underwent restructuring
4'i4uig that period has yielded several' interesting conclusions,
some of which confirmed the work of other researchers, some
of which broke new ground.
. Hall initially observed that the leveraged buyouts and other
private acquisitions of publicly traded manufacturing firms
tended to occur in sectors "where R&D investment and innova-
tion have not been important, at least to the industry as a
whole."" Thus, even if these corporations drastically reduced
same industries, but without a merger history.") The Ravenscraft-Scherer
studies, cited above, and also DAVID J. RAVENSCRAFT & F.M. SCHERER,
MERGERS, SELL-OFFS, AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY (1987), as well as oth-
ers, are sometimes "excluded" from published accounts of the effects of
corporate restructurings on R&D spending, because they involve a "con-
glomerate restructuring wave that is substantially different from current
restructuring phenomena." Grundfest Remarks, supra note 153, at 12
n.39.
173. See CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING, supra note 98, at 91-92. The
study examined 2,500 U.S. manufacturing firms from Standard and Poor
Corp. 'Compustat" files. Professor Hall identified several different types
of changes in corporate structure and examined every such event: merg-
ers and acquisitions (public and private), leveraged buyouts, and increas-
es in debt position not involving changes of control or ownership. This
data base was also utilized in her 1990-1991 INVESTMENT HORIZONS
study. See infra notes 174-82 and accompanying text.
. Approximately 1,200 firms had "exited" from the Compustat files by
1987, the last year of the study. Professor Hall researched the reasons
for the exit (type of acquisition, bankruptcy, liquidation, name change, or
t0,%r reason), the year it occurred, the market price at the time of exit,
And the name of any acquiror. She then organized these firms by catego-
*ry. acquisition by public firms (480), acquisition by foreign firms (100),
going private transaction (250), bankruptcy/liquidation (130) and others
that were "not true exits" (either name changes or delistings). Other
firms that increased their leverage substantially (where increase in long-
term debt in any one year was greater than 75% of the sum of their
debt' and equity at the beginning of the year) were singled out and in-
cluded as firms that had "restructured." See. CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING,
supra note 98, at 92.
174. Hall's work has been prominent in the literature. See, e.g., Hall,
The Effects of Takeover Activity, supra note 170; CORPORATE RESTRUCTUR-
ING, supra note 98; HALL, INVESTMENT HORIZONS, supra note 6.
175. See CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING, supra note 98, at 121. Hall
concludes that "going private" restructurings per se do not pose a signifi-
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R&D, 6 the impact on R&D spending generally would have
been relatively minor. However, when the focus is broadened
from LBOs as such to firms that had moved to a substantially
higher leverage position post restructuring, the exhibited de-
cline in R&D intensity (ratio of R&D expenditures to sales) is
0.8% of sales for the period from 1982 to 1987.7'" Moreover,
these results involved many firms that, unlike the LBO firms,
were doing "significant amounts of R&D" before the restruc-
turing. Finally, Hall discovered "weak" statistical evidence that
publicly-traded acquiring firms also appeared to experience
"permanent declines in their R&D intensity relative to other
firms in their industry."17 '
cant threat to corporate R&D spending in the United States because
"R&D intensive firms and high-technology industries are not good can-
didates for these acquisitions." Id. at 102. Such firms do not have the
"cash flow properties" needed to service the debt incurred by the transac-
tion. Id. at 96: Moreover, the assets of R&D intensive firms tend to be
"not very redeployable (and . . . often difficult to transfer without sub-
stantial investments by the receiving firm."). Id. Thus the "cash flow and
asset specificity considerations argue strongly that leveraged buyouts will
not take place- in firms and industries in which research and develop-
ment is important." Id. Accord, e.g., Abbie J. Smith, Corporate Ownership
Structure and Performance: The Case of Management Buyouts, 27 J. FIN.
ECON. 143, 154-155 (1990). See also HALL, INVESTMENT HORIZONS, supra
note 6, at 14 (firms with stable short project development horizon or low
technology-i.e., low variance in cash flow and investment strategies-are
"far more likely", to undergo LBOs than others).
176. Not all studies of LBOs have reported decreases in R&D spend-
ing. A study by Lichtenberg & Siegel, concluded that R&D intensity for
43 LBO firms between 1978 and 1986 "tended to increase" over this
period. LICHTENBERG & SIEGEL, supra note 170, at 30. During the same
period, the R&D intensity of "all R&D performers [also] increas[ed] sig-
nificantly," however, and the "relative R&D intensity of LBO firms ...
therefore increased less than the absolute R&D intensity." Id. The au-
thors concluded that their data "cast doubt on the hypothesis that LBOs
are associated with reductions in the propensity to perform R&D." Id.
However, Hall's study on investment horizons strongly suggests it is the
leverage, rather than the buyout per se, in the LBO that is associated
with reductions in R&D spending. See supra note 6 and accompanying
text.
177. See CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING, supra note 98; at 122.
178. See id. Since R&D intensity declined .05% in the "more leveraged
of the acquisitions," Hall concluded this tended to "lend[] credence to
arguments that cash flow affects R&D spending." Id. But see
LICHTENBERG & SIEGEL, supra note 170, at 30. While acknowledging the
imprecision of these statistical results and the variability of the experi-
ences of firms in the sample, Hall concluded that "the link between le-
verage and reduced R&D spending has been established." Id. at 123.
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Unlike other empirical studies in the area,7 ' Professor
Hall's study focused on leverage itself, rather than on changes
of control per se, and suggested that the "effect of changes in
debt on R&D spending [is] strongly negative."8 ' Her follow-
up study, Corporate Restructuring and Investment ,Hori-
zons,"' reinforces these earlier findings.'82 These results,
Moreover, her follow-up 1990-1991 study concerning investment horizons
provided even stronger evidence of the linkage between leverage and
decreased R&D spending. See infra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
179. Hall believes her study-to be "the only study, outside of a few
case studies, to look specifically at large financial restructurings which
are not accompanied by a change of control." HALL, INVESTMENT HORI-
ZONS, supra note 6, at 9. As this article goes to publication, I am aware
of no other such study.
180. CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING, supra note 98, at 120.
181. HALL, INVESTMENT HORIZONS, supra note 6. Professor Hall ex-
plained that her data could be interpreted to imply "reductions in the
rate of investment of the order of 50 percent" in the year of a restruc-
turing and the two years following it, where the financial restructuring
increased long-term debt by the size of the capital stock. Id. at 11. The
greatest pressure for reduced investment (and the greatest likelihood of
takeover) occurred in long horizon industries where raiders (and the capi-
tal market) presumably rejected the previous investment strategies of
management. Whether this course of action was warranted depends in
part on the real level of market efficiency. As Professor Hall observes,
aunless one is a doctrinaire believer. in efficient markets, this evidence is
not enough to persuade one that all the investments forgone were un-
profitable." Id. at 21.
182. Professor Hall divided the industrial corporations into four sec-
tors, each of which utilizes different technologies: (1) high technology
(non-cosmetic pharmaceuticals, computing equipment, electrical machinery,
electronics, aircraft and aerospace, instruments), (2) low technology (food,
textiles, lumber, furniture, paper, miscellaneous manufacturing (toys,
leather, musical instruments, etc.)), (3) stable long horizon (non-pharma-
ceutical chemicals, petroleum, primary metals, engines and construction
equipment, non-electrical machinery, automobiles (excluding parts)), and
(4) stable short horizon (rubber and plastics, stone, clay and glass, fabri-
cated metals, cosmetics, motor vehicle parts.) HALL, INVESTMENT HORI-
ZONS, supra note 6, at 13-14. She found that LBO-induced increases in
leveraging are more likely to occur in firms with stable short horizons
and low technology, which are consistent with LBOs requiring a "low
variance in cash flow and investment strategies in order to be profitable."
Id. at 14.
However, stable long'horizon firms are more than twice as likely as
firms in the other three sectors to undertake substantial leverage increas-
es; moreover, this occurs in firms "almost as R&D intensive" as other
firms in the sector. Thus, Hall concludes, pressure to restructure is espe-
cially concentrated in sectors in which, because of size or complexity,
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while consistent with the financial realities of high degrees of
leveraging,' ' i.e., the demands upon cash flow, raise concerns
for corporate innovation in U.S. corporations.
Innovation is a time-consuming and costly process. Rarely
does innovation burst upon the scene. Rather, it develops grad-
ually, and requires the investment of substantial resources for
an extended period. For this reason, a successful innovative
firm typically must plan for a high degree of fixed costs, and
must coordinate the development of interrelated activities
involving basic R&D, production processes and, eventually,
marketing. Successful innovation, then, requires managers to
sustain corporate financial commitment for an extended period
before returns begin to accrue.'" The much vaunted invest-
ment "discipline" that high leverage exerts upon managers
unable to retain earnings, coupled with possible allocational
inefficiencies and informational asymmetries in capital mar-
kets, put at risk the capacity for sufficient financial commit-
ment to innovation.
4. Role of the Cost of Capital
a. Comparisons with Germany and Japan
There is, as noted above, general agreement that levels of
investment growth (and in particular R&D growth) have been
diminishing. ' There is far less agreement about the causes
investment is necessarily long-term and technology has long horizons. Id.
at 15. Stable long horizon firms that experience increases in leverage
also experience "larger declines in investment than firms in the high or
low technology sectors," but only proportional declines in R&D spending.
Id. at 16. Nevertheless, as Professor Hall explains, these decreases in
R&D spending following leverage increases "loom very large" given that
"the outstanding characteristic of R&D spending patterns . . . is their
sluggishness in the face of any kind of change." Id. at 16, sources cited
at 5 n.6.
183. See supra notes 170-82 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., FOLEY & LAZONICK, supra note 96, at 8:
Innovation is an ongoing process . . . [that] requires . . .fi
nancial commitment . . . . [i.e.,] the ability . . . to maintain
sustained access to financial resources so that [the firm] can
pursue innovative strategies to a successful conclusion [allowing
the firm] to invest in the coordination of complex specialized
divisions of labor over the long time period required before re-
turns can be generated.
Id.
185. See supra notes 151-69 and accompanying text.
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of that decline. The cost of capital'" in the United States, rel-
ative to competitor nations abroad, is frequently blamed for
this decreased growth in R&D spending. Indeed, those who
reject managerial/shareholder myopia as a cause of the relative
decline in R&D growth blame it entirely on the high cost of
capital,187 an undeniably important contributing factor.'"
The comparative figures concerning the cost of R&D, for
example, are indeed, as then Commissioner Grundfest ob-
served, "truly frightening."'89 A recent study by the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York reported that the annual effective
cost for a benchmark R&D project in the U.S. was 20.3%, com-
pared to 14.8% in Germany and 8.7% in Japan." Thus, R&D
186. One definition of the cost of capital is "the minimum before-tax
real rate of return that an investment project must generate in order to
pay its financing costs after tax liabilities." Robert N. McCauley & Ste-
ven A. Zimmer, Explaining International Differences in the Cost of Capi-
tal, 14 FED. RES. BD. N.Y. QUAR. REV., Summer, 1989 at 7, 8.
187. See, e.g., Grundfest Remarks, supra note 153, at 6-8; Gilson &
Kraakman, Outside Directors, supra note 10, at 882 n.68.
188. Reportedly, Japanese corporations have generally enjoyed lower
debt and equity costs than U.S. corporations. German corporations have
enjoyed lower debt costs. McCauley & Zimmer, supra note 186, at 9-13.
Thus, the cost of funds (the amount required for payments to a firm's
debt and equity holders)-an economic measure frequently equated with
the cost of capital-is lower in both Germany and Japan than in the
United States. Id. at 8, 13.
Calculating the cost of funds is an intermediate step in calculating
the cost of capital, i.e., those investment costs that must cover both the
after-tax cost of funds and tax obligations. Id. at 15. The low cost of
funds in Japan and Germany is advantageous in the funding of long-
term projects. McCauley and Zimmer observe required rates of return in
these two countries for a 10-year R&D project of 8.7% and 14.8%, respec-
tively, as compared to a 20.3% required rate of return for such a project
in the U.S. Id. at 16. These rates illustrate "how a relatively high cost of
funds erects a high hurdle for investments with delayed payoff." Id. at
15.
189. Grundfest Remarks, supra note 153, at 6. See McCauley &
Zimmer, supra note 186, at 15, table 2; supra notes 159-63 and accompa-
nying text; see also Landau & Hatsopoulos, supra note 152, at 604 (basic
differential in cost of capital would permit Japanese companies to invest
in longer-term R&D projects. or to invest far more than comparable U.S.
corporations).
190. These figures, which represent the "minimum before-tax real rate
of return that an investment project must generate in order to pay its
financing costs after tax liabilities," were for 1988. McCauley & Zimmer,
supra note 186, at 8, 16, table 2; see also George N. Hatsopoulos & Ste-
phen H. Brooks, The Gap in the Cost of Capital: Causes, Effects, and
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may be more than twice as expensive in the United States as
in Japan. Moreover, because of our relatively higher capital
costs, American investors require faster payoff periods than do
German and Japanese investors, and hesitate to undertake the
risky R&D projects being conducted in Germany and Ja-
pan.
91
It is often suggested that our capital costs are higher than
our competitors because our savings rate is lower" and our
price and interest rate volatility is greater. " The personal
savings rate in Japan averages approximately three times that
of the United States (17-18% of disposable income as compared
to approximately 5-8% in United States).'" The result of this
abundance of capital in Japan and its relative scarcity in the
Remedies, in TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC POLICY 221 (Ralph Landau and
Dale W. Jorgenson eds., 1986); Albert Ando & Alan J. Auerbach, The
Cost of Capital in the United States and Japan, 2 J. JAPANESE AND INT.
ECON. 134 (1988); Albert Ando & Alan J. Auerbach, The Corporate Cost
of Capital in Japan and the United States: A Comparison, in GOVERN-
MENT POLICY TOWARDS INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 21
(John Shoven ed., 1988) [hereinafter Ando & Auerbach, The Corporate
Cost of Capital]; Elizabeth Corcoran & Paul Wallich, The Analytical
Economist: The Cost of Capital, SCI. AM. (Oct. 1989), at 79, 79. But see
Gene Koretz, Soon, Japan Will Wave Goodbye to Cheap Capital, BUS.
WK., Sept. 30, 1991, at 16 (because of 40% overall decline in share prce
on Tokyo market, holders of $220 billion in convertible or warrant bonds
will seek to cash out in 1992-94 rather than convert, creating a need for
enormous cash reserves for Japanese corporations, driving cost of capital
up significantly).
191. See, e.g., B. Douglas Bernheim & John B. Shoven, Taxation and
the Cost of Capital: An International Comparison, in THE CONSUMPTION
TAX: A BETTER ALTERNATIVE? 61, 77 (Charles E. Walker & Mark A.
Bloomfield eds., 1987) (noting that as a result of changes in the United
States' tax code between 1980 and 1985, "the United States replaced
West Germany as the country with the highest cost of capital"). Accord-
ingly, a relatively lengthy research project might be feasible in Japan
and impossible in the United States because American investors demand
faster payoff periods. See Grundfest Remarks; supra note 153, at 7 (aver-
age break-even period for new investment in U.S. is 5.7 years as com-
pared to 10.3 years in Japan).
192. See, e.g., McCauley & Zimmer, supra note 186, at 17, chart 8.
193. See Grundfest Remarks, supra note 153, at 7.
194. See McCauley & Zimmer, supra note 186, at 17, chart 8. In fact,
there has been such an excess supply of personal savings in Japan that
it has generated controversy about the "domestic capability [of the busi-
ness and government sectors] to absorb the excess savings of the house-
hold sector." Masahiko Aoki, The Macroeconomic Background for High-
Tech Industrialization in Japan, in THE POSITIVE SUM STRATEGY 569,.
577 (Ralph Landau & Nathan Rosenberg eds., 1986).
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U.S. is that Japan exports in excess of $40 billion of capital
annually, whereas the United States annually imports approxi-
mately $100 billion of capital to finance investments and gov-
ernment deficits.
Although Japan's household savings rate is higher, German
families also significantly outsave U.S. families. 9 ' This may
be due entirely to different habits of thrift. That explanation
ignores, however, other factors that significantly influence the
savings rate, including the timing of wage and salary pay-
ments in Japan (approximately 1/6 yearly wage paid in year-
end bonuses), and the relative scarcity of consumer credit in
both countries compared with the U.S.' In addition to the
personal savings rate, the relative macroeconomic stability of
Japan and Germany greatly contributes to lowering the cost of
capital in those countries.' 7 Both Japan and Germany enjoy
lower price volatility than does the U.S."8 That low price vol-
atility enables Japanese and German investors to accept rela-
tively lower rates of return on debt.' Moreover, returns on
equity are significantly higher in the United States than in
Japan and other competitor nations." The demand for rela-
tively higher returns on equity, coupled with a higher interest
rate than is available in Japan and Germany, result in signifi-
cantly higher capital costs for U.S. corporations than for their
Japanese and German competitors."0 '
195. See McCauley & Zimmer, supra note 186, at 17, chart 8 (Ger-
man households save approximately twice as much as U.S. households).
196. See, e.g., id. at 18.
197. But see Ferdinand Protzman, German Inflation Rate Shows A
Sharp Increase, N.Y. TIMES, March 11, 1992, at D2 (the annual rate of
inflation rose in February to 4.3%, reducing the likelihood that interest
rates would be lowered to stimulate the German economy); James
Sterngold, Japan's Statistics Point to a Slump, Ending Long Boom, N.Y.
TIMES, March 9, 1992, at Al, D2 (depression in stock market has in-
creased cost of capital; decreased spending leading to cutbacks in produc-
tion.)
198. McCauley & Zimmer, supra note 186, at 20, chart 11.
199. Id. at 19 & chart 12.
200. See NAS, CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING, supra note 115, at 29
(remarks of Roger Altman) [hereinfter Altman Remarks]; McCauley &
Zimmer, supra note 186, at 19.
201. But see Ando & Auerbach, The Corporate Cost of Capital, supra
note 190, at 31-37, 46-47 (there "do not seem to be any grounds to con-
clude that the cost of capital in Japan [between 1971-81] was significant-
ly lower than that in the United States," although there is "some evi-
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b. Does Leveraging Pose Greater Risks for U.S. Firms?
The dominant sources of corporate funding and the nature of
private financial institutions (particularly banks) within the
three nations also influence the cost of capital. Equity markets
provide a relatively small percentage of externally generated
capital in all three, since the nonfinancial corporations of Ger-
many,02° Japan and the U.S. raise only a small fraction of
such funds through (relatively costly) equity issues.2" Ger-
man,20' Japanese and U.S. corporations raise a considerable
percentage of their funds through debt. However, notwith-
standing the recent rise in U.S. corporate indebtedness,"°
Japanese"° firms have substantially higher debt-to-equity ra-
tios than do comparable U.S. firms."7 Japanese corporations
dence of lower before-tax rates of return in Japan, though ... this
result is by no means definitive").
202. German corporations rely very little on equity markets for exter-
nally generated funds. Indeed, only 402 German corporations have shares
listed on the eight German stock exchanges. See 2 DEPARTMENT OF
TRADE AND INDUSTRY, BARRIERS TO TAKEOVERS IN THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITY 26 (1989) [hereinafter Coopers & Lybrand Report]. Bank borrow-
ing accounts for 20% of total enterprise funds, the largest source of ex-
ternally generated funding for German corporations. See John Cable,
Capital Market Information and Industrial Performance: The Role of West
German Banks, 95 ECON. J. 118, 119 (1985); Liquidity Versus Control,
supra note 83, at 1302, nn.96-98.
203. See J. Hodder, Corporate Capital Structure in the United States
and Japan: Financial Intermediation and Implications of Financial Dereg.
ulation, in GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARDS INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED
STATES AND JAPAN 241, 247 & figs. 9.2-9.3 (J. Shoven ed. 1988) (3.5% in
Japan; 2.6% in U.S.).
204. German corporations raise most of their externally generated
funds through long-term loans from their primary banks. See supra note
202; see also Coopers & Lybrand Report, supra note 202, at 16.
205. See supra notes 131-40 and accompanying text.
206. Long-term corporate bonds account for only a small percentage of
externally generated funds of Japanese corporations. See Hodder, supra
note 203, at 248, table 9.2 (2% average for 1973-1984). In 1984, only 4%
of the capital structure for nonfinancial companies listed on the Tokyo
Stock Exchange consisted of bonds. Id. at 247. By contrast, bonds ac-
count for an average of 41% of externally generated funds of U.S. corpo-
rations. Between 1974-1983, on average, U.S. corporations raised slightly
more of their externally generated funds from market debt instruments
than from financial institutions (13.7% and 13.4%, respectively), whereas
Japanese corporations raised roughly 75% of externally generated financ-
ing (37% overall) from private financial intermediaries. Id.
207. See id. at 245.
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generate only slightly more than 50% of funds internally
(51.7% average for 1973-1984), compared to a 70% average for
comparable U.S. corporations.2"
Significantly, the role of financial intermediaries differs in
the three countries. German corporations are extremely depen-
dent upon their banks (which enjoy "universal" banking pow-
ers) for external finance,2" and Japanese industrial firms also
obtain the majority of externally generated financings from
private financial intermediaries."' By contrast, a significant
percentage of funds of U.S. corporations is generated through
corporate bonds,2" with only a slightly larger percentage
through loans from private financial institutions.2 '
In Japan, private financial institutions (banks and insurance
companies)213 hold nearly 40% of shares on the Tokyo Stock
Exchange214 which amount to nearly half of the externally-
208. See id.
209. See Liquidity Versus Control, supra note 83, at 1302-03 & n.96;
Cable, supra note 202, at 119-21. Bank borrowing is the largest source of
externally generated funds for German nonfinancial corporations; more-
over, banks are the dominant securities brokerages controlling most new
securities issues. See id. at 119.
210. See Hodder, supra note 203, at 248 & fig. 9.2 (average of 37%
for 1973-1984).
211. See supra note 206; Hodder, supra note 203, at 249 & fig. 9.3
(9.4% average for 1973-1984).
212. Hodder, supra note 203, at 249 & fig. 9.3 (13.4% average from
private financial institutions; compared to 9.4% average from corporate
bonds in 1973-1984).
213. Under section 11 of Japan's Law No. 54 of 1947, insurance com-
panies could then own up to 10% of the equity of domestic corporations.
See Coffee, Liquidity Versus Control, supra note 83, at 1295 n.62.
214. See Hodder, supra note 203, at 251-52 & fig. 9.4 (38% of listed
shares and 35.6% of market value in 1984). Only a small percentage of
listed shares is held by individual investors, with the bulk held through
cross-ownership by members of the various keiretsu. See ARON VINER,
INSIDE JAPANESE FINANCIAL MARKETS 56 (1988) (estimating 65% cross-
ownership); Stephen Barber, A Close Circle -of Friends, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR, Feb. 1991, at 35 (reviewing ROBERT Z. LIELINSKI & NIGEL
HOLLOWAY, UNEQUAL EQUITIES: POWER AND RISK IN JAPAN'S STOCK MAR-
KET (1991) and noting that the authors estimate 70% cross-ownership),
Although U.S. banks are prohibited from owning corporate equity,
bank holding companies are authorized to own up to 5% of the voting
shares of a non-banking corporation and up to 25% of the non-voting
stock of such a corporation. See Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,
§4(cX6)-(7), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(cX6)-(7) (1992); Pauline B. Heller, FEDERAL
BANK HOLDING COMPANY LAW § 4.03(2)(a), at 4-60.8 to 4-60.10 (1989).
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held listed shares. 15 German banks own a far smaller per-
centage outright, but exercise comparable control (approxi-
mately 34% voting power in the top one hundred corporations
and over 50% of the voting power in the ten largest corpora-
tions) because of their importance in the securities indus-
try,216 and because they vote the shares deposited in banks by
the shareholders.1 7 U.S. banks are prohibited both from out-
right ownership of equity securities218 (although bank holding
companies are permitted to own up to 5% of the voting shares
of a nonbanking corporation) 19 and direct participation in the
See infra notes 218-20, 380-84 and accompanying text. Given the close
connections fostered by substantial share ownership within the creditor-
debtor relationship, and the relational continuity of the keiretsu struc-
ture, Japanese banks exercise more influence in corporate affairs than do
American banks. See John S. Reed & Glen R. Moreno, The Role of Large
Banks in Financing Innovation, in THE POSITIVE SUM STRATEGY 453, 456
(Ralph Landau & Nathan Rosenberg eds., 1986); infra notes 224-29 and
accompanying text. German banks, which, unlike their U.S. and Japanese
counterparts, have universal banking powers, also function as house
banks with considerable influence inside and outside the board room. See
Reed & Moreno, supra, at 456-457. See also Sun Bae Kim, Should Banks
Hold Shares in Nonfinancial Firms?, AM. BANKER, April 24, 1991, at 4
(noting European Community plans to adopt "universal" banking; Ger-
man, French, and Italian banks already have that power).
215. Corporations hold another 25.9% of each others' listed shares,
substantially as parent-subsidiary or interfirm holdings; if these are sub-
tracted from aggregate holdings, financial institutions own approximately
half of the remaining externally-held listed shares. See Hodder, supra
note 203, at 253 & fig. 9.4.
216. Unlike Japanese and U.S. banks, German banks are not restrict-
ed to any maximum percentage of equity ownership. See Cable, supra
note 202, at 120-21; Coffee, Liquidity Versus Control, supra note 83, at
1303-04 n.99.
217. See Coopers & Lybrand Report, supra note 202, at 13-14; Cable,
supra note 202, at 120.
218. Despite this prohibition on bank equity participation, institutional
investors in the U.S. (excluding investment banks, bank holding compa-
nies and some trustees) are reported to own nearly 45% of the equity in
the United States. See Carolyn Kay Brancato, The Pivotal Role of Institu-
tional Investors in Capital Markets, in INSTITUTIONAL INVESTING: THE
CHALLENGES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE 21ST CENTURY 3, 17-19 (Ar-
nold W. Sametz ed., 1991).
219. National banks enjoy only certain limited and specified powers
under the National Bank Act of Feb. 25, 1863, §11, 12 U.S.C. §24 (sev-
enth) (1988). Equity participation is not among them. State chartered
banks within the Federal Reserve are subject to similar restrictions. See
Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall), §5(c), 12 U.S.C. §335 (1988).
It has been suggested that such restrictions on financial institutions
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securities industry.220 Japanese banks, although permitted to
own equity shares in their own right,2 1 are subjected to stat-
utory restrictions by the Japanese equivalent of the. Glass-
Steagall Act, 2 which separates commercial banking from in-
vestment banking activities.22
The major Japanese and German banks, to a far greater
extent than their U.S. counterparts, function as financial inter-
mediaries that can lower the costs incurred in the event of firm
failure, i.e., bankruptcy.224 They are, therefore, effectively
able to lower the cost of capital itself.2
have disabled banks and other private financial institutions from effec-
tively participating in monitoring and control of U.S. corporations. See
Roe, supra note 117. But see Coffee, Liquidity Versus Control, supra note
83, at 1295-96 & n.63 (limitations are overstated since bank holding
companies are permitted to own up to 5% of the voting shares of a
nonbanking company under Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, §
4(c)(6)-(7), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6)-(7) (1988)). For further discussion of the
monitoring role of financial intermediaries, see infra notes 374-94 and
accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text; Banking Act of
1933, §§ 16, 20-21 & 23; 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 377-78 (1988). Even bank
trust departments are closely regulated with regard to equity holdings.
See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(b)(9)(ii) (1990) (restricting investment in the
stock of any single corporation to 10% of trust funds). This restriction
followed the Patman Report, which cautioned against the growing influ-
ence of bank trust departments. See Commercial Banks and Their Trust
Activities: Emerging Influence on the American Economy 1-4, 1 STAFF OF
THE HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON DOMESTIC FINANCE, COMM. ON BANKING AND
CURRENCY, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., (1968).
221. Japanese lenders are frequently substantial equity holders in
debtor corporations. See Stephen D. Prowse, Institutional Investment Pat-
terns and Corporate Financial Behavior in the United States and Japan,
27 J. FIN. ECON. 43, 46-47 (1990) (on average, the largest corporate
debtholder owned 6.2% of equity; five largest debtholders owned 18.2% of
equity; largest debtholder was largest equityholder in 57 out of 133 cas-
es). See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 219, infra note 223 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 218-20 and accompanying text; see Banking Act
of 1933, §§ 16, 20, 21, 23; 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 377-78 (1988). Section 65
of Japan's Securities Exchange Act of 1948, Law No. 25 of 1948, prohib-
its Japanese banks from engaging in investment banking. In addition,
since 1987, Japanese banks may not own more than 5% .of the equity of
any domestic corporation. See Section 11(a), Law No. 54 of 1947.
224. But see Sterngold, supra note 197, at D1 ("[B]ankruptcies [of
Japanese corporations] are soaring as big declines in stock and property
prices hurt speculators. Banks are reluctant to lend because of a mount-
ing toll of bad loans.").
225. See Hodder, supra note 203, at 253; Takeo Hoshi et al., Corpo-
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Financial intermediaries can lower the risk of failure for
highly leveraged firms in two ways: first, by monitoring and
restraining (if necessary) management risk-taking, thereby
reducing the risk of bankruptcy overall; second, by intervening,
if necessary, to facilitate firm reorganization without losing the
confidence of employees, customers and suppliers.22 In Ja-
pan, for example, financial intermediaries have traditionally
performed both of these finctions.
When a major Japanese firm suffers financial difficulty, its
main bank decides whether or not to launch a rescue effort. If
the bank does intervene, the transition back to health can be
accomplished 'relatively smoothly and without major disrup-
tion 7 because Japanese main banks have traditionally had
stable, 8 long-term relationships22 with their major indus-
rate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese Indus-
trial Groups, 106 Q.J. ECON. 33 (1991) (institutional arrangements in
Japan offer Japanese firms an important competitive advantage); David
P. Hale, Learning from Germany and Japan, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1991,
at A10 (advocating lowering of barriers between banking and commerce
to enable banks to replace takeover market as monitor for management);
Paul Sheard, The Main Bank System and Corporate Monitoring and
Control in Japan, 11 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 399 (1989). But see Robert
E. Litan, The Dangers of Letting Banks Own Everything, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 5, 1991, at A22 (cautioning against universal banking as increasing
risks to federal deposit insurance and creating unequal advantages for
insured banks over other, non-bank companies).
226. See Hodder, supra note 203, at 254.
227. See id. One prominent Japanese example involves Sumitomo
Bank, which in 1974 rescued a floundering Toyo Kogyo (Mazda) by send-
ing bank executives to take over Toyo Kogyo's management, guaranteeing
the loans of other creditors and, through Sumitomo Trust (another mem-
ber of Sumitomo Group), making commitments for further loans if neces-
sary in the future. Throughout the extended crisis, none of Toyo Kogyo's
seventy-one other lenders ever called in a loan or refused to roll over
existing short-term credit agreements. Moreover, layoffs were unnecessary,
although some workers moved from production to sales for a period of
time. See id. See also Richard Pascale & Thomas P. Rohlen, The Mazda
Turnaround, 9 J. JAP. STUD. 219, 228-30 (1983). For a comparable Ger-
man account, see, e.g., Robert Ingersoll & Rose Brady, The Banker Be-
hind the Shakeup at Daimler-Benz, Bus. WK., July 27, 1987, at 36 (Deut-
sche Bank, 28% shareholder, replacing senior executives at struggling
Daimler-Benz). Those experiences are in stark contrast to the events
surrounding Chrysler's financial woes in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
when an Act of Congress and a loan guarantee backed by the U.S. Trea-
sury were required to rescue the floundering corporation. See Hodder,
supra note 203, at 254-55; see generally ROBERT B. REICH & JOHN D.
DONAHUE, NEW DEALS: THE CHRYSLER REVIVAL AND THE AMERICAN SYS-
TEM (1985).
228. But-see Coffee, Liquidity Versus Control, supra note 83, at 1298-
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trial borrowers and own substantial blocks of their shares. Be-
cause of the intensity of these relationships and the depen-
dence of heavily-leveraged corporations upon their main banks,
main banks have unique access to confidential information
about the corporation's operations and plans.230 Their contin-
ued support in times of difficulty is frequently conditioned
upon their exercise of considerable influence upon corporate
spending, and other short- and long-term policy decisions. 8'
Nevertheless, their control depends upon the corporation's
need for capital, and has been described as "weak" when capi-
tal is not scarce.2 '
99 & nn.79-81 (noting that the stability of these relationships is chang-
ing). See supra note 224, infra note 232, and accompanying text.
229. Although there is increasing competition among the major lend-
ers, their small number (approximately ten top banks control lending to
major industrial corporations), common interests and shared knowledge
tend to facilitate policy coordination and greatly reduce lending risks. Cf.
Douglas W. Diamond, Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring,
51 REV. ECON. STUDS. 393 (1984) (financial intermediary, such as bank,
can be delegated to monitor financial information concerning debtor-firms,
reducing agency costs overall by eliminating duplicative monitoring by
other creditors of debtor-firm, and solving free-rider problem where no
creditors monitor). Professor Diamond's model "focuses on a financial
intermediary who raises funds from many lenders (depositors), promises
them a given pattern of returns, lends to entrepreneurs, and spends
resources monitoring and enforcing loan contracts with entrepreneurs
which are less costly than -those available without monitoring." Id. at
394.
230. Because small lenders tend to follow the lead of the Japanese
main banks with regard to a corporation's creditworthiness, and the ma-
jority of corporate loans are short-term and must be rolled over, these
main banks have enormous power. See Hodder, supra note 203, at 257.
Professor Stiglitz suggests that the two institutions with the great-
est incentives to effectively monitor management are banks and unions.
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Credit Markets and the Control of Capital, 17 J. MON-
EY CREDIT & BANKING 133, 148 (1985). It is interesting to note that,
because of co-determination and universal banking, German corporations
have installed both of these groups as monitors of corporate perfor-
mance--a system frequently praised for its efficiency. But see Joseph F.
Esser, Bank Power in West Germany Revised, WEST EUR. POL., Summer
1990, at 17, 27 (suggesting that management is "usurping the controlling
function of the supervisory boards").
231. Indeed, this influence may amount to veto power and involve the
replacement of senior managers with bank executives. See Hodder, supra
note 203, at xx; see also supra note 227 and accompanying text.
232. See, e.g., JAMES C. ABEGGLEN & GEORGE STALK, JR., KAISHA,
THE JAPANESE CORPORATION 189 (1985) ("Banks must now solicit attrac-
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German banks arguably exercise still greater control over
their client corporations. Indeed, because of their remarkable
voting power,' they hold nearly ten percent of the total seats
on the supervisory boards"" of Germany's one hundred larg-
est firms."'
Monitoring by banks 'in Japan and Germany seems to have
decreased ongoing agency costs for other lenders and inves-
tors,23 6 while facilitating efficient "liquidation or rescue deci-
sion[making]" when necessary, with minimal operational dis-
ruption and often without recourse to costly bankruptcy pro-
ceedings.2 7 Thus, for example, Japan's main bank system, by
tive borrowers, and find themselves providing funds to the weaker com-
panies, in which their power remain considerable. The most successful of
Japan's companies . . . are hardly under bank control.").
233. See supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
234. German corporations law provides for a two-tier structure: a su-
pervisory board on which managers do not sit, and a managing board.
For an early description that retains vitality, see Detlev F. Vagts, Re-
forming the "Modern" Corporation: Perspectives from the German, 80
HARV. L. REV. 23, 50 (1966). For discussions of the role of labor repre-
sentation on the supervisory board, see ALFRED L. THIMM, THE FALSE
PROMISE OF CODETERMINATION (1980); Klaus J. Hopt, European Commu-
nity, New Ways in Corporate Governance: European Experiments with
Labor Representation on Corporate Boards, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1338 (1984).
235. See Cable, supra note 202, at 119. But see Esser, supra note
230, at 26 (representation on the supervisory boards of the hundred larg-
est German firms has dropped to 7%). See also New Dreams at Deutsche
Bank, ECONOMIST, June 22, 1991, at 79 (Deutsche Bank, Germany's lead-
ing universal bank, has begun relinquishing the chairmanship of supervi-
sory boards of German corporations). Nevertheless, bank influence re-
mains substantial. See, e.g., Hermann H. Kallfass, The American Corpora-
tion and the Institutional Investor: Are There Lessons From Abroad? The
German Experience, 3 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 775, 783 (1988).
236. The nature of monitoring provided by Japanese and German
banks is not' uncontroversial. In Japan, for example, although the main
bank within a keiretsu has remarkable capability to consult with man-
agement and advance the interests of all shareholders, it has been sug-
gested that it may choose rather to ally itself primarily with manage-
ment, intervening only in times of financial distress or, sustained
unprofitability. See Liquidity Versus Control, supra note 83, at 1299.
Reform of the German system is surveryed in Friedrich K. Kubler, An
International Perspective: Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A
German Dilemma, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 97 (1991). For the declining influ-
ence of Japanese and German banks, see supra notes 232, 235 & infra
notes 237, 243. For a discussion of proposals to enhance the monitoring
role of U.S. financial institutions, see infra notes 374-94 and accompany-
ing text.
237. See Hodder, supra note 203, at 258.
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guaranteeing the supply of credit to industrial corporations,
has decreased the need to issue equity and permitted Japanese
firms to finance growth with a high degree of debt plus a mini-
mal risk of bankruptcy."8
The governmental response to corporate distress in Japan
and Germany also seems to reinforce the potential for higher
degrees of leverage with relatively low costs from financial
failure. In Japan, the government manipulates antitrust ex-
emptions that result in higher prices through cuts in capacity
and extends official loans to spread the costs of shrinking in-
dustries to taxpayers. 3 ' Germany achieves similar' results
primarily through outright subsidies to declining indus-
tries.40 Although the U.S. has intervened to assist a flounder-
ing Chrysler' and occasionally has subsidized industries
"under pressure, 2  these instances are truly exceptional.
Given the improbability of official "bailouts" relieving creditors
and investors of U.S. corporations of the full risks of financial
distress (outside of the savings and loan industry), the costs of
failure will continue to be compensated ex ante through higher
capital costs.
Although there are signs of change in the relationships of
Japanese and German corporations to their primary banks,2""
238. See Hodder, supra note 203, at 259.
239. See McCauley & Zimmer, supra note 186, at 24; see also Merton
J. Peck et al., Picking Losers: Public Policy Toward Declining Industries
in Japan, in GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARDS INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED
STATES AND JAPAN 195-239 (J. Shoven ed., 1988).
240. See McCauley & Zimmer, supra note 186, at 24.
241. See supra notes 227 and accompanying text. The U.S. govern-
ment also assisted a failing Lockheed, but these two examples pretty
much exhaust the list of substantial overt governmental intervention.
242. McCauley & Zimmer, supra note 186, at 24.
243. There are indications that the increasing availability of credit
(both from abroad and from other domestic lenders), coupled with a
buildup of internal financial resources, is weakening the hold of Japanese
and German banks overall. For Japan, see, e.g., W. CARL KESTER, JAPA-
NESE TAKEOVERS 187-217 (1991); J. Mark Ramseyer, Legal Rules in Re-
peated Deals: Banking in the Shadow of Defection in Japan, 20 J. LEGAL
STUD. 91, 98 n.18, 107-08 (1991); Takeo Hoshi et al., Bank Monitoring
and Investment: Evidence from the Changing Structure of Japanese Cor.
porate Banking Relationships, in ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION, CORPORATE
FINANCE, AND INVESTMENT 105-26 (R. Hubbard ed., 1990); Abegglen &
Stalk, supra note 232, at 166, 189; McCauley & Zimmer, supra note 186,
at 25. For Germany, see, e.g., Kubler, supra note 236, at 100 (Federation
of German Banks survey finding that holdings of ten largest private
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and both economies show signs of slowing, " the gap in the
cost of capital, which is so disadvantageous to U.S. corpora-
tions, seems unlikely to close in the near future.2" This does
not bode well for the expansion of U.S. capital investment
since the cost of capital is central to determining the net pres-
ent value of funs' investment projects."" Indeed, some U.S.
firms may have restructured specifically to use debt2 .7 and to
reduce existing investment programs entailing high capital
costs.4 Under our current system, firms will continue to be
driven toward using relatively costly "external finance" for
investment and the high interest rate will "cut both the level
and the horizon of... investment."49 Indeed, the higher the
banks in aggregate equity of all German stock corporations declined from
1.32% in 1976 to 0.57% in 1989); Esser, supra note 230, at 22-23 (noting
that the credit dependence thesis is undermined by the availability of off-
shore credit, large industrial firms' high rate of self-financing, and re-
duced debt owed to banks by the leading export centers of the German
economy).
244. See supra notes 197 and 224, 237.
245. As McCauley and Zimmer, supra note 186, at 24, observe, "Itihe
prospects advise against waiting and hoping for demographic and consum-
er borrowing trends to improve the U.S. position." Id.
246. See HALL, INVESTMENT HORIZONS, supra note 6, at 20, 34;
Grundfest Remarks, supra note 153; Gilson & Kraakman, Outside Direc.
tors, supra note 10, at 882 n.68.
247. It would be tempting to conclude that Japan's relatively higher
rate of corporate leverage accounts in part for its relatively lower cost of
capital, and that increases in corporate leverage would result in lowering
of those costs for U.S. corporations. However, Japanese and German
corporations enjoy dramatically different relationships with their banks
than do U.S. corporations, which allow them to increase leverage with
relatively low costs of financial distress. See supra notes 202-42 and ac-
companying text; McCauley & Zimmer, supra note 186, at 21-22. By
contrast, U.S. corporations that incr ease their leverage suffer substantial-
ly increased risk of bankruptcy. See id. at 23 (10% rise in U.S. leverage
associated with 29% increase in fraction of corporate debt in bankruptcy).
But see supra notes 136, 224 (indicating that the rate of bankruptcies in
Japan is increasing). It would seem, then, that the potential for decreas-
ing the cost of capital through increased leverage is at best "limited"
given the nature of U.S. corporate debtor-creditor relationships.
248. HALL, INVESTMENT HORIZONS, supra note 6, at 20, 34. See also
Landau & Hatsopoulos, supra note 152, at 604 (concluding that recent
costs of capital to U.S. corporations sometimes exceeded returns).
249. HALL, INVESTMENT HORIZONS, supra note 6, at 35. Professor Hall
concludes that, if corporate restructuring discourages investment, "it does
so by increasing the cost of funds to the firm in order to force managers
to pay out cash, and not by a change of control alone." Id. at 34. Results
of her statistical analysis and case studies indicated that "the most nega-
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cost of capital (either debt or equity), the higher the discount
rate for future returns will be; accordingly, future benefits
from investment must be projected at still higher levels in
order to justify present investment. The final result will be still
less investment over the long term, and the continued decline
in the competitiveness of U.S. firms in world markets.
B. The Problem of Labor Noncooperation
Plant closings and staff reductions that often follow in the
wake of takeover contests and corporate restructurings may be
essential for the sake of efficiency and firm profitability. Nev-
ertheless, they impose costs on the affected employees (and
communities) that may well justify transfer payments to cush-
ion transition to new jobs (or communities).25 The central
question relative to competitiveness is whether a firm's long-
term performance may be harmed by disregarding employee
interests when plants are closed and staff levels are trimmed
in order to effect quick improvements in share price.
1. Broken Promises?
Although anecdotal accounts abound,251 the empirical data
to date on whether the takeovers and defensive restructuring
of the 1980s resulted in significant employment losses and
wage reductions are inconclusive. Some studies suggest thai
white collar and administrative personnel were principally
affected, job losses amounted to about a ten to fifteen percent
reduction in staff levels, and that employment levels tended to
rise again during the post-transaction period."2 Other studies
tive event for investment is the defense of a hostile takeover," although
friendly takeovers between firms in related industries often were not
followed by decreased investment. Id. at 20.
250. See, e.g., Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's
Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced
Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189 (1991); Alan E. Garfield, Helping the
Casualties of Creative Destruction: Corporate Takeovers and the Politics of
Worker Dislocation, 16 J. CORP. L. 249 (1991).,
251. For a haunting Pulitzer Prize-winning account of the human
costs of a leveraged buyout, see Susan C. Faludi, Safeway LBO Yields
Vast Profits But Exacts a Heavy Human Toll, WALL ST. J., May 16,
1990, at Al. See also Shleifer & Summers, supra note 142, at 48-50
(stating that employee wage reductions in TWA takeover equalled one
and one-half times takeover premium paid to shareholders).
252. See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat et al., Hostile Takeovers in the 1980s:
574 [Vol.45:513
BEYOND AGENCY COSTS
offer a considerably gloomier picture.2 "
Measuring the impact of takeovers and restructurings on
employment is difficult given the various causes of staff reduc-
tions. A workforce reduction may be prompted by a decline in
market demand for a firm's product.2 "' Another firm may re-
duce its workforce in the wake of a defensive restructuring in
response to a real or threatened hostile takeover. 5
There are two basic, distinct rationales offered to justify
terminating employees or reducing wages and benefits because
of pressures from the market for corporate control. The posi-
tive, efficiency-enhancing rationale states that the firm was
undertaking long-needed reductions in a bloated staff and
overly-generous compensation packages-reductions that man-
agement, unresponsive to shareholder welfare, had been reluc-
tant to implement. In this view, the takeover threat operates
to force managers to reduce unnecessary labor costs and, in the
process, improve profitability and share price. If the managers
The Return to Corporate Specialization, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECO-
NOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 1, 26, 29 (1990) (layoffs principally of
white collar employees); Charles Brown & James L. Medoff, The Impact
of Firm Acquisitions on Labor, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS, supra note
142, at 9, 10-11, 23 (only 5% decline in employment after sale of assets
but wages were about 5% higher; study limited to companies in a single
state); Steven Kaplan, The Effects of Management Buyouts on Operating
Performance and Value, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 217, 240-42 (1989) (employment
growth rate 6-12% lower in companies taken-over during 1980-86 period,
compared to similar companies not taken over); Frank R. Lichtenberg &
Donald Siegel, The Effect of Ownership Changes on the Employment and
Wages of Central Office and Other Personnel, 33 J. L. & ECON. 383, 401-
02 (1990) (noting that "ownership change is associated with sharp reduc-
tions in the firm's employment of auxiliary-establishment personnel, rela-
tive to its employment of production-establishment personnel," employ-
ment of workers in production plants that changed ownership during
1977-82 period was 7-13% lower than in plants that did not change own-
ers; there is evidence of partial recovery of employment level during post-
transaction period); see also Leveraged Buyouts: Case Studies of Selected
Leveraged Buyouts, Report of the G.A.O., B-244418, Sept. 16, 1991, at 5
(noting an employment decline after four LBOs and one recapitalization
caused by asset divestitures and cost reduction efforts) [hereinafter GAO
Report].
253. See, e.g., Shleifer & Summers, supra note 142, at 33-56.
254. But see infra notes 268, 288-90 and accompanying text (Japanese
firms confronting declining markets explore new ventures and retain or
lend regular employees to subsidiaries/customers because of a strong
traditional inhibition against layoffs).
255. The demonstration effects of takeovers also cannot be directly
measured. See supra notes 115, 137 and accompanying text.
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still refuse to act, shareholders will tender their shares and the
new managers will make the necessary, if painful, adjust-
ments.
According to the second rationale, the firm is interested in
attracting employees who will make a career-long commitment;
its focus is on developing an "internal labor market." The firm
benefits because the employees will develop skills, over the
course of their careers, that will make a greater marginal con-
tribution to the value of the firm's product than the firm could
obtain from workers hired periodically from the external labor
market, who have no prior involvement with the firm. These
are "firm-specific" skills; they improve the employee's produc-
tivity for the particular firm but are not transferable general
skills that would offer similar value to other employers.25
The firm is also interested in encouraging the cooperation of
existing employees in training new workers to develop such
skills without fear that such cooperation will result in their
own replacement. A firm secures this type of commitment from
its employees in large part by promising that layoffs will occur
in inverse relationship to length of service, and by keying com-
pensation and benefits to length of service. Accordingly, a sig-
nificant portion of employee compensation is deferred to the
latter stages of an employee's career. Employees agree ex ante
to such delayed-compensation arrangements presumably be-
cause they will receive more valuable lifetime compensation
(including job satisfaction and job security) than if they remain
in the external labor market."7
256. See PETER B. DOERINGER & MICHAEL J. PIORE, INTERNAL LABOR
MARKETS & MANPOWER ANALYSIS 13-20, 32-40 (1971) (defining general
and firm-specific skills). For a similar analysis of the employment rela-
tionship, see OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF
CAPITALISM 248-49 (1985).
257. A stylized graphic description of this deferred-compensation
scheme can be found in Michael L. Wachter & George M. Cohen, The
Law and Economics .of Collective Bargaining: An Introduction and Appli-
cation to the Problems of Subcontracting, Partial Closure and Relocation,
136 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1355-77 (1988). Professor Lazear offers a some-
what different account of similar compensation arrangements. See Edward
P. Lazear, Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours Restrictions,
71 AM. ECON. REV. 606 (1981) [hereinafter Earnings Profiles]; Edward P.
Lazear, Why is There. Mandatory Retirement?, 87 J. POL. ECON. 1261
(1979) [hereinafter Mandatory Retirement]. In Professor Lazear's view,
compensation is structured in this way in order to minimize shirking by
employees whose performance cannot be closely monitored. For employees
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Outside of the union sector (approximately 15% of the pri-
vate nonagricultural workforce), these arrangements are based
on implied promises, in part because of the difficulty of negoti-
ating all of the terms of a career-long relationship.258 Howev-
er, the employer may behave opportunistically once the
backloaded portion of the employee's deferred compensation
begins. At this stage, the employee is being paid more than her
marginal productivity to the firm (and more than she could
obtain in the external labor market). Employers ordinarily
honor such implied agreements because of what economists
call reputational costs; opportunistic employers would be un-
able to persuade new workers to enter into such arrangements
and would risk demoralizing the existing workforce, inviting
quits and shirking.
Reputational costs are significantly lower, however, among
firms that are leaving product markets or relocating to other
areas of the country. Moreover, such costs may not concern the
new owners who, after all, made no commitments to the affect-
ed employees. For the raider or the managers of a firm fearing
a potential takeover, the incentive to renege on such implied
contracts may be irresistible, since labor accounts for about
70% of total costs. 59
In such situations, staff reductions and wage and benefit
cuts may show up as improvements in share price, but at the
compensated in this manner, the costs of a termination before they have
received their backloaded compensation are particularly high, and they
therefore are less likely to shirk. See Earnings Profiles, supra, at 615-18;
Mandatory Retirement, supra, at 1266.
258. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson et al., Understanding the Employ.
ment Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange, 6 BELL J. OF
EcON. 250-80 (1975). Professor Stone argues that even unions face diffi-
culties negotiating enforceable contracts to protect expectations arising
from internal labor market arrangements. See Stone, supra note 44, at
56.
259. Alan S. Blinder, Introduction, in PAYING FOR PRODUCTIVITY: A
LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE 1, 2 (Alan S. Blinder ed., 1990). See also Shleifer
& Summers, supra note 142, at 36 ("Since firms' labor costs far exceed
their profits and since even poor capital investments yield some returns,
very small differences in firms' success in extracting rents from work-
ers . . . are likely to be much more important in determining market
value than the differences in corporate waste associated with differences
in firms' volume of reinvestment."); cf. Coffee, supra note 44, at 446
(modeling takeovers as efficient breach of implied contracts with middle
managers); Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers, supra note 18, at 73-




cost of violating implied contracts.2" Aside from the impact
on the affected employees, such employer opportunism impairs
ex ante efficiency in two ways. First, it reduces the willingness
of new employees to enter into such deferred-compensation
arrangements (though otherwise attractive to them); second, it
may result in difficult-to-monitor reductions in performance
levels by existing employees. As Professors Shleifer and Sum-
mers observe, "the ability to enter into implicit contracts and
to be trusted to abide by them may be one of the most valuable
assets owned by shareholders. Takeovers may substantially
reduce the value of these assets."' Moreover, "the scope of
fear of trust" will spread to other firms and limit contracting
opportunities there as well.2"
Which explanation is more plausible? The first version may
be persuasive in sheltered product markets where managers
have overpaid workers and maintained unnecessary workers
without fear of market discipline.2" But where barriers to en-
try into product markets are relatively low, could managers
long engage in unnecessary high labor cost policies?
2. Other Consequences of Distrust.
Disregard of employee concerns by managers focused on the
short term may have further negative consequences for the
performance of U.S. firms. First, managers who are preoccu-
pied exclusively with realizing short-term gains for sharehold-
ers will have difficulty securing the trust of employees with
respect to the flexibility of compensation. In both union and
non-union firms, workers in this country, as compared to their
counterparts in Japan and Germany,2 resist variable pay
260. See Shleifer & Summers, supra note 142, at 41 ("As the incum-
bent managers are removed after the takeover, control reverts to the
bidder, who is not committed to upholding the implicit contracts with
stakeholders. Shareholders can then renege on the contracts and expro-
priate rents from the stakeholders. The resulting wealth gains show up
as the takeover premia.").
261. Id. at 46.
262. Id. at 46-47. See infra notes 275-90 and accompanying text (con-
trasting U.S. labor relations with those of Germany and Japan.)
263. This is the gist of Professor Williamson's commentary on the
Shleifer-Summers article. See Oliver E. Williamson, Comment, in CORPO-
RATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 61 (Alan J. Auerbach ed.,
1988).
264. See, e.g., Freeman & Weitzman, Bonuses and Employment in
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and profit-sharing arrangements. Managers thus face difficul-
ties in keying compensation to firm performance, with negative
consequences for productivity. "We now pay workers not for
output produced," Professor Blinder writes, "nor even for labor
input provided, but simply for time spent on the job."
Employees' level of trust and sense of participation in the en-
terprise may determine their receptivity to performance-based'
pay. 2
Second, when workers become demoralized and do not share
a common sense of enterprise with their managers, productivi-
ty may be negatively affected in ways that are difficult to mon-
itor and measure. This may be reflected in the quality of the
product as well as lower labor productivity figures. Dean
Lester Thurow has called for a "producer economics" to combat
this American malaise.267 Managers who demonstrate no com-
mitment to their employees may be unable to persuade them
to work harder (and more creatively) for the welfare of the firm
when demand for the firm's products falls.2s
Finally, the spirit of distrust pervades the system of U.S.
labor relations. It is now more than fifty years since the enact-
ment of the basic labor law in 1935, and American unions and
managers remain in a pitched battle that has yielded bitter
strikes, rigid contracts, and a shrinking union sector., Both
Japan, 1 J. OF THE JAPANESE & INT'L ECONOMIES 168-94 (1987) (approxi-
mately 13 of annual compensation is in form of performance-based bo-
nuses). But see Masahiro Okuno, Corporate Loyalty and Bonus Payments:
An Analysis of Work Incentives in Japan, in THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
'THE JAPANESE FIRM 387, 387 (Masahiko Aoki ed., 1984); Jan Svejnar,
Relative Wage Effects of Unions, Dictatorship and Codetermination: Eco-
nomic Evidence from Germany, 63 REV. OF ECON. & STAT. 188, 189
(1981) (works councils negotiate plant-by-plant variances from industry-
wide agreements).
265. Blinder, supra note 259, at 2.
266. See, e.g., Daniel J.B. Mitchell et al., Alternative Pay Systems,
Firm Performance, and Productivity, in PAYING FOR PRODUCTIVITY 15, 70
fig. 3 (Alan S. Blinder ed., 1990).
267. See Lester C. Thurow, Producer Economics Speech Before Indus.
Rel. Res. Ass'n, New York, N.Y., December 1988); see also HARVEY
LEIBENSTEIN, BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN: A NEW FOUNDATION FOR
MICROECONOMICS 95-134 (1980).
268. Compare Ronald Dore's account of the reaction of Japanese man-
agers to financial crisis, in RONALD DORE, FLEXIBLE RIGIDITIES: INDUSTRI-
AL POLICY AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT IN THE JAPANESE ECONOMY
1970-80 49 (1986) (noting that "[miany Japanese firms allowed profits to
fall or disappear, cut dividends and ran down assets for a year or two
before they cut employment").
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sides share the blame together with a deficient statutory
scheme. However, for present purposes, it suffices to note that
the stock market disfavors employee efforts to seek collective
representation; managers aware of the risks of discounted
share value may be inclined to break long-established collec-
tive bargaining relationships to the extent labor law permits
them to do so. Since unions can play a beneficial role as the
employees' voice within the firm. (indeed, they do so reason-
ably effectively in other countries),270 here, too, is a lost op-
portunity for American companies.
III. TOWARD A SYSTEM OF BOUNDED MANAGERIALISM
As discussed above, we have increasingly witnessed the
subordination of long-term business planning to the pursuit of
short-term gains in the corporate sector. This article has sug-
gested that, despite inevitable agency costs, as between man-
agers and shareholders, managers are the business
decisionmakers of choice. They are the corporate constituency
most capable of synthesizing all available (as opposed to only
public) material information and preparing a long-term plan
for the corporate enterprise.
The approach of the current crop of "stakeholder" statutes,
however, addresses only one side of the problem. By essentially
freeing managers from the discipline of the market for corpo-
rate control, such laws should facilitate long-term investment
decisions, but they also threaten to exacerbate the problem of
wayward agents.271 A coherent plan for reform requires that
269. This is the message of an important book, RICHARD B. FREEMAN
& JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? (1984).
270. See infra notes 286-90 and accompanying text.
271. Although, in general, anti-takeover statutes may facilitate long-
term decisionmaking, laws that encumber proxy contests as a means of
displacing incumbent management seem misconceived. See, e.g., 15 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 2572(A)(4) (1992) (stating that the statute's purpose is to
"discourage . . . speculators from putting [the corporation] 'in play'
through any means, including ... threatening to wage or waging a
proxy contest in connection with or as a means toward or part of a plan
to acquire control of the corporation"). Proxy contests are disappointed
shareholders' only alternatives to exit. By effectively silencing the voice
option, these statutes exacerbate the liquidity perspective. Moreover, such
statutes are unbalanced unless coupled with supplementary monitoring
mechanisms to take the place of the diminished market for corporate
control. See infra notes 332-417 and accompanying text.
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the problems of agency costs be addressed through alternative
monitoring mechanisms that can more effectively constrain
managers without channeling their primary energies into
short-term decisionmaking. A kind of "bounded managerialism"
is needed-a state in which managers are secure enough to
plan for and invest in the long term, while they remain ulti-
mately accountable to the shareholders and other corporate
constituencies they represent.' " The following offers some
suggestions for change in existing laws and practices that
might move us closer to such a system.
A. False Starts
1. Lessons from Abroad
As noted above, 73 the American economy and the American
corporation are losing ground in the international marketplace.
Germany and Japan have evolved significantly different ap-
proaches to corporate governance, finance and investment from
our own.' At first glance, the most appealing option for our
ailing economy would be to adopt in toto the successful practic-
es of Germany and Japan. Unfortunately, this is not a viable
option. The core of Japan's keiretsu system or Germany's
codetermination-cum-banker model capitalism cannot easily be
transplanted to the U.S. under existing conditions.
First, the Japanese and German systems are based on har-
monious labor-management relations, in which a high degree
272. Martin Lipton and Steven Rosenblum have offered a provocative
proposal for reform. See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 116. They sug-
gest that the board of a public corporation be composed of a majority of
independent directors and that all directors be elected for five-year terms,
removable only for cause. These "quinquennial elections" are to be based
on five-year reports independently evaluated by an outside advisor who
will critique the corporation's performance in the prior five years. Hostile
takeovers would not be allowed in the years between board elections. Id.
at 225.
While facilitating a somewhat longer time-frame for managerial
decisionmaking (five-year, as opposed to one-year, terms) this proposal,
too, is subject to the criticism that it "merely recreates the episodic, all-
or-nothing monitoring originally sought to be eliminated." Gilson &
Kraakman, Outside Director, supra note 10, at 882 n.68. Nevertheless,
since Lipton and Rosenblum's proposal also keys executive compensation
directly to the success or failure of the corporation's five-year goals, it
represents a useful step toward creating incentives for the long term. See
infra notes 395-413 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 151-84 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 185-201 and accompanying text.
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of trust permits labor to participate in corporate governance
and agree to flexible work arrangements and variable wages
keyed to firm performance."m By contrast, the U.S. system is
predicated on an adversarial model of labor-management rela-
tions, characterized by chronic hostility and distrust." For a
variety of reasons, including but not limited to the continued
hostility of American management (as well as many workers)
to union representation, the percentage of American workers in
the private sector represented by unions continues to decline.
It is now at a level approaching the union density rate of the
pre-New Deal period. 77 This, in turn, contributes to institu-
tional insecurity and dogged insistence by unions on maintain-
ing wages, benefits and restrictive work rules that place the
union-represented company at a distinct competitive disadvan-
tage within the industry.278 Moreover, federal law governing
collective bargaining itself erects formidable barriers between
workers and managers. 9
In the ever-growing nonunion sector, most American work-
ers are employed "at will"-absent a contract or statutory rule
to the contrary, they can be fired at any time for any reason or
no reason at all.28" The prevailing attitude conceives of labor
275. For an informative comparative overview of systems of labor rela-
tions, see Clyde W. Summers, Comparative Perspectives, in LABOR LAW
AND BUSINESS CHANGE: THEORETICAL AND TRANSACTIONAL PERSPECTWIES
139 (Samuel Estreicher & Daniel G. Collins eds., 1988). The Japanese
system is usefully analyzed in Masanori Hashimoto, Employment and
Wage Systems in Japan and Their Implications for Productivity, in PAY-
ING FOR PRODUCTIVITY 245-94 (Alan S. Blinder ed., 1990).
276. See supra notes 264-70 and accompanying text.
277. The extent to which employer opposition is a principal cause of
the decline of U.S. labor density is a subject of considerable debate. Com-
pare Henry S. Farber, The Decline of Unionization in the United States:
What Can Be Learned from Recent Experience?, 8 J. LAB. ECON. S75
(1990); Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-
Organization under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983), with Leo
Troy, Will a More Interventionist NLRA Revive Organized Labor?, 13
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 583 (1991); Robert J. LaLonde & Bernard D.
Meltzer, Hard Times for Unions: Another' Look at the Significance of
Employer Illegalities, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 953 (1991).
278. See, e.g., Peter D. Linneman et al., Evaluating the Evidence on
Union Employment and Wages, 44 IND. LAB. RELS. REV. 34-53 (1990).
279. Employees who have a role in policy making or policy implemen-
tation are deemed to be "aligned" with management and excluded from
the protection of the labor laws. See, e.g., NLRB v. Yeshiva University,
444 U.S. 672, 680-90 (1980) (holding the university faculty was "aligned").
280. Legislation prohibits terminations on account of race, gender, reli-
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as a service to be purchased when needed and discarded when
the need no longer exists. As one commentator has observed,
"past service creates no future obligations. 81 Astonishingly,
federal labor law actually prohibits nonunion firms from estab-
lishing in-house employee representation arrangements.'
However, despite the urging of labor law scholars, " a funda-
mental overhaul of U.S. labor relations does not appear to be
in the offing.
Secondly, with regard to national industrial and investment
policy as a whole, the United States is characterized by the
absence of influential and active private financial institutions
operating within and upon the corporate sector. The Federal
government resists formalized involvement in the affairs of
private enterprises except under the most extraordinary cir-
cumstances. 28  Moreover, banks and other financial institu-
tions that provide working capital and might be likely sources
of guidance for business enterprises, are discouraged (and
frequently legally prohibited) from meaningful participation in
corporate affairs.2
Contrast these American norms with the practices that pre-
vail in Germany and Japan. In terms of labor-management
relations, German codetermination, far from separating or
alienating labor from management, achieves a high degree of
formalized labor-management cooperation, and considerable
trust and voluntary informational exchange. 8' Unlike Ameri-
gion, national origin, age or union membership, and the state courts have
struggled to expand contractual and tort doctrine to provide some redress
for unjust terminations. See, e.g., PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE
WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 48-104
(1990).
281. Summers, supra note 275, at 141; see also PHILIP SELZNIK, LAW,
SOCIETY AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 134-36 (1969) (discussing implications
of "contract at will" relationship).
282. WEILER, supra note 280, at 212.
283. See, eg., id. at 205-18.
284. Few have bemoaned the state's nonintervention in the past. But
see Reich & Donahue, supra note 227, at 286-287 (stating that, given the
successful federal intervention over several years on behalf of Chrysler
Corporation, "[i]n a nation in which the incompetence and commercial
innocence of federal bureaucrats are assumed as a matter of course, this
record merits attention").
285. See infra notes 374-94 and accompanying text.
286. See, e.g., Alfred F. Conard, Corporate Constituencies in Western
Europe, 21 STETSON L. REV. 73, 78-80 (1991); Vagts, supra note 234. See
also supra notes 275-76 and accompanying text.
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can unions that compete for an ever-shrinking organized
workforce, German unions enjoy institutional security and
represent a workforce with considerable union density. Wages
are uniformly determined at a supra-enterprise level; local
bargaining with enterprise works councils, which typically
transpires without strikes, concerns additional incentive com-
pensation less likely to render individual firms uncompeti-
tive."7 Similarly, the Japanese system is based on a relation-
al model of worker-manager cooperation,' flowing from a
strong cultural tradition of inter-personal commitment,289 in
which firms assume what amounts to a lifetime obligation
towards employees and expect (and apparently receive) an
equivalent sense of loyalty and commitment in return."°
There are also important differences in terms of governmen-
tal or private financial institutions' involvement in shaping
and supporting a national industrial policy. The Japanese
government, for example, intervenes actively to shape industri-
al policy;2 state intervention influences the cost of capital in
both countries.2" Equally (if not more) important, in both
Germany and Japan financial institutions-particularly
banks-play a critical role both as equity holders and active
287. See, e.g., Aoki,, supra note 17, at 160; Manfred Weiss, Recent
Trends in the Development of Labor Law in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, 23 L. & Soc'y REV. 759, 766-67 (1989).
288. See, eg., Hashimoto, supra note 275; DORE, supra note 268, at
77 (Japan uses system of "relational contracting" based on "voice and
loyalty" rather than "exit and entry").
289. This is also evidenced by corporations' reciprocal ownership of
each others' shares, which creates a pattern of "mutual obligation ce-
menting" which functions as a "shareholding stabilization strategy" that
effectively protects against hostile takeovers. DORE, supra note 268, at
70.
290. See id. at 72. The "quasi-fixed cost" imposed by this voluntary
obligation, Dore suggests, creates a strong incentive for Japanese corpora-
tions to diversify. When the market for a particular product shrinks, the
obligation to continue paying a workforce remains; there is, then, consid-
erable incentive to diversify into another product line. Moreover, manag-
ers facing extremely limited opportunities for lateral promotions (corpo-
rations are suspicious of "defectors"), must pull their corporations up with
them in order to advance their careers. Id.
291. See, e.g., id.; supra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.
292. Cf., e.g., Dore, supra note 268, at 127-129 (inflation controlled in
important part because unions responded to government leadership and




participants in corporate governance, a role that is essentially
prohibited to their American counterparts under current U.S.
law.
293
All of these factors demonstrate the impracticality of at-
tempting to graft either the German or the Japanese system
onto the United States corporate sector.2 Although certain
elements of these systems could (with effort) profitably be
introduced into the United States,' we would be well ad-
vised to look closer to home for reforms that can begin to in-
crease productivity and competitiveness both in the near future
and over the long term.
2. LBO Associations
The relatively recent phenomenon of the "LBO Associa-
tion,"' is often praised for its ability to bridge the separation
of ownership and control,9 7 thereby decreasing agency costs
and producing efficiency gains.298 Indeed, Professor Jensen,
an outspoken supporter of LBOs and other "going private"
transactions, has suggested that we may be experiencing the
"eclipse" of the public corporation by these better, more effi-
cient vehicles for the investment of capital.2"
293. See supra notes 224-38 and accompanying text.
294. Some commentators have suggested that the Japanese system is
becoming more like the U.S., rather than the other way around, as the
keiretsu system is eroded by the development of new capital markets and
regulations limiting banks' equity positions in client companies. See, e.g.,
Jensen, Eclipse, supra note 5, at 73; supra notes 232-36 and accompany-
ing text. Professor Roe offers a somewhat different explanation: the con-
centration of financial power may be incompatible with a mature political
democracy. See Roe, supra note 117, at 65 n.206.
295. See infra notes 232-36 and accompanying text.
296. For the purposes of this article, the LBO Association is a cor-
poration, financed primarily by private and public debt, rather than equi-
ty. Its owners (typically an LBO partnership) are institutions rather than
individuals; its managers are also owners having relatively large equity
interests. Such an organization has no public shareholders and its shares
are (at least initially) not listed or traded on national security exchanges.
See Jensen, Eclipse, supra note 5, at 61.
297. See, e.g., id. at 66. It would be more accurate, however, to de-
scribe the LBO structure as eliminating the separation of ownership from
control through the replacement of outside equity with debt. See Gilson
& Kraakman, supra note 74, at 877; see also supra notes 137-40.
298. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 74, at 41; Jensen, Eclipse, supra
note 5 at 66-67; Kaplan, supra note 252.
299. Jensen, Eclipse, supra note 5, at 61.
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Despite the success of some (though by no means all) LBO
transactions,"® even Professor Jensen concedes that the un-
avoidably high levels of indebtedness that are the defining
characteristic of LBOs will be suited only to certain industries,
such as cash-rich low-growth industries, generating more cash
than they can profitably invest."' For these industries, the
discipline of substantial indebtedness may prevent managers
from retaining free cash flow that might more profitably be
invested elsewhere."° However, for growth industries where
profitable investment opportunities exceed internally generated
cash, the LBO Association is not a viable option, since avail-
able cash flow will not, typically, support both these costly
though potentially profitable investment strategies and the
repayment of substantial debt service." s
Even in growth industries, Professor Jensen suggests, it may
be possible to draw on the LBO experience and reduce waste.
Public corporations could, for example, borrow in order to pay
out dividends, thus intentionally subjecting themselves to the
discipline of increased indebtedness. They can further improve
the alignment of managers and public shareholders by either
requiring substantial equity ownership by managers and other
300. See, e.g., GAO Report, supra note 252, at 6-7 (noting that the
companies studied enjoyed "varied" financial performance after LBOs or
recapitalization). This report examined five case studies: Revco D.S. Inc.;
Safeway Stores Inc.; Allied Stores Corporation; Federal Department
Stores Inc., and Phillips Petroleum's recapitalization to avoid an LBO.
Since the LBOs occurred, Allied, Federated and Revco have all filed for
bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11. Safeway, after a period of ad-
justment has improved its performance; Phillips' profitability initially fell,
and has continued to fluctuate. Id.
301. Professor Jensen includes in this group industries such as auto-
mobile tires, steel, chemicals, tobacco, TV/radio broadcasting, automobiles,
aerospace technologies, etc. Jensen, Eclipse, supra note 5, at 64.
302. Professor Roe suggests that the LBO may serve as ,a monitoring
intermediary for financial institutions fragmented by regulation. Roe,
supra note 117, at 62-63. Since the legal framework prevents direct mon-
itoring by financial institutions holding equity control, LBO Associations
can obtain debt and equity funding from these disabled financial institu-
tions, and directly monitor on their behalf. Id. at 63. However, any ap-
proach that hopes to increase efficiency by involving financial institutions
should consider a more direct attack on the disabling rules themselves.
See infra notes 317-24, 374.94 and accompanying text.
303. In such industries, a high level of indebtedness would likely in-
terfere with the ability to make necessary capital investments, such as
adequate levels of R&D spending.
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employees, or creating management compensation plans based
on performance (measured by cash flow and value rather than
the more manipulable measure of earnings)."°
High levels of indebtedness are neither always beneficial nor
sustainable, however. Not surprisingly, the'unusually high
level of debt"° that burdens an LBO Association creates an
increased risk of financial failure."° Despite this increased
risk, there is little reason to expect the LBO Association to
exhibit increased caution, since its owner-managers frequently
invest no more than 10-15% of their own equity in the transac-
tion."' The owner-managers are not the primary debtholders;
they are the big equity holders. Indeed, as the LBO Association
becomes more heavily leveraged, the remaining equity begins
increasingly to resemble a call option. With so little personal
wealth invested, and limited shareholder liability, the risk of
bankruptcy falls overwhelmingly on the creditors who supplied
the lion's share of capital. In effect, the LBO partnership has
purchased an option on the enterprise for a small percentage of
the total cost. If its value does not exceed its liabilities, the
LBO partnership loses only the cost of the option. Such a fi-
nancing arrangement is unlikely to encourage caution or at-
tract patient capital."8
At the time of Professor Jensen's 1989 article, the LBO
transactions of the early 1980s had not been overtaken by a
succession of extraordinary bankruptcies that highlight the
adverse consequences of excessive indebtedness."° Moreover,
304. Jensen, Eclipse, supra note 5, at 72. For further discussion of
executive compensation, see infra notes 395-413 and accompanying text.
305. While German and Japanese corporations typically carry still
higher levels of indebtedness than those that prevail in U.S., the risk of
bankruptcy is considerably higher in the U.S. See supra notes 202-38 and
accompanying text.
306. See also Kaplan and Stein's recent study of 124 large manage-
ment buyouts completed between 1980 and 1989. STEVEN N. KAPLAN &
JEREMY C. STEIN, THE EVOLUTION OF BUYOUT PRICING AND FINANCIAL
STRUCTURE 34 (National Bureau of Economics Working Paper No. 3695,
1991 (noting that "[tihe buyouts of the late 1980s seem to be character-
ized by more of the theoretical pre-conditions for costly distress").
307. See Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers, supra note 18, at 61.
308. See id. (moral hazards attach to high levels of debt where equity
holder enjoys limited liability). Professor Jensen dismisses the moral
hazard problem, suggesting that borrowers will consider the "reputational
consequences" of too little caution, and creditors can protect themselves
through ex ante negotiation. Jensen, Eclipse, supra note 5, at 70.
309. Floyd Norris, Win or Lose, Buyouts Do It Big, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
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bankruptcy is not the only risk that too much debt imposes on
the corporate enterprise. Taking enterprises of considerable
size (such as once-public corporations) "private," requires such
high levels of indebtedness"'0 that these newly "gone-private"
corporations will rarely be able to maintain the cash flow need-
ed for productive capital investment such as R&D spending or
expansion in growing markets.!' Equally troubling is the fact
that certain LBO transactions have been motivated primarily
by the LBO Association's strong desire to "do deals, rather
than good deals" and to take their compensation in "front-end
fees rather than in back-end profits earned through increased
equity value.""1 ' The transactional "one-time-only" gains can
be enormous, but the managers often leave behind a corpora-
tion staggering under its unmanageable debt load, headed
either for bankruptcy or reincarnation as a public corporation.
Such cyclic transactions are unlikely to lengthen the invest-
ment time horizon in the already short-term U.S. economy.
Finally, even assuming that substantial gains in efficiency
were achieved in the 1980s in certain LBOs, LBOs by defini-
tion require plentiful and available credit--a financial climate
28, 1992, at D1 (R.H. Macy filing for bankruptcy represents another
leveraged buyout "gone bad."). See also Gary Weiss, Financing the 90s,
Bus. WK., Nov. 4, 1991, at 113 (describing a wave of "deleveraging").
310. Jensen, Eclipse, supra note 5, at 69 (average debt-equity ratio in
an LBO is 85%).
311. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 10, at 877 nn.50-51 (sug-
gesting LBOs are likely to be a transitory phenomenon). Empirical stud-
ies also indicate that LBOs have not typically occurred in industries that
engage in significant R&D expenditures. See supra notes 173-78 and
accompanying text.
312. Jensen, Eclipse, supra note 5, at 74. Cf. George Anders, LBO
Odyssey: Playtex Goes Through 4 Buy-Outs Since 1985, Enriching Top
Officer, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 1991, at 1 (CEO received $186.5 million
from four successive buyouts of Playtex; his initial personal equity invest-
ment was $5.5 million; corporate product market share and product de-
velopment declined).
LBO transactions frequently involve only a temporary "gone private"
hiatus from public corporate status, since managers who have taken
firms private through LBOs, may sometimes "overinvest temporarily . . ;
but the costs of holding such an expensive and undiversified investment
predictably make this a short-term investment." Coffee, Shareholders
Versus Managers, supra note 18, at 36 (managers later either reduce
leverage by selling assets or by issuing new public equity after the take-
over threat has been removed). See also Janet Sterngold, Wall Street
Buys Into the Action, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1986, at Di.
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that predominated in the U.S. through the 1980s but that has
dramatically shifted in the belt-tightening 1990s. It will no
longer be possible (if it ever was, given the limited viability of
the LBO structure) to look upon the LBO Association as the
deus ex machina that will save us from our economic woes.
Indeed, at this time, when public equity offerings have again
begun to compete with debt to provide the bulk of externally
generated corporate capital, 1 it seems clear that the public
corporation is here to stay. It is the public corporation itself
and its surrounding legal landscape that needs re-examination
and constructive renovation in the quest for long-term indus-
trial recovery.
3. Empowerment of Institutional Shareholders
Many who deplore the managerialist model look to institu-
tional shareholders for more effective oversight--even con-
trol-of corporate decisionmaking 1' If shareholders were in
control, directors would really monitor managerial
decisionmaking and managers would not deviate from their
pursuit of shareholder wealth. The problems of retained free
cash flow would be corrected. Executive compensation would be
rationalized and based on corporate performance rather than
growth.
1 '
Those who hope for increased activism among public share-
holders usually recognize the challenge of attempting to moti-
vate and empower any group of actors so fragmented and wide-
ly dispersed. Indeed, passivity has traditionally been acknowl-
edged to be a sensible investment posture for shareholders who
rationally weigh the costs (which those who monitor bear in
full) against the benefits (which those who monitor must share
with all other shareholders).
1 8
313. Until credit began to dry up generally, there were relatively few
public issues. See Stout, supra note 82, at 647 nn.185-186. Debt seemed
a preferable source of capital since interest payments are (and dividend
payments are not) a deductible business expense for the corporation.
Moreover, equity issues are not inexpensive, since underwriters' commis-
sions and other fees may cost the corporation up to 15% of the total
proceeds. Id. at 661 & n.252.
314. See generally Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 10,; Black,
Agents Watching Agents, supra note 10; Coffee, Liquidity Versus Control,
supra note 83; Gilson & Kraakman, Outside Director, supra note 10.
315. See, e.g., Dent, Unifying Ownership and Control, supra note 10,
at 911-15.
316. See supra notes 117-25 and accompanying text.
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Recently, however, some corporate scholars have observed
that passivity may really be the result of multiple regulations
that have the effect (if not the intent) of preventing concentrat-
ed ownership and control by financial institutions. This com-
plex network of legal barriers, briefly referred to above and
exhaustively described elsewhere,317 will not be rehearsed in
detail here. At bottom, however, these rules reveal a consistent
model of "legitimate" corporate "investment" that is, almost by
definition, passive and accepting of managerial primacy.31
Accordingly, banks may not own shares directly and are limit-
ed to 5% ownership through bank holding companies."9 In-
surance companies are similarly limited in their equity owner-
ship.20 Public shareholders who communicate with each oth-
er about upcoming board elections or other corporate decisions
risk classification as "proxy solicitors" who are subject to bur-
densome federal regulations."' Shareholders who purchase
(or hold as a group) more than 5% of a corporation's shares are
subject to Williams Act disclosure requirements. 22 Investors
who purchase more than 15% or $15 million, whichever is less,
of the shares of a public corporation must file with the Federal
Trade Commission and the Department of Justice and pay a
$20,000 filing fee or risk violating the Hart-Scott-Rodino Anti-
trust Improvements Act. 23 The message comes through loud
317. See supra notes 117, 218-20 and accompanying text; Roe, supra
note 117; Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 10; Coffee, Liquidity
Versus Control, supra note 83.
318. For an interesting discussion of the inappropriate application of
"controlling person" liability under the securities laws to activist institu-
tional investors see Conard, supra note 10. Although it seems desirable
to remove obstacles to benign collective institutional oversight (e.g., the
nomination and election of representative .directors), it has been suggested
that the distinction between "the investment banker goat . . . [and] the
institutional investor sheep . . . is not obvious at first glance." Richard
M. Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A Compara-
tive Perspective, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 24 (1991).
319. See supra notes 218-20 and accompanying text.
320. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1198, 1199 (West 1972) (prohibiting
investment of more than 10% of capital and surplus in equity of any
single company). See also N.Y. INS. LAW § 1405(aX6), (8) (McKinney 1985
& Supp. 1990) (limiting investment in equity securities to 20% of
insurer's assets, or one-half its surplus).
321. See infra notes 326 and accompanying text.
322. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d), codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1988).
323. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1988); PUB. L. No. 101-162, § 605, 103- Stat.
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and clear: "investment" (at least in public corporations) does
not encompass direct involvement in the operations of the
enterprise. Under the present regulatory framework, appropri-
ate public shareholder behavior is not likely to resemble "own-
er" behavior; it is limited to purchasing relatively small per-
centages of shares and voting almost exclusively on matters
presented by management for consideration.
Of course, what the State has made, the State can unmake.
These statutory and other limits on institutional ownership
and activism can be loosened or even eliminated. However,
there are reasons to doubt whether amendment or repeal of
the regulatory strictures would, by itself, result in the con-
structively activist institutions some scholars envision. 2' In-
stitutional shareholder passivity may result primarily from a
number of "extra-legal". causes..5 that cast doubt upon the
prospects for successful shareholder empowerment.
Most obviously, institutional shareholders typically lack the
desire, expertise and long-term commitment to assume control
of the corporations in which they invest.2 Neither improved
information and advice concerning governance issues,"7 nor
988, 1031, as amended Pub. L. No. 101-302, 104 Stat. 217 (filing fee); 16
C.F.R. §§801-803 (1990) (FTC rules). There is an exemption for purchases
up to 10% "solely for the purpose of investment" or purchases up to 15%
or $25 million, whichever is greater, made by institutional investors "sole-
ly for the purpose of investment and in the ordinary course of business,"
or purchases made by public pension funds. However, the regulatory
caveat, "solely in the purpose of investment," excludes any intention to
participate in basic business decisions. According to FTC guidelines, such
decisions include "(1) [n]ominating a candidate for the board of directors
of the issuer; (2) proposing corporate action requiring shareholder approv-
al; [and] (3) soliciting proxies . . . ." 43 Fed. Reg. 33,450, 33,465 (1978).
324. In fact, not all scholars agree that U.S. legal strictures are quali-
tatively or quantitatively more confining for institutional investors than
regulations imposed on their more aggressive foreign counterparts. See
Coffee, Liquidity Versus Control, supra note 83, at 1290-1317.
325. Id. at 241, 242-52. It is too simplistic to lump all institutional
shareholders together, of course, since there are several different types of
institutions, each with its own particular concerns. See supra notes 117-
25 and accompanying text; infra notes 326-30 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 117-30 and accompanying text. See also MICHAEL
JACOBS, SHORT TERM AMERICA 219-20 (1991) (urging the formation of "a
new breed of investment firms whose approach is to make significant
long-term investments in a limited number of companies" because institu-
tional investors lack expertise to function as involved, active long-term
investors).
327. Consider the work of organizations such as the Investor Respon-
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lowered barriers to increased ownership and direct in-
volvement will eliminate the "liquidity perspective" of institu-
tional (and other) shareholders.2 8 Shareholder
decisionmaking during the takeover era reflects a deeply in-
grained preference for an "exit"-driven investment strategy
over a "voice"-driven strategy (even within the limits of the
present regulatory structure). Certain institutions, most nota-
bly open-ended mutual funds, are particularly interested in
liquidity because they may be called upon to cash out, on a
daily basis, any customers choosing to sell. They therefore lack
the incentive to become active long-term shareholders involved,
at some cost,32 in corporate governance issues. Many institu-
tional shareholders lack long-term perspective because they
focus continuously on-short-term share values as indicators of
their performance vis-a-vis other funds. Fund managers' suc-
cess or failure is measured in terms of monthly or quarterly
fund performance; 30 they are not, then, likely to take a broad
sibility Research Center (IRRC), and the Analysis Group and Institutional
Shareholder Services (ISS). See Regulation of Securityholder Communica-
tions, 56 Fed. Reg. 28,987 (proposed June 17, 1991) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-7) [hereinafter SEC Release 34-29315]. Professor Coffee
observes that these organizations are really professional proxy advisors,
and suggests that mandatory use of them as either advisors or delegates
of voting authority would be a first step in ensuring that institutional
voting decisions will be taken seriously by those who vote and by man-
agement. See Liquidity Versus Control, supra note 83, at 1354 n.301.
There are still regulatory wrinkles to be ironed out concerning the
use of these professional proxy advisors. Compare Institutional Sharehold-
er Services, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 SEC No-Act, LEXIS 17,
(Jan. 2, 1991) (advising ISS that Rule 14a-2(b)(2) contemplates exempting
proxy advice rendered in the context of relationship with a general finan-
cial advisor, rather than specialized proxy advisory) with SEC Release
No. 34-29315, at 28,990-92 (proposing Rule 14a-2(bXl) exemption where
proxy advice 'comes from "disinterested" person not seeking to obtain a
proxy). SEC Release 34-29315 refers to "organizations or associations
comprised of securityholders or issuers that exchange information with
members regarding such matters of common concern as proxy voting
positions or views on corporate governance policy. Another category would
be providers of shareholder advisory services, including organizations
[such as ISS, etc.] offering proxy voting information or recommenda-
tions . . . ." Id. at 28,991 (footnote omitted).
328. See supra note 324 and accompanying text.
329. Indexed funds confront another problem: how to become active
and informed monitors of literally hundreds, if not thousands, of portfolio
companies. Coffee, Liquidity Versus Control, supra note 83, at 1338,
n;232; Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 116, at 206.
330. Coffee, Liquidity Versus Control, supra note 83, at 1318-19, 1325
592
BEYOND AGENCY COSTS
or long view of corporate governance issues.
Indeed, this liquidity perspective, if coupled with greater
power and more direct influence within the corporation, may
well worsen the serious problem of investment horizon for
corporate managers. As noted above, although the market may
efficiently evaluate public information concerning corporate
decisionmaking, managers often have access to nonpublic infor-
mation that is withheld from the market.," Since some insti-
tutional shareholders are especially sensitive to fluctuations in
share price, their influence may deter managers from taking
appropriate bold and innovative risks and further inhibit long-
term investment decisions.
B. Supplementary Monitoring Mechanisms
American public corporations currently operate in a state of
legal equilibrium that places widely-dispersed and atomized
shareholder-owners on one side of the balance and the manag-
ers they elect to represent them on the other. The managers
are in charge, but they are vulnerable to short-term sharehold-
er investment horizons. The shareholders are stripped of near-
ly all important ownership functions except the unlimited right
to exit if unhappy, while denominated the monitors-of-choice
over their elected agents. Despite the obvious impediments to
meaningful shareholder monitoring, this system also disables
or prbhibits other interested and capable constituencies, most
importantly banks332 and labor,3 from contributing their
own perspectives on corporate decisionmaking that might aid
in resolving the conflict between short-term interests and the
long-term growth of the enterprise.
Until recently, the prevailing view was that this state of
& nn. 194-195 (noting that money managers seek short-term portfolio
premiums despite recognition of greater profitability potential in a buy
and hold philosophy); Altman Remarks, supra note 200, at 30 (noting
that U.S. equity markets have become "totally dominated by performance-
driven institutional investors of all kinds").
331. This may be the result of poor communication. If so, it is reme-
diable. It is more likely, however, that managers choose to keep silent
about proprietary information in order to avoid benefitting competitors.
See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. If persuading the market
would force managers to reveal confidential information, they must be
able to risk silence.
332. See supra notes 218-20 and accompanying text; infra notes 374-
94 and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 276-93 and accompanying text.
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affairs resulted from a sort of natural selection process that
operates upon economic institutions as it does upon living
species. Thus, the public corporation as currently constituted,
whatever its limitations, was viewed as optimally efficient
since it survived in its current form and not some other."3'
Recently, however, scholars have begun to re-examine the
network of applicable laws and have realized that these laws
determine the structure of corporate governance in much the
way a street map evolves to shape the development of a com-
munity.
35
The following is a discussion of suggested alterations to the
corporate street map. These suggestions may contribute to the
evolution of effectively bounded managerialism for American
corporations.
1. Facilitating Relationship Investing
a. Shareholder-Nominated Directors
Although this article has suggested that the direct empower-
ment of institutional shareholders is a "false start," unlikely to
extend the corporate investment horizon, a regime of unlimited
managerialism would fare no better. While corporate managers
must be secure enough to take appropriate actions in the long-
term best interests of the corporation, they remain fiduciaries
of the firm, subject to ongoing monitoring intended to ensure
optimal performance of their fiduciary duties.33
Over the years, various reforms have been suggested, largely
directed at reconfiguring the board of directors to provide for
honest and impartial oversight of managerial performance.
334. See, e.g., Fama & Jensen, supra note 22, at 301 ("Absent fiat,
the form of organization that survives in an activity is the one that
delivers the product demanded by customers at the lowest price while
covering costs."); see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 416, 418 (observing that
most efficient corporate law rules ultimately "survive").
335. See generally Roe, supra note 117; supra notes 317-23 and ac-
companying text.
336. This article does not offer a comprehensive analysis of "account-
ability." Such an analysis would require answers to all the ultimate ques-
tions that have plagued the debate over corporate governance: account-
ability to whom? (shareholders alone? other nonshareholder constituen-
cies?), accountability for what? (short-term shareholder wealth maximiza-




Effective oversight by the board could narrow the separation
between ownership and control, 37  and outside direc-
tors 38-- who are ostensibly without significant personal or
business ties to senior corporate managers-increasingly popu-
late the boards of most public corporations. 39 But, apart from
the difficulty of remaining truly independent from a manage-
ment that ultimately selects nominees to the board, ' outside
directors must look to management for their information, and
they often lack the time to become expert in the corporation's
affairs." Since it is unclear whether outside directors, select-
ed through the traditional proxy process, significantly outper-
form inside directors,4 2 commentators continue to search for
337. To that end, it has been suggested that even minority sharehold-
ers should always have board representation through cumulative voting.
See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & James A. Brickley, Cumulative Voting: The
Value of Minority Shareholder Voting Rights, 27 J.L. & ECON. 339, 342
(1984).
338. . See, e.g., MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE COR-
PORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 170-185 (1976) [hereinafter STRUCTURE OF.
THE CORPORATION]. Professor Eisenberg has carried his vision forward as
Chief Reporter of the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate
Governance: Analysis and Recommendations, ALI Project, supra note 33,
recommending that the boards of all publicly held corporations "have a
majority of directors who are free of any significant relationship with the
corporation's senior executives," absent a single (or group) majority share-
holder. Id.
.339. It is not always clear whether a director can be considered a
true "outsider." See STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION, supra note 338, at
144-146; Victor Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or
Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 602-603 (1982) [hereinafter
Independent Director]; Dent, supra note 10, at 898-99. Estimates therefore
.vary concerning both their numbers and effectiveness.
340. Although candidates are increasingly put forward by nominating
committees, see ALI Project, supra note 33, at § 3A.04, nominees can be
vetoed by the Chief Executive Officer, who typically retains' enormous
influence over board composition. See Dent, supra note 10, at 898; ROB-
ERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 105-108(1986); Harold Geneen, Why
Directors Can't Protect Shareholders, FORTUNE, Sept. 17, 1984, at 28-29.
See also Gilson & Kraakman, Outside Director, supra note 10, at 875.
341. See Brudney, supra note 339, at 609 n.38 (noting that the aver-
age outside director devotes only 122 hours per year to the position);
STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION, supra note 338, at 141-144 (noting that
most boards spend less than thirty-six hours a year meeting and that the
.amount, quality, and structure" of information to which the board has
access is "almost wholly within the control of the corporation's execu-
tives").
342. See Brudney, supra note 339, at 635 nn.101-103; Dent, supra
note 10, at 900. But see Baray D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Corpo-
1993] 595
RUTGERS LAW REVIEW
improvements in the traditional director selection process. 4
One recent proposal, by Professor George Dent, suggests
vesting exclusive proxy control in a committee of the ten-to-
twenty largest corporate shareholders. " This group would
collectively nominate and solicit proxies for a shareholder slate
of candidates for seats on the board, and the corporation would
be required (either by federal statute or SEC rule) to pay for-
the solicitation.'" Thus, incumbent directors would presum-
ably have to please shareholders or risk being rejected for
renomination. Of course, the management slate might still
mount its own solicitation, but would have to pay for it without
use of corporate funds.
Professors Eisenberg, Brudney and others have suggested
affording substantial shareholders the opportunity to make
nominations to the board. 46 Because shareholder-nominated
rate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of
Changes in Board Composition, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 101, 118-19, 121
(1985) (stating that boards consisting of both outside and inside directors
perform most effectively).
343. Paradoxically, rather than render the board more accountable to
shareholders, the presence of independent directors may immunize the
entire board from liability. See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 339, at 603
n.15 (outside directors approve of interested transactions). Moreover, out-
side directors are sometimes able to persuade courts to dismiss derivative
actions against inside directors as against the best interests of the corpo-
ration. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979);
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); CLARK, supra note
340, at 645-49.
344. Dent, supra note 10, at 907-15. Professor Dent's proposal would
limit access to corporate treasury funds for proxy solicitation to these
shareholders. These shareholders, in his view, would probably be the
most knowledgeable about the firm and have the largest stake in its
welfare. Id. at 907. The shareholders could be selected under guidelines
established by the SEC, which would consider whether particular share-
holders should be disqualified because of conflicts of interest. Id. at 907
n.146.
Lipton & Rosenblum have also recommended increasing the access
of large shareholders to the proxy machinery. Their proposal, however,
does not exclude incumbent managers from that process. See Lipton &
Rosenblum, supra note 116, at 232.
345. Dent, supra note 10, at 910-11.
346. See STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION, supra note 338, at 16-18
(suggesting that large shareholders-those holding more than 5% of
shares-should be allowed to nominate directors in the corporate proxy
statement); Victor Brudney, Fiduciary Ideology in Transactions Affecting
Corporate Control, 65 MICH. L. REV. 259, 284-85 (1966); Lipton, supra
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directors might lose, Professor Lowenstein would reserve a
certain percentage (20-25%) of board seats for shareholder-
nominated directors.4 7
b. Professional Outside Directors
Professors Gilson and Kraakman urge the creation of a new
species of director: the professional outside director."8 Their
proposed mechanism would involve delegating recruitment to
an organization-a kind of clearinghouse-established and
financed by a coordinated body of institutional investors. Be-
cause the clearinghouse vould select and monitor these direc-
tors, they would not be specially dependent upon any particu-
lar shareholder. They would be dependent upon the overall
satisfaction of institutional investors for their reappointment,
and presumably faithful agents of these shareholders collec-
tively.
34 9
c. Shareholder Advisory Committees
In addition to the above proposals for proxy reform, certain
large institutional investors have advanced a somewhat less
formal arrangement for communicating shareholders' views to
management: the shareholders' advisory committee. 5 ' Adviso-
ry committees could serve as general purpose "shadow" moni-
tors, 5 attempting to fill the role outside directors are sup-
note 3, at 67-69; see also Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 116, at 231-32
(suggesting "free access [quinquennially] to the corporate proxy machin-
ery" to any shareholders having 5% of outstanding shares or $5 million
dollars aggregate market value of shares).
347. See Lowenstein, supra note 3, at 209-18.
348. See Gilson & Kraakman, Outside Director, supra note 10, at 883-
92. These directors would be experts having the skills to effectively moni-
tor corporate management. They would be well paid to make a full-time
commitment to serve on the boards of as many as six public corpora-
tions.
349. This proposal is not free of difficulties, including problems of col-
lective action, see id. at 887-88, directors' independence from shareholders
as well as management, see Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain)
Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 505
(1991), as well as the specter of group liabilities under the various feder-
al rules discussed above, see supra notes 321-23 and accompanying text.
350. The committee proposal seems to have been adopted from the
bankruptcy model, in which equityholders are permitted to form commit-
tees to represent their interests in Chapter 11 proceedings. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1101-1174 (1988).
351. Rock, supra note 349, at 498.
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posed to play on the board with even less information and
fewer resources than available to conventional outside direc-
tors. 2 The committee might also function as a conduit for
the shareholders' views to ensure that their concerns reach
corporate directors on a regular basis. A third possibility would
be the creation of targeted special-purpose committees, to as-
sist in decisionmaking in those circumstances where the board
is least likely to fairly represent shareholders' interests. For
example, when directors face potential conflicts of interest,
such as when certain directors are named as defendants in
shareholder derivative actions," 3 a shareholder committee
might have a clearer vision of the issues at stake than outside
directors who are asked to decide whether to sue their fellow
board members."'
d. Shareholder Proposals
At a time when the SEC is considering certain proposed
352. Id.; Gilson & Kraakman, Outside Director, supra note 10, at 871-
72.
353. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E. 2d 994 (N.Y. 1979);
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. Ch. 1984). In this con-
text, the so-called "special litigation committee" (consisting of independent
directors) always suffers from an inherent structural conflict concerning
the potential litigation. Some courts find this conflict tolerable. See, e.g.,
Auerbach, 393 N.E.2d at 1001-02. Others find it more problematic. See,
e.g., Alford v. Shaw, 324 S.E.2d 878 (N.C. App. 1985), rev'd and remand-
ed, 358 S.E.2d 323 (N.C. 1987).
354. These limited advantages do not eliminate certain collective ac-
tion problems with regard to particiption on such committees by particu-
lar institutions. For example, the free-riding problem exists here as in
other collective action contexts. See, e.g., Rock, supra note 349, at 496.
Why should an institution contribute to the enterprise, i.e., serve on the
committee, when it can wait and let others incur the costs? Of course, it
is never clear that others will in fact step forward, particularly in the
start-up period where there is no proven track record of benefits accruing
to the institutions. Another serious problem for certain institutions is the
potential loss of flexibility and greater legal exposure that might result
from serving on the committee. Members might be subject to fiduciary
duties to their fellow shareholders that would limit their ability to exit
through trading in the corporation's shares. Although this might have the
beneficial side effect of creating a long-term perspective for those tempo-
rarily "rooted" member institutions, it is not clear that all (or even many)
institutions would be prepared to accept such constraints given their
traditional preference for unconstrained liquidity.
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amendments' to its proxy rules intended to "facilitate
securityholder communications in furtherance of the goal of
informed proxy voting,""'6 one issue has captured the atten-
tion of the public and the regulators: management compensa-
tion. 7 The SEC has adopted a new policy intended to permit
shareholders (1) more complete and accessible information
about executive compensation in their corporation 58 and (2)
greater opportunity to express their views concerning executive
compensation through shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-
8." Since the setting of management compensation levels is
a matter traditionally committed to market forces and state
corporation law,"e the SEC initiative focuses not on the level
or type of compensation, but rather on the complementary
function of facilitating shareholder communications through
the proxy process. 61
355. See SEC Release 34-29315, supra note 327.
356. "Shareholder Proposals-Rule 14a-8," Remarks of Richard Y.
Roberts, Commissioner of the SEC, before the American Society of Corpo-
rate Secretaries, Oct. 5, 1991, at 1.
357. See generally GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE
OVERCOMPENSATION OF THE AMERICAN EXECUTIVE (1991); Steve Lohr,
Recession Puts a Harsh Spotlight on Hefty Pay of Top Executives, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 20, 1992, at Al, D8; What is a CEO Worth?, N.Y.L.J., Feb.
20, 1992, at 5.
358. See Barbara Franklin, Issue for Securities Bar: Proxy Reform,
Small Business Rules Debated, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 12, 1992, at 5. The SEC
is currently considering proposed changes in the way executive compensa-
tion is reported: (1) a summary table containing salaries, bonuses and
the value of stock grants and options; (2) a table showing changes in
compensation compared to changes in shareholder returns; and (3) expla-
nations of factors used in setting compensation levels. Id.
359. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1992). A record or beneficial holder of 1%
or $1000 in market value of corporate securities entitled to vote may
submit one proposal to be included in the corporate proxy materials. Rule
14a-8(a)(1). The corporation may omit the proposal only if it is excludable
under one of the provisions of Rule 14a-8(c). See infra notes 362-65 and
accompanying text.
360. See ALI Project, supra note 33, at § 3.02(a)(1) (stating that the
board of directors of a publicly held corporation should "fix the compensa-
tion of, and, where appropriate, replace the principal senior executives").
Section 3A.05 recommends that large publicly held corporations establish
a "compensation committee" composed of at least a majority of outside
directors, to "[rieview and recommend to the board, or determine, the
annual salary, bonus, stock options, and other benefits, direct and indi-
rect, of the senior executives," § 3A.05(bX1), and "take steps to modify
any executive compensation programs that yield payments and benefits
that are not reasonably related to executive performance." § 3A.05(bX2).
361. See Richard C. Breeden, Remarks at The Press Conference on
600 RUTGERS LAW REVIEW [Vol.45:513
Institutional and individualP 2 shareholders have repeated-
ly attempted to address the question of executive compensation
through shareholder proposals." However, these proposals
were routinely excluded because under Rule 14a-8 as interpret-
ed by the SEC, executive compensation was considered a mat-
ter of "ordinary business."" Abandoning its former position,
the SEC has announced its intention to require inclusion of
shareholder advisory" proposals concerning executive or di-
rector compensation in corporate proxy statements.
In a system of bounded managerialism, shareholders need
mechanisms to monitor and communicate with their directors.
That relationship must, however, leave management indepen-
dent and secure enough to withstand the pressure to engage in
short-term decisionmaking. Thus, although reforms directed at
the amplification of shareholder voice (such as requiring inclu-
sion 9f shareholders' non-binding advisory proposals concern-
ing executive compensation) are desirable. counterweights to
management, they should fall short of transferring control of
detailed corporate matters to the shareholders by means of the
proxy process.
e. Taxing Short-term Gain: Disincentive to Liquidity
If the tendency to "exit" exhibited by shareholders exacer-
Corporate Executives' Compensation (Feb. 13, 1993) (transcript available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Federal News Service File) [hereinafter Breeden
Remarks].
362. See, e.g., Kevin G. Salwen, The People's Proxy: Shareholder Pro-
posals on Pay Must Be Aired, SEC to Tell 10 Firms, WALL ST. J., Feb.
13, 1992, at Al (reporting that the SEC reversed its position of many
years by requiring the inclusion in .Bell Atlantic Corp.'s proxy statement
of a shareholder proposal by the owner of seventy-six shares concerning
$4.2 million executive bonus pool).
363. See Kevin G. Salwen, Shareholders, Likely to Get Vote on Pay,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 1992, at A3. In 1986 there were 35 shareholder
proposals concerning compensation and benefits; in 1990 there were 110.
See Breeden Remarks, supra note 361 at 2.
364. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(cX7); supra notes 358-59 and accompa-
nying text. Other relevant possible grounds for exclusion would include
claims that such proposals are not proper subjects for shareholder action
under state law, Rule 14a-8(cX1), or contained false or misleading state-
ments, Rule 14a-8(cX3).
365. Rule 14a-8 already distinguishes between proposals "that man-
date[] certain action by the . . . board of directors" from those "recom-
mending or requesting such action." See Rule 14a-8(c)(1) note.
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bates the problem of short-term decisionmaking, 6 it might
be beneficial to place some limits on liquidity. An obvious pos-
sibility would be a system of tax incentives intended to encour-
age investors to invest for the long term. This tax would be
similar in principle to the now-defunct long-term capital gains
tax. Under such a system, gains from the short-term sale of
equity (or derivative securities)36 could be taxed at a high
rate; the tax rate would decrease, however, the longer the hold-
ing period prior to the sale.'" Such a provision would work
dramatic behavioral changes in securities markets, especially
among short-term speculators such as arbitrageurs. 9 The
provision would have to provide exemptions for certain traders
whose short-term trades are essential for the market, such as
market makers and exchange specialists. Moreover, lawmakers
would have to determine which transactions other than ordi-
nary market trades, for instance, involuntary corporate trans-
actions such as forced sales after a merger, triggered the
tax.
70
If Congress were to adopt such a tax, it would radically
alter, or, in the case of a 100% tax on short-term gain, virtual-
ly eliminate, the active market in options, futures and other
index-related short-term investments. Although this would
generate considerable controversy, 71 the overall impact, after
the dust settled, might be entirely salutary. If index futures
366. See supra notes 117-30 and accompanying text.
367. See infra notes 371-73 and accompanying text.
368. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 3, at 86-87, 204-05, 207 (endorsing
proposal by Warren Buffett that gain from sale of stocks be taxed at
100% if stocks were held for less than one year). See also David Wessel,
Tsongas, Clinton Differ on Strategies for Spurring U.S. Economic Growth,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 1992, at A14 (Tsongas advocating three policies: (1)
a cut in capital gains tax for equity securities only, (2) a declining tax
rate tied to length of time securities are held, (3) a more rapidly declin-
ing rate for investments in new businesses.)
369. For example, in the case of a tender offer, long-term sharehold-
ers would profit from the takeover bid, but arbitrageurs who began mak-
ing purchases in contemplation of the imminent offer would be taxed at
100% of their gain.
370. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 3, at 87.
371. Some commentators have suggested that the availability of such
derivative instruments increases market efficiency. Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve Bd. et al., A STUDY OF THE EFFECTS ON THE ECONO-
MY OF TRADING IN FUTURES AND OPTIbNS 207-209 (1984); W. Gary
Simpson & Timothy C. Ireland, The' Impact of Financial Futures on. the




and options, introduced in the early 1980s, have "contributed
significantly to shifting the markets' focus from long-term to
short-term strategies, " ' proposals likely to limit the prolifer-
ation and active trading of derivative instruments would be
welcome.873
2. Facilitating Relationship Banking
One obvious difference between corporate decisionmaking in
the United States and its competitors, Japan and Germany, is
the role of banks in corporate affairs" 7 As, noted above,
banks are actively involved as corporate monitors (directors),
equity holders and major creditors of German and Japanese
corporations. 7" Banks have considerable influence, particular-
ly in times of uncertainty or crisis, over corporate
decisionmaking; indeed, they have been able to prevent major
dislocations and enable ailing corporations to make relatively
painless recoveries from financial distress."7 At least in part
as a result of these intimate business relations, Japanese and
German corporations enjoy a significantly lower incidence of
bankruptcy and lower cost of capital than U.S. corpora-
tions. 77
372. Hazen, supra note 77, at 163, 166.
373. The proper regulatory response to the active market in derivative
investments is beyond the scope of this article. See id. For a suggestion
that regulators should abandon their current laissez-faire regulatory pos-
ture and "seriously consider limiting derivative investments and trading
strategies with a view towards restoring some stability in the financial
markets." See id. at 207.
374. It may seem anomalous to take the view that empowering insti-
tutional shareholders generally would be a "false start," see supra notes
314-31 and accompanying text, while facilitating bank involvement may
be a desirable reform. Several obvious differences are noteworthy. Banks,
as institutions that would be both creditors and owners under suggested
reforms, see infra notes 388-94 and accompanying text, would contribute
judgment that would balance the short-term, more risk-preferring per-
spective of shareholders, against the more long-term, cautious interests of
the firm's creditors. Thus, they would not necessarily exacerbate an al-
ready heavily share price-driven agenda that has distorted corporate
decisionmaking.
375. See supra notes 209-23 and accompanying text.
376. See supra notes 227-38 and accompanying text.
377. See supra notes 209-38 and accompanying text. This problem is
exacerbated by the modern U.S. banking practice of "securitizing" loans
into parts (securities) that can be traded to third parties. Although this
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By contrast, although in the early 20th century U.S. banks
played similar complex and central ownership-advisory-moni-
toring roles for their corporate customers, 7. they are effec-
tively prohibited from such multiple role-playing under present
U.S. law. ' These legal prohibitions, coupled with available
alternative sources of commercial credit (including foreign
banks), have resulted in what one commentator has referred to
as "the demise of relationship banking" in the United
States!3 °
Since the 1930s and the enactment of the Glass-Steagall Act,
the U.S. has followed a segregated model of financial regula-
tion: commercial banking is strictly separated from investment
banking."1 Following some variation of the "universal" bank-
process generates fees for the bank that originates and services the loan
and spreads the risk of failure, the borrower may lose out in the long
run. A securitized loan is far more difficult to restructure in times of
financial crisis. Indeed, under certain circumstances, a single
noncooperating participant may prevent successful restructuring. See
JACOBS, supra note 306, at 150-52.
378. It has been suggested that the old-fashioned "bank-dominated
form of capitalism" existing side by side with the "stock market form of
capitalism" might achieve the integration of long-term investment horizon
with flexibility and entrepreneurship. See Hale, supra note 225, at A10.
379. As has been noted, bank holding companies are permitted limited
ownership. See supra note 214 and accompanying text. In addition, bank
trust departments vote blocks of shares on behalf of their beneficiaries,
although trust holdings are also severely fragmented. See Roe, supra note
117, at 18.
380. JACOBS, supra note 326, at 143. Despite the dismal record of
U.S. banking institutions in recent years, the claim 'is that talented indi-
viduals who have increasingly preferred other, more dynamic careers
than are possible under the current regulatory scheme would be drawn
to banking once freed from stultifying and anticompetitive restrictions. Id.
at 145-146. Such individuals would soon acquire the professional skills
they now lack if given the same opportunity afforded to Japanese and
German bankers to exercise them creatively. Id. at 160. Cf. Michael
Klausner, An Economic Analysis of Bank Regulatory Reform: The Finan-
cial Institutions Safety and Consumer Choice Act of 1991, 69 WASH. U.
L.Q. 695, 736-37 (1991) (beneficial effects of expanding range of invest-
ments and services open to banks).
381. See Banking Act of 1933, §§ 16, 20, 21, 32, 12 U.S.C. §§ 24,'377,
378, 78 (1988). See generally John D. Hawke, Jr., The Glass-Steagall
Legacy: A Historical Perspective, 31 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 255 (1986) (set-
ting out the basic requirements and prohibitions of the Banking Act of
1933 and definining the principle issues that have arisen under the Act).
The complex regulation of precisely which securities activities banks and
their affiliates may or may not engage in will not be rehearsed here.
See, e.g., Klausner, supra note 380, at 700-03. It is interesting to note,
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ing model," 2 European banks, typically, impose no such re-
strictions on the provision of financial services. Although this
segregation of financial services in the U.S. was enacted in
reaction to the Great Depression and a nationwide flood of
bank failures, many commentators " argue that it now inter-
feres with the ability of U.S. institutions to compete in world
financial markets.8 '
Since banks can no longer own their customers' equity out-
right, they deal with corporations from a pure "creditor" per-
spective. Creditors do not share in their debtors' profits beyond
the contractual debt; they are therefore likely to prefer risk-
averse corporate investment strategies that do not threaten
their security interest. If these creditors also held their
customers' equity, that ownership interest might mitigate their
strong risk aversion. They would anticipate sharing the poten-
tial profits and become more tolerant of entrepreneurial (more
however, that banking institutions have sought (and won) regulatory
approval for an expanding universe of nonbanking activities, frequently
opposed by the Securities Industry Association. See Klausner, supra, at
742 & nn.145-49. However, legal restrictions constrain the banks' ability
to perform these services. Id. at 742-43 nn.150-56. It seems reasonable to
conclude that investors might be the winners were banks to compete
with securities firms in the provision of securities-related services.
382. Donald E. McNees, Global Financial Market Structure: Implica-
tions of Regulations For Competitiveness, ISSUES IN BANK REG., Fall 1990,
at 2, 4-5. These "all service" institutions may be divided into "universal"
banks (institutions that are granted all financial powers,* where broad
ownership of and by commercial enterprises is permitted) and
"omnipurpose" banks (institutions that are granted all financial powers,
where ownership of and by commercial enterprises is limited). Id. at 4.
Germany is the predominant example of a universal banking system. Id.
Japan follows the U.S. model of segregated financial services, although
Japanese banks are permitted to hold equity securities. Id. at 4-5. See
supra notes 214-19 and accompanying text.
383. For dissenting voices, see, e.g., Litan, supra note 225 (arguing
that if banks were allowed to engage directly in other financial non-bank-
ing activities, it "would stretch the federal safety net - deposit insur-
ance and access to the Fed's discount window - under not just banks
but much of the rest of the economy as well"). One solution to the depos-
it insurance problem might be the creation of specialized "insured deposit
banks." See infra notes 388-91 and accompanying text.
384. Indeed, such limitations severely restrict additional sources of
profit for these institutions, which therefore must maintain higher inter-
est rates, thereby contributing to our uncompetitively high cost of capital.




risk-accepting) strategies favored by optimistic owners.
While some urge adoption of a universal banking system in
this country,3" others fear this approach could result in cata-
strophic demands on the system of federal deposit insur-
ance. '" As banks begin to invest their capital in corporate
securities, they risk making poor choices that increase the
risks to their depositors' accounts, and therefore the risks to
the federal treasury."7
385. See, e.g., McNees, supra note 382, at 17-19. In a study under-
taken by the accounting firm KPMG Peat Marwick at the request of the
United States Congress Offic, of Technology Assessment, bankers world-
wide identified the U.S. banking regulatory system as the most expensive
in terms of overhead cost to the regulated institution and the most com-
plex and confusing. Id. at 14. As this article and others have observed,
see supra notes 186-91 and accompanying text, the cost of capital (includ-
ing the cost of debt), is significantly higher in the U.S. than in Germany
and Japan. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that our more byz-
antine regulatory system bears significantly on those costs.
The three classes of commercial banks (national banks, state mem-
ber banks of the Federal Reserve System, and state nonmember banks)
are subject to a bewildering network of regulators and regulations. Na-
tional banks are regulated by the Comptroller of the Currency and auto-
matically become members of the Federal Reserve System, subject to the
Federal Reserve Board. State banks are subject to state banking authori-
ties; additionally, state "member" banks choose to join the Federal Re-.
serve System and are therefore subject to the Federal Reserve Board. In
addition to state banking authorities, "nonmember" state banks are sub-
ject to Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). All bank holding
companies are subject to the Federal Reserve Board. See Klausner, supra
note 380, at 700 n.17. Contrast this with the regulation that applies to
auniversal" banking systems proposed for the European Economic Commu-
nity (EEC), i.e., where banks may engage in the securities business, own
equity and be owned by non-financial organizations. Such systems will
typically have a single regulator overseeing all non-insurance financial
institutions. See McNees, supra note 382, at 6.
386. See, e.g., Litan, supra note 225.
387. There is some controversy whether adoption of a universal bank-
ing model would increase the risks of bank failure. See McNees, supra
note 382, at 19. Indeed, some scholars now question the Depression era
analysis that led to the segregated regulatory system in the first place.
See Klausner, supra note 380, at 701-02 & sources cited in nn.25-26.
A legitimate danger exists that banks and other financial institu-
tions owning shares and serving on corporate boards of directors may be
able to engage in successful market manipulation. See Liquidity Versus
Control, supra note 83, at 1335 & n.224 (citing others who have already
warned of this danger). See also Steve Thel, The Genius of Section 16:
Regulating the Management of Publicly Held Companies, 42 HASTINGS
L.J. 391, 399 (1991) (suggesting that § 16 was intended primarily to
eliminate insiders' incentives to manipulate stock price by strategic corpo-
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Even though this pessimistic scenario is not inevitable, the
universal banking model seems likely to encounter political
opposition. Operating within the existing "holding company"
regulatory model would be a less controversial possibility. "
Congress could authorize uninsured bank affiliates, within a
bank holding company structure, to engage in the full range of
securities activities. 89 The danger of abusing federal deposit
insurance could thus be confined by separating out these secu-
rities operations and establishing federally insured and unin-
sured banks. Certain banks could serve as uninsured deposito-
ry institutions, free to invest in a full range of securities. Such
banks would pay their uninsured depositors a market-based
rate of return that adequately reflects their level of investment
risk. Federal deposit insurance could be limited to "insured
deposit banks"--narrow institutions that would accept all de-
posits, without limits, but pay a lower rate of interest that
reflects a lower risk factor."9 ' These insured deposit banks
would be permitted to invest only in government or high-grade
corporate securities."'9
rate decisionmaking). A related concern is the potential for abuse by the
banks (or indeed any other financial institutions) that serve on corporate
boards of directors and are privy to confidential information that is mate-
rial to the interests of other customers, etc. The possibilities include
conflicts between the bank and the corporation itself and conflicts be-
tween third parties that may be in business with the bank and the cor-
poration. See, e.g., Klaus J. Hopt, Self-Dealing and Use of Corporate
Opportunity and Information: Regulating Directors' Conflicts of Interest,
in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND DIRECTORS' LIABILITIES 285, 306 (Klaus
J. Hopt & Gunther Teubner eds., 1985). Such conflicts abound in other
contexts as well, and are addressed through federal (and state) prohibi-
tions against insider trading. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §
10(b); SEC Rule 10b-5; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 and state laws imposing
strict standards of loyalty and good faith on fiduciaries. The problem also
may be mitigated by delegation of board representation to professional di-
rectors. See Gilson & Kraakman, Outside Directors, supra note 10.
388. See Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a)
(1988).
389. See, e.g., S.696, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 203(a)(3)(C) (1991) (pro-
posing amendment to Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 which would
permit establishment of securities and insurance affiliates with full range
of securities activities); Klausner, supra note 380, at 745-46.
390. For a discussion of "narrow" banking, see generally ROBERT E.
LITAN, WHAT SHOULD BANKS Do? (1987); Kenneth E. Scott, Deposit In-
surance and Bank Regulation: The Policy Choices, 44 Bus. LAW. 907
(1989).
391. Investments in U.S. government or agency securities, AAA- or
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This system would extend to U.S. banking institutions the
necessary freedom to compete with other nonbanking or for-
eign banking institutions in the world marketplace for finan-
cial services. By segregating insured deposits in these special
banks, and insulating them (to a greater degree than is now
possible) from risk, this regime can preserve and even expand
deposit insurance for risk-averse depositors, while diminishing
the risk to the U.S. treasury of future bailouts.
Under such a regime, it might be possible to resurrect rela-
tionship banking. The relationship banking of the pre-Depres-
sion era operated to the advantage of corporations in several
ways. Corporations established lasting relationships with their
major creditor based on reciprocal advantage and shared infor-
mation. Banks not only owned shares of their customer corpo-
rations, they frequently held seats on their board of directors,
worked cooperatively with corporate debtors-in-trouble to con-
tain risk, minimize losses and restructure debt outside of the
formal bankruptcy process."
Removing banks from their active and constructive involve-
ment in corporate affairs left a monitoring void because man-
agers were freed from the watchful eyes of informed financial
professionals who combined creditor and ownership perspec-
tives. This void, in the eyes of some commentators, was filled
for a time (albeit with mixed results)93 by the market disci-
pline of the hostile takeover.94 As that disciplinary mecha-
AA-rated corporate bonds, and A1-Pl-rated commercial paper would be
the only permissible investments for such insured deposit banks. Absent
a national catastrophe, there should be minimal risk of failure and,
therefore, minimal drain on the federal deposit insurance funds. JACOBS,
supra note 326, at 235; see also James Tobin, Keep Deposit Insurance but
Protect Taxpayers, WALL ST. J., May 29, 1991, at A10.
392. See JACOBS, supra note 326, at 143; Kim, supra note 214. De-
spite its advantages, relationship banking has disappeared in the United
States, not simply because of the prohibitory bank regulations described
above. See supra notes 209-20 and accompanying text. U.S. banks also
risk exposure to substantial liability under a variety of doctrines that
may create lender liabilities, subordinate creditor-owner's claims, destroy
the priority in bankruptcy of bankers that also own equity, or create
conflicts of interest concerning disclosure of confidential information.
Thus, even if banks were suddenly authorized to own corporate equity
outright, such risks of liability would create their own powerful
disincentives. By contrast, Japanese and German banks face no compara-
ble exposure except for acts of fraud or manipulation. See JACOBS, supra
note 326, at 158-60.
393. See supra notes 300-03 and accompanying text.
394. See supra notes 296-313 and accompanying text.
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nism has faded from the scene, the need for effective monitor-
ing has grown. Restored multi-layered relationships between
bankers and corporate managers might partially fill that void.
Banker-owners who have forged lasting relationships with
corporate clients can inject useful creditor-owner perspectives
on risk and entrepreneurship into the mix of decisionmaking.
Moreover, by lowering financial risk, and therefore the cost of
capital, for corporations, such relationships may lower a criti-
cal barrier to desperately needed long-term capital investment
in U.S. industry.
3. Keying Executive Compensation to Corporate Perfor-
mance
95
In 1930, in the depths of the Depression, Babe Ruth was
informed that he was being paid more than President Hoo-
ver."' He is said to have replied, "Well, I had a better year
than he did." The "Babe" had an instinctive understanding of
compensation ex post as reward for past excellence, but com-
pensation can also be viewed ex ante, as incentive for future
performance. 97 As U.S. productivity falters, that traditional
view has increasingly come under fire. American chief execu-
tives are the best paid in the world-typically earning many
times more than their counterparts in Japan and Germany. 8'
395. This article is not attempting to catalog or discuss the intricacies
of the modem system of executive compensation. Rather, it attempts to
discuss in general terms the implications executive and directors' compen-
sation may have on short- and long-term corporate decision-making.
396. Ruth was paid $80,000; Hoover received only $75,000. See Crys-
tal, supra note 357, at 26.
397. This is a widely accepted traditional view of productivity. See,
e.g., THOMAS J. PETERS & ROBERT H. WATERMAN, JR., IN SEARCH OF
EXCELLENCE 43 (1982) (describing one tenet of the "old" business ratio-
nale as "[glet the incentives right and productivity will follow. If we give
people big, straightforward monetary incentives to do right and work
smart, the productivity problem will go away. Over-reward the top per-
formers.").
398. The numbers are startling: at the biggest U.S. corporations,
CEOs earn an average total of $3.2 million while their Japanese counter-
parts earn an average of $525,000. Robert Null & Joyce Bamathan, How
Much Japanese CEOs Really Make, Bus. WK., Jan. 27, 1991, at 31, 31.
Other commentators place the figures somewhat lower, though stark con-
trasts remain. See Crystal, supra note 357, at 204-07 (reporting that the
typical U.S. CEO earns approximately $2.8 million in salary and bonus
while the typical Japanese CEO earns approximately $310,000 in cash
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If our system of incentives were working properly, executive
pay would correspond to corporate performance. Unfortunately,
disappointing corporate performance is rarely reflected in an-
nual executive compensation;'" indeed, executive compensa-
tion may be becoming less rather than more sensitive to fluctu-
ations in corporate performance.' °
The precise nature of the problem is disputed. In a recent
book, In Search of Excess, Professor Graef Crystal claims that
levels of executive compensation are simply excessive.'' Pro-
fessors Jensen and Murphy disagree, contending that the real
problem is not how much chief executive officers (CEOs) are
paid but how they are paid.' An effective system for com-
pensation would rationally combine the carrot with the stick:
substantial predictable rewards for outstanding performance
and substantial predictable penalties or dismissal"° for fail-
compensation and the typical German CEO earns approximately $735,000
in salary and bonus).
399. But see Kodak Chief Takes Pay Cut, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1992,
at D2 (chief executive officer of Eastman Kodak Company took 19% pay
cut in 1991 because of company's poor performance).
400. See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives-It's
Not How Much You Pay, But How, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1990, at
138-53.
401. In Professor Crystal's view, "U.S. senior executives are paid so
far in excess of U.S. workers as to raise fundamental questions of equity,
and even decency." Crystal, supra note 357, at 241. While the wages of
the average American worker declined over the last 20 years by 13%, the
pay of a typical CEO of a major corporation more than tripled. Id. at 27.
An even more telling statistic is the change in the average pay multiple:
in 1974 a typical CEO earned approximately 35 times the pay of an
average manufacturing worker; today the multiple is closer to 120 times
the pay of an average manufacturing worker. Id.
402. See Jensen & Murphy, supra note 400, at 138. Jensen and Mur-
phy conclude that top executives "are not receiving record salaries and
bonuses." Id. Indeed, they claim that pay levels are only now beginning
to equal those of 50 years ago. Id. at 139. The average pay level of
CEOs of NYSE-listed companies in 1938 was $882,000 in 1988 dollars.
Between 1982 and 1988, the average salary and bonus for CEOs of com-
parable companies was $843,000. Id.
403. While conceding that some executives are overpaid,, Professor
Gary Becker asserts that the real problem with corporate competitiveness
is the difficulty in ousting incompetent executives from their positions.
See Gary S. Becker, The Problem Is Not What CEOs Get-It's Getting
Them to Go, Bus. WK., Mar. 2, 1992, at 18. Given the degree of control
CEOs exercise over even independent directors, see supra note 340 and
accompanying text, they are effectively protected from removal for poor
performance except through hostile takeovers, which frequently trigger
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ure. Moreover, any payment system should be sufficiently
sensitive to corporate performance to make a lasting impres-
sion, whether favorable or unfavorable, upon the person being
compensated.
According to Professors Jensen and Murphy, typical cash
compensation systems are too insensitive to corporate perfor-
mance since for every $1,000 change in shareholder wealth the
median CEO experiences only a $2.59 change in personal
wealth. Thus, a $10,000,000 market loss for the corporation
translates into a typical personal loss of $25,900. This is "not
much of a disincentive for someone who earns on average
$20,000 per week." °' Professors Jensen and Murphy advocate
greater alignment of CEO interests with shareholder interests
by making CEOs into substantial shareholders. If CEOs owned
signficant percentages of their corporation's shares,'" they
would experience a more intense "feedback effect" from fluctua-
tions in share price.'" This, in turn, would create more effec-
tive incentives to aggressively avoid waste and pursue profit-
able strategies.
Although CEOs frequently receive stock options, this compo-
nent of deferred compensation does not necessarily align CEOs'
interests with shareholders. For example, although both CEO
option-holders and shareholders benefit from rising prices,
CEOs alone avoid loss when prices begin dropping (by not
exercising the option). In fact, most corporations will rewrite
their CEO's option grant at a lower strike price if share price
has declined. Thus, CEOs can only benefit from stock options,
never lose."7 Moreover, since CEOs' gains from stock options
are geared entirely to share price, CEOs may be drawn toward
short-term business strategies directed at inflating share price
for a specific period; such manipulative strategies may not be
sustainable over the long-term, leaving the corporation unable
to compete in the years ahead.' °
costly golden parachutes. Fixed-term (three to five year) renewable con-
tracts would institutionalize periodic performance reviews and facilitate
efficient removal of those who perform poorly. See Becker, supra.
404. Jensen & Murphy, supra note 400, at 140.
405. However,, it is virtually impossible for CEOs in the "truly giant"
corporations like GM or IBM to own sufficiently large percentages of
.shares. Id. at 141. Indeed, Jensen and Murphy consider that fact to be a
"real cost associated with bigness." Id.
406. Id.
407. See Crystal, supra note 357, at 175-85.
408. For example, the CEO of General Dynamics Corp. was promised
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As noted above, the issue of executive compensation is tradi-
tionally a matter of state law, committed to board control and
subject to the limits of business judgment doctrine, and per-
haps, in egregious cases, the doctrine of waste."°
Professor Crystal has proposed certain other changes, not
involving government intervention, that he believes can effect
reform of the executive compensation system. In particular, he
recommends bolstering the effectiveness of the executive com-
pensation committee410 by requiring it to hire an independent
compensation consultant free of any ties to the corporation or
its CEO.' This consultant would attend all compensation
committee meetings, review existing compensation plans and
prepare at least annual written reports for the committee and
full board concerning all existing and proposed plans, particu-
larly that of the CEO. Presumably, such a consultant would
have more independence from the CEO than her traditional
counterpart. 2
In addition to these steps, a fundamental restructuring of
twice his annual salary of $800,000 as a bonus if the corporation's aver-
age stock price remained above $45.56 for 10 consecutive trading days.
The CEO told market analysts that corporate earnings were above expec-
tations and that management intended to return "excess cash" to share-
holders. Share price rose to $46 and after 10 days, the CEO earned a
$1.6 million bonus. See Robert J. McCartney, A Most Unusual Executive
Bonus Plan, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1991, at Al.
409. See supra notes 362-64 and accompanying text; Rogers v. Hill,
289 U.S. 582 (1933).
410. See supra note 360 and accompanying text. The committee needs
all the bolstering it can get, since even the outside directors that com-
prise the committee are vulnerable to the CEO's influence. Therefore,
Professor Crystal suggests a formalistic decisionmaking structure involv-
ing "comparator" groups of industries against which to measure executive
and director levels of compensation. See Crystal, supra note 357, at 244-
45.
411. See Crystal, supra note 357, at 242-43. CEOs frequently employ
their own corporate compensation consultants, but, not surprisingly, 'they
may be eager to please and unlikely to bite the hand that pays them.
Id. at 242. Of course, it seems reasonable to inquire how long a
committee's consultant will remain on the payroll if the recommendations
frustrate the CEO's expectations.
412. As an added protection, once a compensation committee has hired
its consultant, the consultant's hame should be required to be disclosed
to shareholders in the corporate proxy statement. Moreover, given the
potential for conflict with the CEO over compensation, the consultant
should enjoy the limited protection afforded to outside auditors under the
proxy rules: if the consultant has been dismissed, the corporation should
have to say so and explain why. Id. at 244.
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executive compensation is needed so that the incentives of the
managers are better aligned with the long-term profitability of
the firm. This is not the place for a detailed proposal, but the
essential features of the needed restructuring seem evident.
First, the incentive component must be a large enough share of
the overall compensation package to provide a meaningful
carrot for spurring improved performance. Second, the valua-
tion of the incentive component cannot be subject to executive
manipulation. Third, the incentive should work in both direc-
tions; the executive should face both the prospect of an upside
gain and a downside loss. Finally, the incentive should provide
for a substantial holding period before any gain can be realized
in order to ensure a long-term horizon. Federal tax laws might
be utilized to motivate firms to adopt such incentive programs
for key executives."'
4. Facilitating Employee Voice
The example of German codetermination suggests that giv-
413. Consider, for example, Professor Crystal's proposal to have the
government offer long-term capital gains treatment to stock options that
meet certain requirements so that they "[promote] the desired long-term
behavior." Crystal, supra note 357, at 248. First, the initial strike price
of the option would be established by averaging the share price during
the preceding two years to prevent executives from taking advantage of
inside information by manipulating the date of the granting of the op-
tion. Second, the initial strike price would be increased to include a min-
imum shareholder return, possibly keyed to government bonds carrying a'
10-year maturity. This would ensure that the executive receives no bene-
fit unless market price at the time of exercise exceeds the minimum
return. Third, the final strike piice would be lowered whenever dividends
were declared during the ten-year period following the grant so as to
encourage distribution of dividends. Fourth, the executive could not exer-
cise until the end of ten years after the grant; this would prevent cash-
ing in simply to take advantage of a momentary rise in share price.
Finally, the payoff would not involve the exercise of a stock option at all.
The executive would receive a payment (or no payment at all) at the end
of the tenth year. The payment would be made only if the "adjusted final
market price per share,' determined by the average stock price over the
two years preceding the end of the tenth year, exceeded the strike price
per share, as adjusted to reflect the minimum shareholder return. Id. at
248-50. Professor Crystal anticipates no net loss to tax revenue because,
to compensate for the favorable long-term capital gains treatment of the
incentive payout, taxes would be increased on any compensation received




ing employees an enhanced voice in the decisionmaking pro-
cess of the firm 1' also could serve as another useful counter-
weight to managerial discretion. Employees, too, have an inter-
est in the long-term success of the enterprise. Moreover, partic-
ipation may be a key to enhanced productivity and receptivity
to performance-based compensation.'15 However, employees
may also suffer from truncated time horizons which may be at
variance with the firm's profitability.'6 The presence of un-
ions further complicates matters, given the adversarial nature
of U.S. labor relations. The German model appears to work in
part because of the different labor relations climate in that
country and the fact that employee representation is offset by
the very significant role. banks play in corporate governance.
The merits of formal inclusion of employee representatives
on the board of directors is beyond the scope of this article. A
less controversial step would be to remove the obstacles that
our labor laws presently erect to greater employee involvement
in the decisionmaking processes of the firm."7
414. The German system operates both at the board level, where
employees sit on the supervisory board, and at the operational level of
works councils. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. Either or
both forms of labor participation might be considered for implementation
here.
415. See, eg., David I. Levine & Laura D'Andrea Tyson, Participation,
Productivity, and the Firm's Environment, in PAYING FOR PRODUCTIVITY
183-244 (Alan S. Blinder ed., 1990).
416. This is the reason why Professors Jensen and Meckling question
the efficiency of employee ownership and/or management arrangements.
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Rights and Production
Functions: An Application to Labor-managed Firms and Codetermination,
52 J. BUS. 469, 481-84 (1979).
417. Useful first steps include repeal of the prohibition of employee
representation plans in the non-union sector, see NLRB v. Cabot Carbon
Co. 360 U.S. 203 (1958), and repeal of the exclusion of "managerial em-
ployees" from union representation, see NLRB v. Yeshiva U., 444 U.S.
672 (1980). Professor Weiler also advocates mandatory establishment of
"employee participation committees" in every company. See Weiler, supra
note 280, at 44. The question of union directors on the board is consid-
ered in, for example, Helen S. Scott, Union Directors and Fiduciary Du-
ties Under State Corporate Law, in LABOR LAW AND BUSINESS CHANGE
115 (Samuel Estreicher & Daniel G. Collins eds., 1988); Robert A.
McCormick, Union Representatives as Corporate Directors, The Challenge





We rely on corporations for the production of social wealth,
and the American firm is falling down on the job. Many factors
no doubt contribute to the declining competitiveness of our
economy. This article has suggested that short-term
decisionmaking by managers and shareholders may enrich
some individuals today, but at great cost to the economy. Cor-
porate managers must be encouraged to refocus their vision in
a system of laws that rewards investment for the future, be-
cause, as John Maynard Keynes has written, "there is no such
thing as liquidity of investment for the community as a
whole.""
418. JOHN M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTER-
EST AND MONEY 155 (1936).
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